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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation extends a growing literature on banking and finance by investigating bank 
corporate governance, internationalization, and bailouts. The first essay conducts the first 
assessment of shareholder activism in banking and its effects on risk and performance. 
Activism can create value and be an effective monitoring mechanism for banks, but it may 
also be a destabilizing mechanism, as maximizing shareholder value may cause financial 
instability. We focus on the conflicts among bank shareholders, managers, and creditors 
(e.g., regulators, deposit insurers, taxpayers, depositors). We find activism may generally 
be a destabilizing force, increasing bank risk-taking, but creating market value for 
shareholders, and leaving operating returns unchanged. This is consistent with the 
empirical dominance of the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict, which predicts that activist 
shareholders may induce managers to take higher risk to increase returns at the expense of 
creditors, given creditors’ difficulty in monitoring and regulatory-induced incentives.  
However, during financial crises, the increase in risk vanishes, suggesting activism may 
not be a major cause of risk during such times. From a public perspective, creditors 
(including the government) may lose during normal times, but not during crises. 
In the second essay (co-authored with Allen N. Berger, Sadok El Ghoul, and 
Omrane Guedhami), we document a positive relation between internationalization and 
bank risk. This is consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis – 
whereby internationalization increases banks’ risk due to market-specific factors in foreign
 vii 
 
markets – over the diversification hypothesis – whereby internationalization allows banks 
to reduce risk through diversification of their operations. The results continue to hold 
following a variety of robustness tests, including endogeneity and sample selection bias. 
We also find that the magnitude of this effect is more pronounced during financial crises. 
The results appear to be at least partially explained by agency problems related to poor 
corporate governance. These findings suggest that authorities might consider 
internationalization as an additional factor in bank supervision and regulation. 
In the third essay (co-authored with Allen N. Berger), we investigate whether the 
U.S. government bailout of banks during the recent financial crisis, the Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (TARP), gave recipients competitive advantages. Using a difference-in-
difference (DID) approach, we find that: 1) TARP recipients received competitive 
advantages and increased both their market shares and market power; 2) results may be 
driven primarily by the safety channel – TARP banks may be perceived as safer, which is 
partially offset by the cost disadvantage channel – TARP funds may be relatively 
expensive; and 3) these competitive advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP 
banks that repaid early. The results of this paper may help explain other findings in the 
literature on TARP and yield important policy implications. The costs of the competitive 
distortions of bailouts should be weighed against the costs and benefits in terms of lending, 
risk taking, financial stability, and the overall effects on the economy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation proposal investigates corporate governance, internationalization, and 
government bailouts in banking. The robust findings of three essays add to the banking and 
corporate finance literatures. 
The first essay in Chapter 2 is the first empirical study to test shareholder activism 
as a channel of external corporate governance in banking, complementing internal 
governance, regulators, and other external governance structures. We use a unique hand-
collected dataset on shareholder activism (SEC Filings: 13D and DFAN14A) for all listed 
commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US over the period 1994-
2010, we explore several the following research questions: 1) is there a role for shareholder 
activism for banking?, and if so, 2) what do activists do to change the focus of the targeted 
banks, and 3) are they a stabilizing or destabilizing force?. We focus on three conflicts 
arising among bank stakeholders: Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1 (managers take less 
risk than desired by shareholders due to risk aversion), Shareholder-Manager Conflict 2 
(managers take more risk than desired by shareholders due to overconfidence and/or 
hubris), and Shareholder-Creditor Conflict (activists induce managers to take higher risk 
to increase returns at the expense of bank creditors (deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators, 
etc.), given creditors’ difficulty in monitoring and regulatory-induced incentives.
 2 
 
We find that activism is important in banking: about one third of our banks have 
some form of activism during the sample period and activists appear to target banks with 
agency problems and growth potential that are easy in which to implement changes to 
increase value. We find that shareholder activism creates value for shareholders but has 
little impact on operating returns and increases bank default risk, consistent with the 
empirical dominance of Hypothesis 3, the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. This suggests 
that activism may be generally a destabilizing force. However, we find that activism differs 
significantly during financial crises, resulting in higher market value and no increase in 
risk, suggesting that the shareholder activism may not represent a significant source of risk 
during crises. From a public standpoint, government loses during normal times, but not 
during financial crises. 
The paper contributes primarily to two strands of research. First, it contributes to 
the broader literature on shareholder activism by examining activism within one important 
industry rather than across a number of very different industries, which reduces the concern 
about confounding inter-industry differences. Although researchers point to the 
shareholder return benefits resulting from activism, our results suggest that other additional 
effects of activism, such the increase in risk, should not be neglected. Second, this paper 
also adds to the literature on bank risk and performance by introducing shareholder 
activism as a factor influencing risk and performance and sets the groundwork for further 
research on shareholder activism in banking. The current topic is important especially from 
a government policy perspective because poor governance may aggravate financial system 
fragility to shocks and pose systemic risk to the real economy (Laeven and Levine (2009), 
Kirkpatrick (2009), G30 Steering Committee on Corporate Governance (2011), Song and 
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Li (2012)) and is regarded as a possible important contributing factor to the recent financial 
crisis. In addition, shareholder activism may be regarded with skepticism. Our findings 
suggest that activists in banking may increase risk and market value at the expense of 
creditors and may be a threat to financial stability. These results may have important 
implications for the government policies targeting bank governance and regulation of 
activism regarding banks. 
The second essay, in Chapter 3, offers the first assessment of the role of 
internationalization in bank risk using US bank data. We find strong, robust evidence that 
the more internationalized the bank, the higher the risk. We use a number of different 
measures of internationalization and risk, employ various econometric procedures to 
control for potential endogeneity and sample selection biases, and consider different 
subsamples of the data. The data persistently suggest that internationalization is associated 
with higher bank risk, consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk 
hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. This effect seems to be more pronounced 
during financial crises, particularly market crises. 
Our finding that internationalization is associated with higher risk raises the 
question of why banks internationalize. One potential explanation is higher returns, but our 
results seem to contradict this explanation, given that we find lower mean profitability for 
internationalized banks. Second, banks may become international as part of a defensive 
strategy to follow their important customers abroad by setting up offices in countries where 
their home country customers have foreign affiliates to avoid losing their clients’ business 
(e.g., Brimmer and Dahl, 1975; Goldberg and Saunders, 1981; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; 
Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). This strategy might not translate into large enough financial 
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benefits to offset the costs of internationalization. A third potential explanation is empire 
building by bank managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, Roll, 1986, 
Stulz, 1990). Managers that grow the bank through international activities may gain higher 
salaries and/or more prestige than domestic bank managers. This may occur if there are 
significant agency problems in banking, particularly if these agency problems are 
intensified by international diversification (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007).  We put this 
last explanation to test and we find that the positive relation between internationalization 
and bank risk is consistently stronger for banks that more likely to have severe agency 
problems, supporting the empire-building explanation.  
This paper contributes primarily to two related strands of research. First, it adds to 
the literature on bank risk by introducing internationalization as a factor influencing risk 
and sets the groundwork for further research on bank internationalization. Although some 
policymakers, practitioners, and researchers point to the benefits of geographical risk 
diversification resulting from the internationalization of banks, our results suggest that this 
effect is dominated by other factors. Specifically, our results suggest that the additional 
local market risks taken on following international expansion outweigh the benefits of 
diversification. Second, this paper contributes to the broader internationalization literature 
by examining risk within one important industry rather than across a number of very 
different industries with their confounding differences. After controlling for endogeneity 
and other possible explanations for our results, we continue to find that bank 
internationalization is associated with a higher risk in an industry in which risk is highly 
monitored by bank supervisors as well as shareholders and debt holders. These findings 
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suggest that authorities might consider internationalization as an additional factor in bank 
supervision and regulation. 
The third essay, in Chapter 4, conducts an empirical assessment of the TARP 
injections on bank competition and investigates whether TARP may have given its 
recipients competitive advantages. Our difference-in-difference (DID) regression analysis 
yields several important results: 1) TARP recipients did get competitive advantages and 
increased both their market share and market power relative to non-TARP recipients, 
consistent with the empirical dominance of Hypothesis H1a over Hypothesis H1b and 
Hypothesis H2a over Hypothesis H2b. 2) Results point to the likelihood that the positive 
market share and market power findings may be driven primarily by the safety channel 
(TARP banks may be perceived as safer), which is partially offset by the cost disadvantage 
channel (TARP funds may be relatively expensive). Thus, the safety channel and the cost 
disadvantage channel are the most important to explain the results. 3). The competitive 
advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP recipients that repaid early, suggesting 
that these banks significantly reduced the importance of the cost disadvantage channel and 
increased the importance of the safety channel, consistent with Hypothesis H3. 
Overall, our results suggest that TARP may have resulted in a possible distortion 
in competition, which may have misallocated resources, and may help explain other 
findings in the literature on the effects of TARP on bank risk and bank lending. First, our 
findings may help explain the results in the literature that TARP increased risk for the large 
banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming; Duchin and Sosyura, forthcoming) and 
decreased risk for the small banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming). As discussed 
above, results in the literature suggest that a nonmonotonic effect of market power on risk 
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may have been in effect during the crisis period – higher market power may be associated 
with higher risk for banks at high levels of market power, while higher market power may 
be associated with lower risk at low levels of market power (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 
2010; Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2013). Given that large (small) banks typically have 
higher (lower) levels of market power, TARP may have led to an increase (decrease) in 
risk for large (small) banks. 
Our results also may help explain the findings in the literature that TARP resulted 
in reduced or no change in lending by large banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming; 
Duchin and Sosyura, forthcoming) and increased lending by small banks (Black and 
Hazelwood, forthcoming; Li, forthcoming). According to the standard structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis, an increase in market power should lead to a reduced supply of 
credit. However, for relationship borrowers, the supply of credit may be increased by larger 
market share and larger market power because limits on competition help banks force 
implicit contracts with relationship borrowers that result in greater credit availability (e.g., 
Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). This may help explain the increase in lending by 
small banks which tend to specialize in relationship lending, and the decrease or no change 
in lending by the large banks, which more often engage in transactional lending (Berger, 
Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005). 
In terms of policy implications, determination about which banks to be bailed out 
should rely on a comprehensive analysis of both benefits and costs. Some but not all of 
these costs and benefits, competition, risk taking, and lending, may be evaluated based on 
our results and those in the literature.  Based on the findings for these three effects, any 
bailouts may be focused primarily on the small banks, where the effects seem to be less 
 7 
 
distortionary and more toward the public interest, since the increase in market share and 
market power is the least, risk may be decreased, and lending may be increased. However, 
in regards to the other major benefit of bailouts, increasing the stability of the financial 
system, presumably the benefits would be greater for the large banks. However, also the 
distortions in competition may be greater, and risk taking and lending implications may be 
less favorable. Therefore, policymakers should balance all these different effects. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the core findings of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and discusses the 
implications of these results to policy makers and regulators.  
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CHAPTER 2  
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN BANKING1,2  
"Action to improve corporate governance at many financial institutions is seen by us as a matter of urgency”.  
Roger Ferguson, Chairman of the G30 Steering Committee on Corporate Governance, February 2011 
 
“Weak and ineffective corporate governance of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) was an 
important contributory factor in the massive failure of financial-sector decision-making that led to the global 
financial crisis”. 
Jean-Claude Trichet, G30 Steering Committee on Corporate Governance, February 2011 
 
“When Wall Street learned that predator Michael Price, president of Heine Securities Corp., had bought 6.1% 
of Chase Manhattan Corp., the sign underscored that even the biggest banks are vulnerable….his efforts to 
shake up management at New York's venerable Chase Manhattan Corp. make many bank managers nervous. 
That's especially true after his toppling of Michigan National Corp.” 
Daniel Kaplan, The American Banker, 1995 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis raised serious concerns regarding banks’ corporate governance
                                                 
1 Raluca A. Roman. To be submitted to Journal of Financial Economics. 
  
2 I am deeply grateful to my dissertation committee and the Ph.D. Coordinators: Allen Berger (chair), Jean 
Helwege, Eric Powers, Timothy Koch, Omrane Guedhami, and Tanakorn Makaew for valuable guidance and 
support. I also thank Chris Anderson, Kin Blackburn, Alexander Borisov, Nicole Boyson, Florentin Butaru, 
Michael Carhill, Yongqiang Chu, Sean Cleary, Kim Dasol, Bob DeYoung, Marco Gallo, Zhaozhao He, 
Jonathan Jones, Dasol Kim, Paul Koch, Yaron Leitner, David Malmquist, Steve Mann, Martin Melecky, 
Chuck Morris, Greg Nini, Mikhail Oet, Michael Pagano, Ajay Palvia, Ning Pu, Chris Rauch, Douglas 
Robertson, Hector Perez Saiz, Gheorghe Salahura, John Sedunov, Partha Sengupta, Rajdeep Sengupta, Yan 
Shu, Amine Tarazi, Gökhan Torna, Sergey Tsyplakov, Liying Wang, Jide Wintoki, Peter Wong, Xinlei Zhao, 
Donghang Zhang, Eddie Zhao, Marc Van Essen, Tina Yang, and participants at the presentations at the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Northern Finance Association Conference, Financial 
Management Association, International Finance and Banking Society Conference, Eastern Finance 
Association, Southern Finance Association, Southwestern Finance Association, University of South 
Carolina, University of Kansas, University of Texas – El Paso, University of Hawaii – Manoa, Villanova 
University, Babson College, Seton Hall University, North Dakota State University, Boise State University, 
University of Houston – Downtown, Pace University seminars for helpful comments and suggestions. I also 
thank Allen Berger, Lamont Black, Christa Bouwman, and Jennifer Dlugosz for data on Discount Window 
and Term Auction Facility programs, Chris Rauch for some data help on hedge funds, and Lucian David and 
Constantin Roman for excellent research assistance help. I am responsible for all errors in this paper.  
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and their ability to manage such a crisis successfully. A larger question is whether good 
governance in banking could have mitigated or avoided the recent financial crisis. Several 
papers agree that poor governance was a significant contributing factor to the crisis (e.g., 
Diamond and Rajan (2009), Kirkpatrick (2009), Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2014), 
Cheffin (2014)), while others find the opposite (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012)). There has been also discussion that financial crisis was not 
caused by “greedy” bank managers, but by the pressure from shareholders to maximize the 
put option value they enjoy from explicit and implicit government insurance (e.g., Armour 
and Gordon (2014)). Banking research indicates that corporate governance impacts bank 
risk and performance (e.g., Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007), Adams and Mehran (2005), 
Laeven and Levine (2009)), however there is no evidence on the specific mechanism of 
shareholder activism.  
Is shareholder activism beneficial for bank shareholders, creditors, and the public? 
Literature on nonfinancials shows that shareholder activism may be able to create value 
and be an effective monitoring mechanism (e.g., Clifford (2007), Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and 
Partnoy (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Klein and Zur (2009), Boyson and 
Mooradian (2012), Bebchuck, Brav, and Jiang (2013)). However, it may also be a 
destabilizing mechanism, as it may maximize shareholder value in the short-run, but it may 
increase risk-taking (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), Bebchuck, Brav, and 
Jiang (2013)). There is one place where the goal of maximizing shareholder value should 
not be taken for granted as it may not be socially optimal: the banking industry. Here, a 
single firm’s maximization may spill negative externality to the financial system. 
Therefore, it would be important for researchers and policy makers to understand whether 
 10 
 
shareholder activism could be destabilizing, even when what activists advocate may be 
individually maximizing from the shareholders’ perspective. To our knowledge, there are 
no studies which focus on assessing how shareholder activism affects banks. This omission 
from the literature may be potentially serious from a policy perspective due to the 
importance of banks for the overall financial stability and real economy.  
This paper contributes to the banking literature on bank risk and performance by 
introducing shareholder activism as a factor influencing risk and performance, and sets the 
groundwork for further research. It also adds to the broader literature on shareholder 
activism by examining activism within one important industry rather than across a number 
of very different industries, reducing the concern about confounding inter-industry 
differences. Our findings suggest that activism in banking may increase risk and market 
value at the expense of creditors and may be a threat to financial stability during normal 
times. However activists do not seem to increase risk during financial crises. From a public 
perspective, creditors (including the government) may lose during normal times, but not 
during financial crises. We also add to the debate in the literature on the role of bank 
governance around financial crises and show that at least one corporate governance 
mechanism, shareholder activism, may not have been a major source of risk during the 
financial crisis.3 
Understanding the role of shareholder activism in banking is important because 
there are several critical peculiarities of banks, which make them different from non-
financials and can impact their corporate governance and the economy at large. First, bank 
                                                 
3 This is consistent with Beltratti and Stultz (2010), which document that poor bank governance (e.g., lower 
shareholder friendliness of the board) was not a major cause for the financial instability during the recent 
crisis. 
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stability is relatively important to society as a whole as bank failure and distress can have 
major impacts on the economy and growth.4 Second, banks are more fragile, vulnerable to 
instability than other firms or sectors as they tend to be the most highly levered firms and 
subject to runs on their short-term liabilities. Third, banks are inherently opaque as they 
are in the business of gathering proprietary information about their customers.5 Banks’ 
opacity can make information asymmetries between management and other stakeholders 
arguably more severe in banking (e.g., Furfine (2001), Morgan (2002), Levine (2004)). 
Thus, on the one hand, it may be more difficult for regular shareholders to monitor and 
reduce agency problems. But, on the other hand, it may be a bigger role and need for activist 
shareholders to act as delegated monitors to cut through this opacity. Finally, regulation 
makes banks different from other industries as explicit and implicit insurance may induce 
more risk-taking (e.g., Laeven and Levine (2009), Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff 
(2013). Prudential supervision and regulation, such as capital requirements, are designed 
in part to offset this moral hazard incentive. At the same time, heavy regulation may make 
it more costly for activist investors to reduce agency problems in banks and harder to derive 
benefits from it (e.g., Levine (2004), Laeven and Levine (2009)).6  While some other 
industries, such as utilities, are also regulated, banking stands out in that the regulation is 
                                                 
4 The recent financial crisis involved a significant decline in bank lending, resulting in the most serious 
recession since the Great Depression. 
 
5 There are several reasons why banks are particularly opaque: loan quality is not observable and can be 
hidden for long periods; banks can alter the risk composition of their assets more quickly than nonfinancials, 
banks can readily hide problems by extending loans to clients that cannot service debt obligations, bond 
analysts disagree more often over bonds issued by banks than those issued by nonfinancials (e.g., Furfine 
(2001), Morgan (2002)). 
 
6 For example, there are restrictions on who can own bank shares and regulators can limit the capability of 
outsiders to buy a significant percent of bank shares without regulatory approval (Barth, Caprio and Levine 
(2006)). It is a rule that nonfinancials cannot buy banks. Also, (Prowse (1995, 1997), and Adams and Mehran 
(2003) show that, despite active consolidation, there have been very few hostile takeover bids in the banking 
industry. 
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primarily prudential, to reduce risk taking, rather than setting prices.  The capital 
requirements in particular may affect corporate governance by changing the conflicts 
among the parties via changing the leverage of the firm. 
This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to test shareholder activism7 as a channel 
of external corporate governance in banking, and its effects on performance and risk-taking 
during both normal times and financial crises. We focus on the conflicts between 
shareholders and managers and those between shareholders and creditors (which, in 
banking, are more loosely defined to mean all the other financial claimants other than 
shareholders, such as: deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators, depositors, etc.). Using a 
hand-collected dataset on shareholder activism (SEC Filings: 13D and DFAN14A) for all 
public banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US (1994 to 2010), we analyze 
whether there is a role for shareholder activism in banking, what do activists do to change 
the focus of the bank, and whether activist investors are a stabilizing or destabilizing force 
in banking. 
 To analyze activism in banking, we consider three conflicts that may arise among 
different bank stakeholders, and which may be addressed by activism. The first conflict is 
the Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1 caused by the risk aversion of managers. This 
suggests that managers take less risk than desired by shareholders, and activists can reduce 
agency problems between managers and shareholders and increase returns by inducing 
managers to take value-enhancing risk. The second conflict is the Shareholder-Manager 
                                                 
7 Tirole (2006, p.27) defines shareholder activism as “interfering with management in order to increase the 
value of the investors’ claims. Gantchev (2013) defines activism as an active monitoring process which often 
can take the form of a sequence of the announcement of activist intentions and escalating decision steps of 
the activist to bring about change within the company such as demand negotiations, board representation, 
and (threatened) proxy fight. 
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Conflict 2 caused by overconfidence and/or hubris of managers. This suggests that 
managers may take more risk than desired by shareholders, and activists can curtail agency 
problems between the two parties and improve performance by correcting the overly-risky 
investments by managers. The third conflict is the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict caused 
by a moral hazard problem induced by creditors’ difficulties in monitoring banks and 
regulatory-induced incentives. This suggests that activists may induce managers to take 
higher risk to increase market value at the expense of bank creditors (deposit insurers, 
taxpayers, regulators, etc.). This may suggest undesired consequences for bank health and 
stability.  
 The three conflicts among bank stakeholders are used to develop and test our 
competing hypotheses. Importantly, each of the three hypotheses may hold simultaneously 
for different sets of banks at a given time. All that we can do as researchers is to evaluate 
which of these hypotheses has stronger empirical support, i.e., which hypothesis 
empirically dominates the other. To address this question, we test empirically the impact 
of activism on bank behavior. To run the tests, we use OLS regressions with bank and time 
fixed effects and regress measures of market value, operating returns, and default risk on a 
dummy for shareholder activism and a set of bank characteristics (including primary 
regulator dummies to account for regulatory influence), following prior research on bank 
governance (Beltratti and Stutz (2012)) and shareholder activism (e.g., Brav, Jiang, 
Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Muller-Kahle (2010)). We lag all independent variables four 
quarters to reduce concerns of endogeneity and to give time for activists to have effects.  
We have a number of key findings. First, we find that activism is important in 
banking: about one-third of the banks (337 unique banks) have some form of activism 
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during the sample period (1994-2010), and about 8.5% of banks have activism during each 
year. In total, there are 1,204 activist events, with a surge in activism during financial crises, 
such as during 2000-2002 and 2007-2009. Also, activists appear to target banks with more 
agency problems and growth potential, and where it is easier to implement changes to 
increase value. Our regression results are consistent with the empirical dominance of the 
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. Activism creates market value gains for shareholders, 
leaves unchanged operating returns, and increases bank default risk. This suggests that 
activist shareholders may generally be a destabilizing force, inducing managers to increase 
risk in order to increase shareholder returns at the expense of creditors. However, we find 
that results are significantly altered during financial crises: the market value increase is 
greatest during financial crises and risk does not increase. This suggests that activism was 
not a major source of risk during the crises. From a public perspective, creditors, including 
the government, may lose during normal times, but not during financial crises. 
We perform a variety of robustness checks. First, we check the sensitivity of our 
results to alternative proxies of performance, risk-taking, and activism measures. Second, 
we employ alternative econometric approaches and standard errors: an event study 
employing cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), several other model and error 
specifications such as fixed effects, random effects, two-way clusters, Newey-West errors, 
and a model using macro variables instead of time fixed effects. Third, to address the 
potential endogeneity concerns and sample selection bias, we employ an instrumental 
variable analysis, a matched sample analysis using propensity score probabilities, a 
Heckman selection model, and an analysis including also Lexis-Nexis news events. The 
results are robust to all these checks. Fourth, we conduct subsample analyses based on: 
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hedge funds (HF) versus non-hedge funds, regular activism versus proxy fights, excluding 
too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, and different bank sizes. Among these results, we find higher 
risk when activists are hedge funds or when there is a proxy fight. In addition, we find that 
the overall results of activism on returns, operating performance, and risk hold primarily 
for smaller banks, although large banks also experience an increase in market value.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present 
the related literature. In Section 2.3, we explain the hypotheses. In Section 2.4, we explain 
the data and empirical approach and Section 2.5 discusses the empirical results. In Sections 
2.6 and 2.7, we describe robustness tests and subsample analyses. In Section 8, we discuss 
channels of action for activism, and in Section 2.9, we conclude. 
2.2 Related Literature 
Our paper is related to the shareholder activism literature for nonfinancial firms. 
Researchers in this literature find that activism can create value and be an effective 
monitoring mechanism of publicly listed companies, reducing agency costs and improving 
returns. Clifford (2007), Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), and Greenwood and 
Schor (2009) find that activist shareholders can induce positive changes in the companies 
they monitor and increase shareholder value. They report significant positive abnormal 
returns and positive modest changes in operating returns around the time of the activism. 
On the contrary, Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner 
(1996), Wahal (1996), Gillian and Starks (2000), Karpoff (2001), and Song and Szewezyk 
(2003) find little impact of activism on firm performance or operations. In addition, some 
of the shareholder activism literature regarding nonfinancial firms shows that activism 
influences risk (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008)). Literature on nonfinancials 
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also shows that activism can increase the probability of CEO turnover (e.g., Parrino, Sias 
and Starks (2003), Gopalan (2008), Gallagher, Gardner and Swan (2009), Bharath, 
Jayaraman and Nagar (2013), Qian (2011), Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)). Boyson 
and Mooradian (2011) find that governance-related hedge fund activism through 
management turnover is associated with favorable stock market reactions. 8  Helwege, 
Intintoli, and Zhang (2012) find that voting-with-their-feet techniques can lead to more 
forced CEO turnovers. In contrast, Black (1990) and Roe (1994) show that activists can be 
unsuccessful in removing entrenched managers.  
As discussed in the introduction, the banking industry is one place where the goal 
of maximizing shareholder value may not be socially optimal. Here a single firm’s 
maximization may spill negative externality to the financial system. There are no studies 
which focus on assessing how shareholder activism affects banks and bank stakeholders. 
Two papers related to banking, although not focusing on banking, are Li and Xu (2010) 
and Sunder, Sunder, and Wongsunwai, (2014) which both focus on nonfinancial firms’ 
hedge fund activism and effects on target firms’ bank loan contract terms. Li and Xu (2010) 
document tighter bank contract terms for the firms after targeting and Sunder, Sunder, and 
Wongsunwai, (2014) document that loan spreads increase when activism relies on the 
market for corporate control, while loan spreads decrease when agency problems are 
addressed. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on bank governance and its effects on 
performance and risk. First, there are papers that look at the effects of bank governance on 
                                                 
8 Also, several papers (Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Kaplan and Minton 
(1994) and Conyon and Florou (2002)) find that the presence of a large shareholder is associated with 
management turnover. 
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performance. Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) find that larger cash flow rights by the 
controlling owners and stronger shareholder protection leads to higher bank valuation. 
Other papers find that board size is positively associated with valuation (Adams and 
Mehran (2002, 2003, 2005), Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007), Belkhir (2009)). Second, 
there are papers that look at the effects of bank governance on bank risk-taking. Saunders, 
Strock, and Travlos (1990) find that shareholder-controlled banks take higher risk than 
banks controlled by managers. Also, Laeven and Levine (2009) find that banks with 
controlling shareholders are characterized by higher risk-taking and that different aspects 
of regulation (e.g., FDIC deposit insurance, capital regulation, and restrictions on 
nonlending activies of banks) may induce owners to select a riskier investment portfolio to 
compensate for the loss of utility from costly regulatory requirements. Other researchers 
find that stock-option-based executive compensation is associated with higher risk taking 
(Mehran and Rosenberg (2009), DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2012)). Opposing this, Pathan 
(2009) finds that more independent boards, and thus more monitoring of managers, may 
reduce risk-taking. 
Finally, there are papers that look at the role of bank governance around financial 
crises. There are opposing views on whether poor bank governance was a significant 
contributing factor to the recent financial crisis. Several papers find that governance was 
important. Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2014) find that high shareholdings of lower-
level management increased banks’ default risk significantly. Diamond and Rajan (2009) 
suggest that traders and executives of banks had incentives to take risks that were not in 
the best interest of the shareholders, suggesting failure of governance. Kirkpatrick (2009) 
suggests that weak governance of banks lead to inadequate risk management, especially 
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insufficient risk monitoring through the board, a factor that contributed significantly to the 
financial instability during the crisis. Cheffin (2014) suggests that the persistence of the 
imperial CEOs in the financial services industry to whom boards would give more and 
more freedom plausibly contributed to the market turmoil of 2008. Other papers find that 
the governance was not to blame. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that banks with more 
shareholder-friendly board structures performed significantly worse during the crises than 
other banks and had higher stability risk. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) document that 
banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash 
bonuses for CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. They suggest that CEOs and 
senior executives cannot be blamed for the crisis or poor bank performance during the 
crisis, as they could not have foreseen the extremely high risks in some of their bank 
investment and trading strategies. 
However, there is no study in the literature focusing on how activist shareholders 
interact with bank managers and creditors to shape the behavior of banks during normal 
times and financial crises. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature. 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
Our hypotheses examine the effects of activism on bank behavior: market value, operating 
returns, and bank risk. We consider three conflicts arising among bank stakeholders and 
which may be addressed by shareholder activism. These correspond to our hypotheses are 
shown in Table 2.1 Panel A.  
 The first conflict is the Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1 (shown in Figure 1, 
Column 1). It suggests that managers may be inherently risk-averse as they would like to 
preserve or increase their career security and private benefits of controls, so they may take 
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less risk than desired by the shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Smith (1985), Hirshleifer and 
Thakor (1992)). 9 Even if the managers are risk-neutral, shareholders may wish them to 
take more risks than managers to take advantage of the creditors, particularly the deposit 
insurer and taxpayers, because they are not charged for the risk and can take the value of 
the put option from FDIC. Some researchers also find that the agency problem between 
shareholders and managers distorts investment and managers may pursue a “quiet life” to 
preserve resources for private benefits, so they may avoid expanding into a profitable new 
line of products (underinvestment) or getting rid of unprofitable divisions, both cases 
leading to suboptimal investment (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Boot (1992)).10  
According to this conflict, activists can curb agency problems between managers and 
shareholders, and improve performance by inducing managers to perform better and take 
value-enhancing risks (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen and Smith (1985), Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson 
(1998)). Our first hypothesis (H1) and empirical predictions are: 
Hypothesis 1 (Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1): Shareholder activism is associated with 
better market value, higher operating returns, and more risk-taking by the targeted 
banks. 
 The second conflict between bank stakeholders is the Shareholder-Manager 
Conflict 2 (shown in Table 2.1, Panel A, Column 2), which may be caused by 
overconfidence and/or hubris of managers (e.g., Roll (1986), Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 
                                                 
9 Jensen and Smith (1985) show that managers are more likely to minimize risk, and engage in short-term 
investments as well as employee growth strategies to increase their compensation and job security. 
 
10 Underinvestment may also be pursued in banking if some of the benefits of investment may go to the bank 
creditors. 
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(1998), Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Li and Tang (2010)). This conflict suggests 
that managers are prone to biases such as hubris, over-optimism, and overconfidence and 
thus may underestimate risk and take more risk than is good for shareholders. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986, 1993) also argue that the agency problem between 
shareholders and managers distorts investment and that firm insiders have the tendency to 
build an empire and expropriate resources for private benefits at the cost of outsiders. Thus, 
when a firm has plentiful resources for investment, insiders may overinvest. Activists may 
curb agency problems between managers and shareholders, and improve performance by 
correcting the over-risky investments by managers and thus reducing risk. Our second 
hypothesis (H2) and empirical predictions are: 
Hypothesis 2 (Shareholder-Manager Conflict 2): Shareholder activism is associated with 
better market value, higher operating returns, and less risk-taking by the targeted banks. 
 The third conflict between bank stakeholders is the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict 
(shown in Table 2.1, Panel A, Column 3). In this conflict, activists may induce bank 
managers11 to take higher risk to increase market value at the expense of bank creditors 
(e.g., Laeven and Levine (2009), Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2010), Prabha, Wihlborg, and 
Willett (2012), Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff (2013)). This is due to the difficulties 
of creditors (e.g., deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators, etc.) to monitor and discipline 
banking organizations due to banks’ opaqueness and regulatory-induced incentives. First, 
as noted above, banks are opaque, and as a result, creditors might not be able to obtain 
                                                 
11 Managers may be willing to represent shareholders’ interests if they may have a vested interest through 
the managerial compensation schemes that align interests (Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2010), DeYoung, 
Peng, and Yan (2012), Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011)). 
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information to assess accurately the bank’s riskiness and monitor on-going bank activities. 
Second, several aspects of bank regulation and government safety net protect bank 
creditors from losses in case of bank default and may reduce their incentives and ability to 
monitor banks: explicit insurance (deposit insurance put option (e.g., Merton (1977),  
Karekan and Wallace (1978), Keeley (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995)) and implicit 
insurance (bank creditors expect to be bailed out in case of insolvency because the bank is 
considered too-big-to-fail (TBTF), too-important-to-fail (TITF), or a wide-spread 
government guarantee is expected in case that many banks face distress (e.g., Acharya and 
Yorulmazer (2007, 2008), Brown and Dinc (2011), Duchin and Sosyura (2012), Black and 
Hazelwood (2012)). Explicit and implicit insurance induce banks to shift default risk to 
deposit insurance funds and taxpayers. 12  13  Our third hypothesis (H3) and empirical 
predictions are: 
Hypothesis 3 (Shareholder-Creditor Conflict): Shareholder activism is associated with 
better market value and more risk-taking by the banks, but not necessarily better 
operating returns. 
 Finally, a last conflict that may arise between bank stakeholders is the Shareholder-
Other Stakeholders Conflict (shown in Table 2.1, Panel A, Column 4), which may be 
caused by overconfidence and/or hubris of the activists. This conflict suggests that 
                                                 
12 However, prudential supervision and regulation, such as capital requirements, are designed in part to offset 
this moral hazard incentive. 
 
13 Billett, Garfinkel, and O’Neal (1998) show that deposit insurance reduces the incentive of depositors and 
debt holders to monitor banks and increases the incentive of other bank stakeholders to increase risk. Also, 
Laeven and Levine (2009) show that deposit insurance intensifies the ability and incentives of shareholders 
to increase risk and the impetus for greater risk generated by deposit insurance operates on owners, not on 
bank managers. 
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activists, similar to managers, can be prone to hubris and overconfidence, which make them 
think that they know what is best for the company. Thus, they may induce the bank 
managers to take risky decisions that end up not being good for any of the parties, including 
bank managers, other shareholders, creditors, and themselves. Activists may induce over-
risky investments by managers and at the same time not produce the desired returns and 
they may also get out of their position quickly. Our fourth hypothesis (H4) and empirical 
predictions are: 
Hypothesis 4 (Activist-Other Stakeholders Conflict): Shareholder activism is associated 
with worse market value, worse operating returns, and more risk-taking by the targeted 
banks. 
 Each of the four hypotheses can hold simultaneously for different sets of banks at 
a given time. We test empirically the impact of activism on bank behavior to try to 
understand which of the four hypotheses (Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1, Shareholder-
Manager Conflict 2, Shareholder-Creditor Conflict, Activist-Other Stakeholders 
Conflict) empirically dominates or finds more empirical support. Results are reported in 
Section 2.5. In Section 2.8, we further explore the channels that activists may use to induce 
changes in the target banks. 
2.4 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics 
2.4.1 Data and sample 
The sample consists of all public commercial banks and BHCs in the US for the period 
1994:Q1 to 2010:Q4 and our data come from multiple sources.  
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Our bank data is sourced from the quarterly Report of Condition and Income (Call 
Report) filed by all active commercial banking institutions. Given that the majority of the 
public banking organizations are holding companies, data in the Call Report are aggregated 
at the bank holding company (BHC) level when the BHC has more than one commercial 
bank owned, otherwise the information for the commercial bank is preserved. For 
convenience, we will use the term bank to mean either type of entity. We remove bank-
quarter observations that have missing or incomplete financial data on basic accounting 
variables such as total assets and equity. To avoid distortions in ratios that use equity as 
the numerator, for all observations with total equity less than 1% of gross total assets 
(GTA),14 we replace equity with 1% of gross total assets (e.g., Berger and Bouwman, 
2013). Finally, we normalize all financial variables be in real 2010:Q4 dollars using the 
seasonally-adjusted GDP deflator. The resulting sample is then intersected with CRSP and 
Compustat using the CRSP-FRB link of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
Activist filings (SEC Schedule 13D and DFAN14A) are retrieved by manual 
collection from the SEC EDGAR database for the period 1994:Q115 to 2010:Q4 following 
a procedure similar to that described in Greenwood and Schor (2009). We restrict our 
searches to public US commercial banks and BHCs in the CRSP-FRB file of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.16 Schedule 13D of the SEC requires that investors file within 
                                                 
14 Gross total assets (GTA) equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated 
transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). Total assets on Call Reports deduct these two 
reserves, which are held to cover potential credit losses. We add these reserves back to measure the full value 
of the assets financed. 
 
15 The sample starts in 1994 because the shareholder activism data becomes available online in SEC EDGAR 
in 1994. 
 
16 We also performed searches using all SIC Codes relevant for commercial banks 6021, 6022, 6029, 6035, 
and 6036 and this gives a higher number of total filings, however a large number of them cannot be ultimately 
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10 days of acquiring more than 5% of a voting class of a publicly traded company’s equity 
securities. 13D documents the size of the share purchase and the investors’ intentions.17 In 
addition, we also include any material amendments in the investor’s purposes from the 
initial Schedule 13D reported in Schedule 13D/A. 13D can also be filed for crossholdings 
formed when two firms merge or form business alliances (Greenwood and Schor (2009)). 
To deal with this problem, we manually screen for such events and/or cross-reference our 
initial sample of 13D filings with 13F holding reports (Thompson Institutional database) 
and get the activist filings. To the sample of 13Ds and amendments on 13Ds are added the 
definitive proxy statements filed by non-management (DFAN14A) as literature suggests 
these are another important form of activism (e.g., Dod and Warner (1983), Pound (1988), 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989), Mulherin and Poulsen (1998)). These statements are filed 
with the SEC by investors who intend to or are involved in a proxy fight with a company’s 
management. Form DFAN14A is defined as “Additional definitive proxy soliciting 
materials filed by non-management”,18 and is filed ahead of the annual shareholder meeting 
when soliciting shareholder votes. A proxy contest may be initiated with less than a 5% 
stake in the target companies’ shares. Activist investors can use the proxy statements as a 
tactical instrument to achieve objectives often specified previously in their Schedule 13D. 
To be comprehensive, we include both 13D and DFAN14A filings.19 We obtain 3,142 13D 
                                                 
matched to the Call Report, CRSP, and Compustat intersection as they are not covered in at least one of these 
databases.  
 
17 See http://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm 
 
18 http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/forms/edgform.pdf; http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-155.htm. 
 
19 To mitigate the concern that at some very large firms, some investors could have engaged in activism with 
a less than 5% stake in the company and these events were not accompanied by Schedule 13D & 13D/A or 
DFAN 14A filings, we also collect information about such events through news searches in LexisNexis for 
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filings and 369 DFAN14A filings, for a total of 3,511 filings. We discard 1,693 filings that 
refer to one of the following situations: filings by a parent holding company that assists 
with financing or restructuring or other internal strategies, bank mergers not associated 
with activism, or filings by corporate insiders (e.g., CEO, CFO, etc.), which are not true 
activist filings. This results in a final sample of 1,818 filings for the period 1994:Q1 to 
2010:Q4.  
After reading the “purpose of transaction” section of the 13D reports to understand 
whether the filer is pursuing an activist strategy, we take out 614 filings with no Item 4 or 
passive investment only (where filer says the purchase was only for investment, with no 
intention to engage in any form of activism, or if the filing has no Item 4: Purpose of 
Transaction). Our final sample of material activist events consists of 1,204 events 
corresponding to 337 unique banking organizations which we use in our empirical analysis. 
We create the variable ACTIVISM as a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if there 
is shareholder activism targeting the bank during a quarter. 
We also use data from several other sources for additional control variables: FDIC 
Summary of Deposits, Federal Housing Finance Agency website, St. Louis Federal 
Reserve website, Thompson Institutional dataset, I/B/E/S, SEC DEF 14A and 10K filings, 
and LexisNexis news articles. We end up with a final sample of 27,731 bank-quarter 
observations and 1002 unique banking organizations. All bank-specific variables, other 
than activism or internal governance, are constructed using the Call Report / Summary of 
Deposits for US commercial banks and the WRDS database (including CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT, Thomson Institutional Data, I/B/E/S). 
                                                 
our top largest 100 banks in each time period. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these and are discussed 
in detail in Section 2.6.3.4 and Appendix B.  
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2.4.2. Empirical methodology 
To investigate determinants of activism in banking, we use a probit model for targeting as 
in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008).  
 0 1it it k t itACTIVISM Control Timeϕ ϕ ω−= + + +   (2.1) 
Where ACTIVISMit is the dependent variable and represents a dummy variable equal to one 
if the bank-quarter observation corresponds to a bank i being targeted by an activist 
investor during quarter t. Controlit-k is a vector of controls of bank i during quarter t-k, Timet 
represents time fixed effects, and ωit is an error term. Standard errors are clustered by the 
bank. For controls, we use a broad set of bank characteristics that were previously used 
also in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008) in the shareholder activism literature 
complemented with other bank-specific variables from the banking literature. For all 
independent variables, we retain k=4 to capture 4-quarter effects as in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, 
and Partnoy (2008). 
To investigate whether activism has a significant impact on bank market value, 
operating returns, and risk, we estimate several versions of the following econometric 
model: 
          0 1 2it it k it k t i itY ACTIVISM Bank Characteristic Time Bankβ β β ε− −= + + + + +           (2.2) 
where Yit is the dependent variable of interest for bank i during quarter t, ACTIVISMit-k is 
shareholder activism dummy for bank i during quarter t-k, Bank Chracteristicit-k is a vector 
of controls of bank i during quarter t-k, Timet represents time fixed effects, Banki represents 
bank fixed effects, and εit is an error term. The main dependent variables (Yit) are: market 
value proxied by TOBIN’s Q – defined as market value of common stock over equity book 
value), operating returns proxied by ROA (defined as the ratio of annualized net income to 
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GTA), default risk proxied by bank Z-SCORE – calculated as the sum of a bank’s ROA and 
Capitalization Ratio (equity capital over GTA) divided by Std_ROA (the volatility of 
ROA).20 For all independent variables, we retain k=4 in our analysis and robustness tests 
to capture 4-quarter effects. 
For controls, we use a set of bank characteristics following prior research on bank 
governance and shareholder activism (e.g. Beltratti and Stutz (2012), Brav, Jiang, Thomas, 
and Partnoy (2008)). We control for BANK SIZE (the log of GTA), BANK AGE (age in 
years of the oldest bank in the BHC), DEPOSITS/GTA (ratio of deposits to GTA), 
LOANS/GTA (ratio of loans to GTA), INCOME DIVERSITY (following Laeven and Levine 
(2007), constructed as 1 – ((Net Interest Income – Other Operating Income) / Total 
Operating Income), OVERHEAD_COSTS (a proxy of the bank’s cost structure determined 
as the ratio of overhead expenses to assets as in Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2011)), 
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP (a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is foreign owned) and regulatory 
environment. The regulatory environment is an important determinant of bank risk-taking 
and individual bank behavior mentioned in the banking literature (e.g., Buch and DeLong 
(2007), Laeven and Levine (2009), Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) and 
Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2014)). We control for the bank’s primary federal 
regulator, by including: FRS, OCC, and FDIC dummies if the bank’s primary federal 
regulator is the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, respectively. In the regressions, we omit 
                                                 
20 Many researchers use the Z-SCORE as defined here as a measure of bank risk (e.g., Laeven and Levine 
(2009), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010), Duchin and Sosyura (2013), 
Ongena, Popov, and Udell (2013)). 
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the FRS dummy to avoid perfect collinearity. Our main models are OLS regressions with 
bank and time fixed effects.21  
2.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, we analyze empirically the importance of shareholder activism in banking, 
activist objectives, and effects on individual bank behavior (market value, operating 
returns, and risk).  
2.5.1 Prevalence of activism in banking and determinants 
How important is activism in banking? In Table 2.2 Panel A, we find that about one third 
of the banks (337 unique banks) in the sample have some form of shareholder activism at 
some time during the sample period 1994-2010 and about 8.5% banks have events during 
each year. 22  Activism tends to surge during crises periods (2000:Q2-2002:Q3 and 
2007:Q3-2009:Q4).23,24 The documented prevalence of activism makes the study of the 
effects of activism worthwhile and each of the four hypotheses described in Section 2.3 
could hold, however only an empirical analysis of the effects can assess which of them 
empirically dominates. 
                                                 
21 We do not control for bank risk because it is an endogenous variable. 
 
22 One fifth of the total 13D filings for banks are non-material events, that is, the filer does not specify a 
particular objective or future plans to engage in activism. This latter percentage is slightly smaller than the 
results reported in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), Greenwood and Schor (2009), and Boyson and 
Mooradian (2011), for hedge fund activism for non-financials. In their cases, approximately one half of the 
activism events, hedge funds do not state specific objectives. 
 
23 These periods were identified as financial crises in Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
 
24 The surge in activism during crises may be due to general discontent of investors when all firms in the 
market are not doing well. This is consistent also with investors asking for CEO turnover during crises when 
performance is lower (e.g., Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)). For example, when Bank of America’s 
share price declined dramatically by 85% during 2008-2009, shareholders blamed Ken Lewis, the CEO and 
Chairman, for the decline. 
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We also analyze what type of banks are targeted by activists. Table 2.3 reports 
results for the probit regressions predicting shareholder activism targeting. Our first model 
shown in column (1) includes target characteristics as in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy 
(2008) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010): BANK SIZE, TOBIN’s Q, GROWTH (bank asset 
growth), ROA (defined as the ratio of annualized net income to GTA), CAPITALIZATION 
RATIO (equity capital over GTA), DIVYLD (dividend yield or the ratio of common 
dividend over market value of common stocks), INST OWNERSHIP (percentage of 
institutional ownership), trading illiquidity, AMIHUD (calculated as 1000 multiplied by 
the square root of the absolute value of market return over the dollar trading value), and 
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS (number of analysts covering the entity).25 Column (3) reports 
the results when including additional bank specific characteristics: BANK AGE, 
BRANCHES / GTA (ratio of branches over GTA), NO_STATES (the log of the number of 
states in which the bank has branches), METROPOLITAN (number of metropolitan 
markets as a fraction of all markets in which the bank is active), DEPOSITS / GTA, LOANS 
/ GTA, CASH_HOLDINGS (ratio of cash holding over GTA), NPL RATIO (the ratio of 
bank nonperforming loans to total loans), INCOME DIVERSITY, 
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP, HHI DEPOSITS (Herfindahl-Hirschman deposits index, a 
proxy for the local market concentration), primary regulator dummies, and INCORP_DE 
                                                 
25 Since NUMBER OF ANALYSTS, defined as the number of analysts covering the company from IBES as 
in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), is available for less than two thirds of our sample banks, the 
multivariate regression with NUMBER OF ANALYSTS is reported separately in column (2). 
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(a dummy equal to 1 if the bank is incorporated in Delaware). 26 , 27  In all models, 
independent variables are lagged 4 quarters and models include time fixed effects as in 
Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008). In addition, standard errors are clustered by the 
bank. 
Table 2.3 reveals several interesting results. First, we find that activists tend to 
target value banks, banks with low profitability and growth potential: smaller size 
(consistent with results for non-financials in Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008), 
Klein and Zur (2009), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy 
(2008), Clifford (2008), and Mietzner and Schweizer (2008)), lower TOBIN’s Q and lower 
ROA, consistent with Gillian and Starks (2007), low NO_STATES, indicating that they 
operate in fewer states, which gives them opportunities to grow more geographically. 
Second, we find that activists target banks with more agency problems: banks with more 
CASH HOLDINGS, but paying fewer dividends (DIVYLD), symptoms of the agency 
problem of free cash flow according to Jensen (1986) and Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and 
Partnoy (2008), and banks with more complex organizational structures, that is, with more 
branches per dollar of assets (BRANCHES/GTA, ratio of branches over GTA). Finally, we 
find that activists seem to target banks in which it is easier to implement changes: having 
higher institutional ownership (INST OWNERSHIP) and analyst coverage (NUMBER OF 
ANALYSTS), allowing them to get more allies and information to implement changes, and 
with higher trading liquidity (indicated by the negative coefficient on AMIHUD, a direct 
                                                 
26 Delaware is known to have less antitakeover provisions which makes firms more likely to become a 
takeover target (e.g., Daines (2001). 
 
27 We also tried to run a model which considers regulatory enforcement actions taken by FDIC, FED, and 
OCC regulators against banks (data on enforcement actions is limited to 2005-2010), however it could not 
be run as there are too few enforcement actions for these publicly listed institutions for the period. 
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measure of trading illiquidity with lower values meaning more liquidity) making it easier 
for activists to accumulate a high share in a bank in a short period of time without incurring 
adverse price changes.28, 29 Finally, targets tend to have fewer deposits and more loans. A 
lower reliance on deposits for funding means that banks use more money-market funding, 
so that shareholders may have more information about them. The fact that activists target 
banks with more loans is consistent with the view that activists may target banks with a 
smaller portfolio of securities, and which are less subject to market credit spreads (Beltratti 
and Stutz (2012)). The other variables are not statistically significant, suggesting that they 
are not important determinants for activism in banking. 
Overall, results seem to indicate that activists target banks with more agency 
problems and growth potential, which could be easily turned around to increase shareholder 
returns. 
2.5.2 Activists’ objectives and tactics 
What is the nature of activists’ demands in banking? Panel B of Table 2.2 summarizes the 
stated objectives that activists provide when they announce their intent to intervene (1994-
2010). The panel classifies the demands into the following seven categories following prior 
literature (e.g., Greenwood and Scor (2009)): ENGAGE MANAGEMENT, CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE, INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ASSET SALE (STRATEGIC), 
                                                 
28 Results are consistent with Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008) and Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele 
(2009), and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) who find that liquid stocks (above median) have a 50% higher 
likelihood to be targeted by activists. In addition, it is consistent with the theoretical model of Maug (1998), 
in which “liquidity mitigates the free-rider problem in costly monitoring of managers because activist 
blockholders can compensate for their monitoring costs through the increased trading profits due to high 
liquidity.” 
 
29 It is to be noted that the coefficient on AMIHUD becomes insignificant when included together with 
ANALYST due to its collinearity with this latter variable as noted also in Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010). 
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STRATEGIC CHANGES, LITIGATION/BANKRUPTCY and PROXY FIGHT. The 
categories are not mutually exclusive, so an event can sometimes fall into multiple 
categories. 
First, ENGAGE MANAGEMENT represents 36.5% of all activist events.  This is 
the lightest form of shareholder activism and includes events in which the activists try to 
help the managers maximize shareholder value by discussions with management and 
making suggestions for improvements. They can send letters, phone bank management or 
have face-to-face meetings, request company documents or make a general statement that 
shares are “undervalued” and might engage in future discussions / meet management etc. 
Second, STRATEGIC CHANGES are 35.1% of all events. These include a wide variety of 
strategies targeted by activists such as changes in business strategy (operational efficiency, 
growth and cost strategies and business line restructuring), M&A, sale of the target 
company to a third party, hire an investment bank to explore strategic alternatives, offer to 
acquire the company, block a merger and request a higher price, sell the company, etc.  
Third, INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE represents 28.1% of all events. 
It can include election of activist-selected directors, firing a company officer or board 
member, challenging board independence and fair representation, board or executive 
compensation issues, a call to declassify the board, remove a poison pill, or question 
potential corporate fraud. Fourth, CAPITAL STRUCTURE represents 13.9% of all events. 
It includes activism targeting firm’s payout policy and capital structure. This category 
includes events in which the activist proposes changes oriented towards the reduction of 
excess cash, an increase in firm leverage, or higher payouts to shareholders. This group of 
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events also involves issuance of securities by the target banks such as modifying seasoned 
equity offerings or proposing debt restructuring.  
Fifth, PROXY FIGHT represents 11.6% of all events. It refers to situations in which 
the activist solicits proxies from shareholders to elect proposed directors or to adopt a 
shareholder proposal. Sixth, ASSET SALE (STRATEGIC) represents 6.5% of all events. 
These refer to cases in which activists express their discontent by selling their entire 
position in the company. This is consistent with the literature for nonfinancials where some 
researchers document that activist investors will sell their stock to cut losses (e.g., 
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2010), Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)) and their 
exit can serve as a governance mechanism (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), 
Edmans and Manso (2011)). Finally, LITIGATION / BANKRUPTCY represents 2.6% of all 
events. It involves situations in which the activist files a lawsuit, the target is in bankruptcy, 
and/or the activist offers to help with financing and other restructuring options.30 31 
2.5.3 Effects of activism 
Table 2.4 reports results from regressing measures of market performance (TOBIN’s Q), 
operating returns (ROA), and risk (Z-SCORE), on shareholder activism (ACTIVISM). As 
                                                 
30  Using a sample of hedge fund activism for non-financials, Greenwood and Schor (2009) report the 
objectives of their activists as follows: about a half (45.5%) of the hedge fund activism events include 
comments about target being “undervalued” and engage management to improve the value of the firm. 
Further, activism agendas related to capital structure, asset sales, and internal corporate governance represent 
11.5, 18.1, and 21.9 percent of their full sample, respectively. Our results are qualitatively similar as 
composition to Greenwood and Schor (2009).  
 
31 In a separate test, reported in Appendix B, we break down our ACTIVISM measure into these seven 
different demands that activists declare to try to understand which of these are most important to explain our 
results. We find that all channels have an impact on bank behavior, except for ENGAGE MANAGEMENT, 
and PROXY FIGHT contributes to the highest increase in bank risk. 
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discussed in Section 2.4.2, we use ordinary least square (OLS) models with time and bank 
fixed effects. 
Column (1) analyzes whether activism creates value for shareholders by using 
TOBIN’s Q as a dependent variable. We find that banks with activism experience positive 
and significant increases in market value. Activism may be perceived by the market as a 
positive signal since activists are expected to provide more monitoring that will curb 
agency problems and costs (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)), and thus improve bank 
performance. 
Column (2) uses ROA as a measure of operating returns. The coefficient estimate 
indicates that activism has little impact on the operating profitability of the targets, 
consistent with results in Klein and Zur (2009). The difference in sign between Tobin’s Q 
and ROA can be due to Tobin’s Q incorporating market-based information and being more 
forward-looking than ROA, while ROA may take longer to manifest a positive effect. 
Another possibility is that these banks may have a higher market value in the event of 
failure because of the prospect of being bailed out. 
Column (3) presents results for the risk-taking of banks as a result of activism by 
using Z-SCORE as a dependent variable. A larger value for the Z-SCORE indicates less 
risk and greater overall bank stability (e.g., Boyd and Runkle (1993), Berger, Klapper, and 
Turk-Ariss (2009), Laeven and Levine (2009), Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Beltratti and Stulz (2012)). We find that activism is 
associated with a lower Z-SCORE, and thus, a higher default risk after intervention.32 
                                                 
32 In unreported results, we decompose the Z-SCORE into its subcomponents and we find that the increase in 
risk is primarily due to both a decline in the bank capitalization ratio and an increase in the standard deviation 
of ROA. 
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Looking together at the results for market value, operating returns, and risk, we can 
conclude that activism creates market value for shareholders, has little impact on operating 
returns, and increases bank risk (lower Z-score). Although all hypotheses may hold to some 
degree, our results are most consistent with the empirical dominance of the Hypothesis H3, 
the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. This suggests that activists may induce management 
to increase risk in order to increase shareholder returns at the expense of bank creditors 
(regulators, taxpayers, deposit insurers, depositors etc.) given the difficulty of creditors in 
monitoring and regulatory-induced incentives. This shows that activism may be a 
destabilizing force, at odds with financial stability. 
2.6 Robustness Checks 
2.6.1 Alternative measures  
We test whether our results are robust to using alternative measures of market value, 
operating performance, risk, and activism. In Table 2.45 Panel A, we examine whether our 
results for effects of activism on performance are robust to using alternative measures of 
market performance: buy and hold return (BUY-AND-HOLD_RET), buy and hold 
abnormal return (BUY-AND-HOLD_AB_RET), and SHARPE_RATIO (columns 2-4), while 
column 1 repeats the main effect. In each of the estimations (columns 2-4), we find that the 
coefficient on the ACTIVISM variable is statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
We thus continue to find consistent evidence of an increase in market performance 
associated with activism. 
Table 2.5 Panel B column 2 reports the estimation results when using an alternative 
measure of operating returns on ACTIVISM, namely return on equity (ROE). We find that 
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results are qualitatively similar to our main model (which is repeated in column 1 for 
comparison). 
In Table 2.5 Panel C, we examine whether our main results continue to hold when 
we consider alternative measures of bank risk-taking. We first analyze the sensitivity of 
our results to VOLATILITY_STOCK_RET, the volatility of daily returns for each calendar 
year in column 2. Second, we use as a measure of risk, the LLA RATIO, or the ratio of loan 
loss allowance over GTA, in column 3. Third, we use as a measure of risk, the NPL Ratio, 
the bank-level ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans in column 4. Finally, in model 5, 
we show the estimation results when using as a dependent variable VOLATILITY ROA, 
determined as the standard deviation of ROA over the previous 4 quarters, where ROA is 
annualized net income as a percentage of GTA. All regressions include time and bank fixed 
effects. In each of the estimations, we find that the coefficient on the ACTIVISM variable 
is statistically significant at the 5% level or better. We thus continue to find consistent 
evidence of an increase in bank risk associated with activism. 
 In Table 2.5 Panel D, we consider an alternative measure of ACTIVISM –
NO_ACTIVISM_EVENTS – the number of activist events that a banks has during a quarter 
as per 13D and DFAN14A filings. Results using this measure are qualitatively similar to 
main findings. 
2.6.2 Alternative econometric specifications 
In this subsection, we check the sensitivity of the results to the use of alternative 
econometric specifications. 
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For market performance (Table 2.6, Panel A1-A2), we conduct both daily and 
monthly event studies reporting the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and using a 
value weighted index.  
In Panel A1, we conduct a daily event study using several event windows. The 
returns are on average 1.42% for (0, 1) days, 1.79% for (-1, 1) days, 2.26% for (-2, 2) days, 
2.89% for (-5, 5) days, indicating that the market reacts positively to the activism events.  
In Panel A2, we conduct a monthly event study using several event windows. We 
find positive and significant CARs for all periods, with the highest returns being achieved 
by investors for longer time windows up to 3 years: That is, returns are on average 4.22% 
for (0, 3) months, 4.88% for (0, 6) months, 6.77% for (0, 12) months, 8.93% for (0, 24) 
months and 13.11% for (0, 36) months. Returns are also positive and significant for the (-
1, 12) months window. Overall, our results in this event study confirm that shareholder 
activism creates value for shareholders. 
Panels B and C of Table 2.6 report results from alternative econometric 
specifications for operating returns, and bank risk. Column (2) of each these panels reports 
the results when using a simple OLS model without time and bank fixed effects. Column 
(3) reports results when using a specification with time fixed effects only. Column (4) 
reports results when using a bank random effects model. Column (5) uses regression 
specifications with Newey-West (1987) standard errors and time fixed effects to control 
for residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Column (6) implements two-way 
clustering models by firm and time as suggested in Thompson (2006) and Cameron, 
Gelbach and Miller (2006). These models allows for correlations among different banks in 
the same quarter and different quarters in the same bank, for example, and calculates 
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standard errors that account for two dimensions of within-cluster correlation. The results 
in all models of Table 2.6, Panels B, and C, using ACTIVISM as a dependent variable, 
confirm our earlier evidence. More specifically, we find that ACTIVISM leads to higher 
market value, unchanged operating returns, and more risk.33  
2.6.3 Endogeneity 
In this subsection, we carry out several tests to address the problem of potential 
endogeneity of our ACTIVISM variable, which could bias our findings. For example, it may 
be possible that activism and the bank key outcomes (market value, operating returns, and 
risk) may be simultaneously driven by certain unobservable bank-level characteristics. 
Also, our key independent variable (ACTIVISM) could be improperly measured due to 
difficulty to observe and/or quantify its magnitude. Finally, there might be a potential 
causal link from our outcome variables for market value, operating performance, and bank 
risk, to ACTIVISM, as bank market value, operating performance, and risk, may affect 
ACTIVISM involvement. In the main analysis, we attempt to alleviate some of these 
concerns by lagging the ACTIVISM variable. To more directly address the endogeneity 
concerns, we perform several sets of tests discussed below.34  
 
                                                 
33 In unreported results, to address the potential concern that time fixed effects may not capture the full impact 
of macroeconomic variables during our sample period, we also try models that include the percentage change 
in national GDP growth, percentage change in the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) real estate index, 
and interest rate spread instead of time fixed effects. The results confirm our prior findings. 
 
34 In addition to the tests discussed in this section, to alleviate the concern about potential endogeneity 
stemming from potentially omitted correlated variables, we also try saturating the main regressions with a lot 
more bank level controls, including several other corporate governance mechanisms, and results are 
consistent. These results are presented in detail in the online Appendix B. 
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2.6.3.1 Instrumental variables analysis  
It is possible that the endogeneity may be the result of reverse causality that runs from bank 
behavior for market value, operating performance, and bank risk to activism. For example, 
banks with a poor performance and a higher risk, might be more likely to be targeted by 
activists and this bias may invalidate the interpretation of the coefficient on ACTIVISM. 
We use instrumental variable techniques (two-stage least squares (2SLS)) to extract the 
exogenous component of bank activism in assessing the influence of activism on market 
value, operating performance, and bank risk. We use as an instrument, % BUSY 
ACTIVISTS, the percentage of busy activists in the financial services industry (SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999) based on number of activist campaigns (13D filings) and proxy 
fights (DFAN 14A filings). Busy activists are those with five or more campaigns and/or 2 
or more proxy fights at the same time and are likely to generate more activism.35 The results 
of the IV regressions are reported in Panel A of Table 2.7. The first-stage regression 
indicates that our instrumental variable is positively and significantly related to activism. 
We perform two tests to check the suitability of the selected instrument. First, we conduct 
the Kleibergen-Paap under-identification test to evaluate the rank condition. We find that 
the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level (rk LM = 544.718 
with a p-value less than 0.001), indicating that the model is well identified. Second, using 
an instrument that is weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable can lead 
to large inconsistencies in the coefficient estimates. To examine the relevance of our IV, 
                                                 
35 In unreported results, we also tried tests with three instruments: % BUSY ACTIVISTS, AMIHUD, the 
Amihud (2002)’s measure of illiquidity since liquid stocks were found by Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2010) to be 
more likely to be targeted by activists, and % ACTIVISM OF OTHERS (N-1), the average level of activism 
for the other (N-1) banks in the industry following the logic in Laeven and Levine (2009) for cash flow and 
we obtain consistent results. 
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we conduct an F-test of the excluded exogenous variable in the first stage regression, in 
which the null hypothesis is that the instrument does not explain the variation in the 
ACTIVISM. We reject this null hypothesis at the 1% level (F = 3605.728 with a p-value 
less than 0.001). The IV second stage regression estimates indicate that ACTIVISM is 
associated with better market performance, little impact on operating returns, and higher 
risk, consistent with our earlier evidence. 
2.6.3.2 Propensity score matching (PSM) analysis  
Another potential concern with our results is that perceived market value, operating 
performance, and bank risk differentials between banks targeted by activists and those that 
are not targeted may spuriously reflect bank characteristics rather than activism 
characteristics. To control for this, we use the propensity score matching (PSM) analysis. 
PSM models match observations based on the probability of undergoing the treatment, 
which in our case is the probability of being targeted by activists.  
In our case, PSM estimates the effect of activism on a bank’s market value, 
operating performance, and risk, by comparing the bank’s current behavior with the 
behavior that the bank would have observed if activists had not targeted it. This quasi-
experiment is conducted by matching each targeted bank with a non-targeted bank sharing 
similar characteristics as indicated by their propensity scores. To estimate a bank’s 
propensity score (or probability of being targeted), we use a probit model in which the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous activism measure that takes a value of 1 if the bank 
has activism and 0 otherwise and the independent variables are all bank characteristics 
from the main specification and year fixed effects. We use a nearest-neighbor matching 
with n=5 with replacement, which matches each targeted bank with, respectively, the 5 
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banks with the closest propensity scores.36,37 Regression results are reported in Table 2.7 
Panel B and are qualitatively similar to the main models, with the only exception being that 
the coefficient of activism in the ROA equation is negative and significant. 
2.6.3.3 Heckman selection model 
Another potential concern with our results is that perceived risk differential found may 
reflect selection bias. For example, our results may reflect differences in bank 
characteristics between those targeted by activists and those not targeted rather than the 
impact of activism per se on market value, operating performance, default risk, and 
leverage risk. We address this issue by using Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to 
control for selection bias induced by banks being targeted by activists by incorporating the 
activism decision into the econometric estimation. In the first step, we determine whether 
the bank has activism using a probit estimation. The dependent variable in the first step is 
our ACTIVISM dummy. The explanatory variables are the instrumental variable used in the 
IV estimation and all control variables from our main specification. In the second stage, 
the TOBIN’s Q, ROA, and Z-SCORE are the dependent variables and we include all the 
variables from the main regressions, the activism variable, and the self-selection parameter 
(lambda or inverse Mills’ ratio).  
The results are reported in Panel C of Table 2.7. While controlling for potential 
self-selection bias, the results of the two-step estimation model continue to confirm that 
                                                 
36 In unreported tests, we compare the means of the bank characteristics used in the selection models across 
the samples of targeted banks and other banks to assess the effectiveness of our propensity matching 
procedure. Reassuringly, the distributions of the bank characteristics are statistically indistinguishable at 
conventional levels. 
 
37 In unreported results, we also do a nearest-neighbor matching with n=10 and obtain consistent results. 
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ACTIVISM is associated with better market performance, little impact on operating returns, 
and higher risk. In the selection equation, the instrumental variable is positively related to 
ACTIVISM. In the outcome equation, the ACTIVISM variable enters significantly positively 
on TOBIN’s Q and negatively on ROA, and Z-SCORE, consistent with our prior results.  
2.6.3.4 Including Lexis Nexis News 
Given the amount of capital that is needed to acquire a 5% stake in a large-cap company, 
we worry that the previously collected filings may bias the sample toward smaller targets. 
At very large firms, some pension funds may engage in activism with a less than 5% stake 
in the company. To incorporate activism events that were not accompanied by Schedule 
13D or DFAN 14A, we collect information about such events through news searches in 
LexisNexis for our top 100 banks in each time period in terms of total assets using a general 
search with the company current name and any previous names (where information is 
available) and  any and various combinations of the following keywords: “activism” or 
“activist investor” or “dissident investor” or “activist shareholder” or “group of concerned 
shareholders” or “shareholder activism” or “hedge fund activist” or “hedge fund activism” 
or “institutional activism” or “activist campaign” or “investor campaign.” This generates 
96 events, the majority (~85%) of which, has a pension fund as an activist.38 We add these 
new events to our sample and incorporate them in our ACTIVISM variable and re-estimate 
our results to understand whether our results may be impacted by these investors with stake 
                                                 
38 We impose no limitation to the percentage of shares owned as many times this information is not available 
in the LexisNexis news. In few cases, we are able to retrieve the ownership from the DEF 14A report when 
the shareholder appears in the Shareholder Proposals section and for those cases the share ownership is small, 
many times < 1%. 
 43 
 
less than 5% that may behave as activists. The results are robust to these tests and are 
presented in detail in Appendix B. 
2.7 Effects of Activism: Subsample Analyses 
2.7.1 Hedge fund (HF) or not 
Not all activists may be alike. Some may be more aggressive such as hedge funds compared 
to mutual funds, pension funds, individuals, or other types of shareholders. Hedge funds 
might have the pressure to deliver short-term results via asset sales and increased cash 
payouts, while other minority investors may be more interested in long-term results.  
To differentiate between hedge fund activists and other types of investors, we use 
a list of commonly known hedge funds in Bloomberg Markets Magazine39 and Wikipedia 
to identify hedge fund activists among the filers in the 13D and DFAN14A material events. 
We then complement the list with manual searches on Google and fund internet website to 
understand if the filer is a hedge fund or not.40  
We break down the ACTIVISM dummy into HF_ACTIVIST and 
NON_HF_ACTIVIST to take into account the two types of activists (Table 2.8 Panel A). 
We conduct a test for the equality of the coefficients (HF_ACTIVIST and 
NON_HF_ACTIVIST). The regression results reveal that HFs tend to improve the bank 
market value more when looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, however the t-test 
reveals that the difference is not statistically significant. When looking at the earnings 
(ROA), it appears that HFs do not significantly impact ROA, while the non-HF investors 
                                                 
39 http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/rJWUURETpDOE,http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/rEpa5X 
EFo000, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_hedge_funds#Other_notable_hedge_fund_companies. 
 
40 We recognize that this search process may be imperfect, but we are confident that almost all (if not all) 
activists that are hedge funds are classified adequately. 
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tend to negatively impact ROA. In regards to risk-taking, both HF and non-HF investors 
are driving the bank to take on more risk, but hedge funds tend to lead to a higher bank 
risk. Results are consistent with the main analysis and suggest that HF activists may have 
a more positive influence on banks’ changes compared to non-HF investors, though the 
increase in risk remains a potential concern. 
2.7.2 13D versus DFAN 14A 
We next break down the ACTIVISM dummy into DFAN14A, a more aggressive activism 
form, and 13D filings, to take that into account whether aggressiveness of filings makes a 
difference for our findings. The results in Table 2.8 Panel B show that our main results 
continue to hold for the two types. However, the coefficient for DFAN14A is larger for the 
default risk. 
2.7.3 Excluding TBTF banks 
Next, we exclude too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks from our sample (Table 2.8 Panel C) to 
understand whether our results may be caused by the banks that are too big to fail. We 
define TBTF as a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 in all quarters when the banks 
has GTA greater or equal to $100 billion, which were subject to the stress tests (SCAP) in 
2009.41 We find that our results are not driven by TBTF banks. 
2.7.4 Bank size 
We further re-estimate our main regressions by bank size to understand whether results are 
dominated by a particular size class. Table 2.8 Panel D reports effects of activism by bank 
                                                 
41 This definition of too-big-to-fail is also used in Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010). 
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size: SMALL, MEDIUM and LARGE. SMALL represents banks with GTA up to $1 billion, 
MEDIUM represents banks with GTA exceeding $1 billion and up to $5 billion, and 
LARGE represents banks with GTA exceeding $5 billion. The regression results indicate 
that results only hold strongly for the small banks, suggesting that activists have a lesser 
influence on the larger banks. However, we find that activists do increase the market value 
of large banks, without affecting their operation or risk. 
 2.7.5 Activism effects during financial crises 
We also study whether effects of activism may be different during financial crises. Under 
normal circumstances, banks may take more risk as a result of activism. However, during 
financial crises, banks already have been taking a lot of risk and are under more heightened 
scrutiny by regulators, so that it may be harder for activists to get them to take more risk, 
so these risk-taking incentives are muted.
 
Alternatively, consistent with a limited liability 
effect, in the presence of financial distress (high bank leverage or capital) and low 
demandable deposits (Calomiris and Kahn (1991)) during crises, there may be an increase 
in moral hazard and adverse selection problems for banks and activists can take advantage 
of it and induce bank managers to take risky decisions in an attempt to “gamble for 
resurrection”.  
We re-estimate our regressions to take into account the financial crises and 
understand whether the effects may be different during financial crises versus normal 
times. For testing this, we use the following modified model: 
 .... 
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_
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FINANCIAL_CRISES is a dummy variable equal to 1 whenever there is a banking crisis or 
a market crisis. We follow Berger and Bouwman (2013), and identify three financial crises 
(the credit crunch (1990:Q1-1992:Q4), the bursting of the dot.com bubble and September 
11 terrorist attack (2000:Q2-2002:Q3), and the subprime lending crisis (2007:Q3-
2009:Q4)). We exclude FINANCIAL_CRISES alone from the model because time fixed 
effects absorb the direct effects of FINANCIAL_CRISES. The interaction term between 
FINANCIAL_CRISES and ACTIVISM captures the differential impact of activism on bank 
behavior during financial crises, and the sum of 1 2γ γ+ )( captures the total effect of 
activism during financial crises.  
We report the results in Table 2.9. The results reported in Panels A suggest that 
activism has a significantly different effect during crises versus normal time periods. Thus, 
we find higher market value, but there is no increase in risk, suggesting that it may be 
harder for activists to get banks to take more risk during crises, so risk-taking incentives 
are muted. Therefore, activists do not seem to increase risk during financial crises. Because 
some authors discuss about poor governance being a contributing factor to the subprime 
crisis, we also conduct the crises regressions by focusing on the subprime crisis only. In 
this sense, we rerun regressions over the 2006-2010 period and report the results in Panel 
B. We find again a higher market value, but no increase in risk, suggesting that the effects 
of activism during crises are muted. 42 This also adds to the debate on the role of bank 
governance during financial crises and shows that at least one corporate governance 
mechanism, shareholder activism, was not a major cause of risk during the financial crisis. 
                                                 
42 In unreported results, we also rerun the results using the three individual crises and we find that results 
hold tightly for the last two financial crises: the dot-com bubble and the recent subprime lending crisis. 
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We find that during a crisis, activists raise market value without increasing risk or 
income. There are two possibilities to explain this: either 1) it may be the case that risk did 
not go up, but market value went up because operating revenue will go up in the following 
years or 2) government interventions during the crises such as TARP (The Troubled Asset 
Relief Program), Discount Window (DW), and Term Auction Facility (TAF) may offset 
the increase in risk. In Panel C we report the results when considering separately the effects 
of the three government intervention programs and use the dummies TARP, DW, and TAF, 
for whether a bank received TARP capital support, discount window loans and/or Term 
Auction Facility (TAF) funding during the crisis. We find that the risk is decreasing 
primarily for the banks that received TARP, but the other programs do not seem to have an 
important effect.43 Therefore, the government, in its role as a creditor, may lose during 
normal times, but not during financial crises.  
2.8 Channels of Action for Activists and Actual Outcomes 
Finally, we conduct an analysis to better understand the channels through which activists 
may act.  
2.8.1 Channels predictions 
As shown above, our results are generally consistent with the empirical dominance of the 
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. In this conflict, activists may induce bank managers to 
take higher risk to increase market value at the expense of bank creditors (e.g., depositors, 
deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators, etc.) due to banks’ opaqueness and regulatory-
induced incentives. This leads to the prediction that shareholder activism is associated with 
                                                 
43 In unreported results, we also look at the effects of activism on operating revenue up to 2 years for the full 
sample, however we do not find a significant increase in operating revenue. 
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better market value and more risk-taking by the banks, but not necessarily better operating 
returns. In this section, we explain how activist investors can make targeted banks better 
or worse and change the focus of the banks in the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. We 
consider three potential channels of action: Internal Corporate Governance, Capital 
Structure, and Strategic Direction, as shown in Table 2.1 Panel B. 
 One channel activists may use is to induce changes in the Internal Corporate 
Governance of the targeted banks. 44   Activists may increase pay-for-performance 
sensitivity for managers to better align the interest between managers and shareholders 
(Brav, Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010)). Although there is 
no clear prediction in regards to CEO/board turnover and CEO pay, activist shareholders 
can force out management if it has conflicting views to the shareholders in regards to how 
the company should be run or the bank is poorly run and/or can change the board 
composition by nominating themselves or other members elected by them to the board to 
be able to better implement their proposals (e.g., Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003), Gopalan 
(2008), Brav, Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010), Qian (2011), 
Boyson and Mooradian (2011), Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012), Bharath, Jayaraman 
and Nagar (2013)).45 Besides exerting discipline over managers, activists can also make 
                                                 
44 For example, in April 1999, Lawrence Seidman, activist investor of South Jersey Financial Corp was 
involved in a proxy contest seeking to elect two directors to the company's board and an agreement was 
reached between the company and Seidman, which permitted Seidman and a second proposed nominee to 
become directors of the company. Similarly, in October 2007, Financial Edge Fund, activist of Alliance 
Bancorp Inc of Pennsylvania, met with the Company’s CEO, Dennis Cirucci, to discuss the company’s 
dismal financial performance and the need for management to dramatically enhance shareholder value and 
design compensation and benefit plans that are tied to financial performance and shareholder value metrics. 
 
45 Changes in the board composition that lead to an increase the number of outside directors with equity 
ownership may also increase the willingness of managers to accept a takeover bid (Brook, Hendershott, and 
Lee (2000)) and changes leading to a higher proportion of independent outside directors may increase bid 
premiums offered for target banks (Brewer, Jackson and Jagtiani (2000)) if activists consider getting the 
company taken over. 
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changes to bank executive compensation, by curtailing the executives’ base pay (Brav, 
Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010), Hartzell and Starks 
(2003)), however the prediction is unclear for the total compensation.46  
 A second channel that activists may use is to change bank Capital Structure. 
Activists can reduce agency problems of free cash flow in banks by reducing cash holdings 
and increasing dividend payouts to shareholders or repurchasing shares (e.g., Brav, Jiang, 
Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Brav, Jiang and Kim (2010), Clifford (2009).47 Activists can 
also induce management to hold a lower level of equity capital to improve bank’s asset 
choice, which may favor higher returns to shareholders (e.g., Calomiris and Kahn (1991)). 
A lower level of equity capital can also offer debt discipline and alleviate agency problems 
of free cash flow, which may increase returns to shareholders (e.g., Jensen, (1986), Jiraporn 
and Gleason, (2007)).  
 A third channel to induce change in the target banks is to change the Strategic 
Direction of the bank. 48  Thus, activists may induce management to engage in more 
investments in risky assets in order to improve performance (e.g., commercial real estate 
loans, more M&As). In addition, although there may not be a clear prediction for takeovers, 
                                                 
46 DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2012) find that bank CEOs respond to risk-taking incentives by taking more 
risk, and bank boards use executive compensation incentives to reinforce or support increased risk taking. 
 
47 For example, in November 2007, Seidman Lawrence, activist investor of MassBank Corporation demands 
higher dividends for shareholders, in the form of both quarterly and special payments and recommends 
accelerated share repurchases, including a possible Dutch auction. In a similar example, in August 1998, 
Seidman Lawrence, activist of 1st Bergen Bancorp believes the profitability of the company's business can 
be improved by re-deploying certain assets and better utilizing its excess capital.  
 
48 For example, in December 1997, Lawrence Seidman, activist of Wayne Bancorp requested that company's 
board consider acquisition/merger discussions with potentially interested commercial banks to maximize 
shareholders' value. Similarly, in August 2005, Lawrence Seidman, activist of Interchange Financial Services 
Corporation, states that because Mr. Abbate, the CEO of the bank was unable to grow EPS, or hold the line 
on the net interest margin and it is time for someone else to take the reins of the company. He strongly 
encourages management to hire an investment bank and solicit bids from potential acquirers.  
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activists may make the bank a takeover target if it increases shareholders’ value (e.g., bank 
can take advantage of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) or too-important-to-fail (TITF) policies). 
Literature on nonfinancials shows that returns to investor activism are driven by activists’ 
success at getting target firms taken over, in which case they can get a takeover premium 
(e.g., Greenwood and Schor (2009)). The effects on divestitures of bank divisions and costs 
are ambiguous, however these can be used as a preparatory step to make the bank look 
good on the books before becoming a takeover target so that activists can get a higher 
premium. 49 
 We test empirically the impact of the activism on the three channels described 
above and try to understand which of the channels are most important to explain the main 
results. The empirical results are presented in Table 2.10 Panels A and B.   
2.8.2 Channels of action for activists 
In Table 2.10 Panel A, we conduct a change analysis which considers all banks 
targeted by activism and means changes in their Internal Corporate Governance50, Capital 
Structure, and Strategic Direction channels, 8 quarters (2 years) before the activism and 8 
                                                 
49 Activists can also induce more divestitures if they can create value for shareholders (e.g., Brav, Jiang, 
Thomas and Partnoy (2008), Gillian, Kensinger and Martin (2000), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)).  
50All Corporate Governance variables are manually collected for the target banks from DEF 14A proxy 
statements, 10K annual reports, and 8K quarterly reports. CEO TURNOVER is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
CEO changes from 1 year to the next as per DEF 14A and 10K annual filings. CEO/BOARD TURNOVER is 
a dummy equal to 1 if CEO or another board member changes as per 8K quarterly filings. To construct this 
latter variable, we look at the 8K information contained in “Item 5.02 - Departure of Directors or Certain 
Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain 
Officers”. Search keywords include one of the following commonly mentioned phrases to indicate executive 
turnover: dismiss, dismissed, dismissed for cause, employment ceased, fire, fired, appointment revoked, 
eliminate, position eliminated, position change within company, let leave, not re-elected, expiration of 
employment agreement etc. We eliminated cases involving death (deceased), health based resignations, and 
mandatory retirement. In regards to the CEO compensation variables, these are manually collected from the 
DEF 14A and 10K annual filings. EQUITY BASED-COMPENSATION/CEO TOTAL COMPENSATION is 
the sum of total restricted stock grants and stock options granted to the CEO divided by CEO Total 
Compensation. CASH BONUS/CEO TOTAL COMPENSATION is total cash bonus granted to the CEO 
divided by CEO Total Compensation. 
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quarters (2 years) after the activism to account for the fact that some outcomes of activism 
could take a longer time period.  We find that all three channels play an important role in 
the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict.   
First, in terms of Internal Corporate Governance, we find that shareholder 
activists in banking are successful at both changing the CEO and inducing changes in the 
boards (CEO TURNOVER and CEO/BOARD TURNOVER), which may help mitigate some 
of the agency problems between management and shareholders. We also find a higher pay-
for-performance sensitivity after activism as indicated by the statistically significant results 
on EQUITY BASED-COMPENSATION/CEO TOTAL COMPENSATION, consistent with 
the prior prediction of the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict that activists may induce more 
alignment with shareholders to increase market value.  In regards to CASH BONUS/CEO 
TOTAL COMPENSATION, we find that this declines perhaps due to the fact that it is not 
directly tied to the shareholders’ value. There is no significant effect on the CEO total pay.  
Second, in terms of Capital Structure, we find that shareholder activism leads to 
more STOCK REPURCHASES and a lower CAPITALIZATION RATIO, although there are 
no significant effects on either cash holdings or dividend yield paid. Finally, in terms of 
Strategic Direction, we find that shareholder activism leads to more investments in risky 
assets as indicated by the COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS (the ratio of bank 
commercial real estate loans over GTA) and REAL ESTATE LOANS (the ratio of bank real 
estate loans over GTA)51, and also riskier funding as indicated by the increase in the 
NONDEPOSIT FUNDING (ratio of bank nondeposit funding over GTA). As for banking 
organizations becoming a takeover target (TAKEOVER TARGET), the actual takeover rate 
                                                 
51  Prior literature in banking suggests that real estate loans, and in particular commercial real estate loans 
was a factor that contributed significantly to the recent crisis (e.g., Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2013). 
 52 
 
is about 10%, suggesting that activists in banking may be quite successful at getting the 
banks acquired. This may increase these banks’ government safety net by getting them 
acquired by larger institutions and/or stepping into the TBTF umbrella52 and may also lead 
to significant premiums for the activists when successful (as indicated in Greenwood and 
Schor (2009)). Also, we find that activism in banking leads to a reduction in costs and 
acquisitions and an increase in divestitures of banks in the BHCs, potentially designed to 
make the banks more attractive targets on the market for strategic alternatives such as 
takeovers. To sum up, all channels seem to play an important role in explaining the 
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. 
2.8.3 Actual outcomes 
In Table 2.10 Panel B, to better understand what actual actions the target firms take 
in response to the activist’s requests, we follow Greenwood and Schor (2009) and collect 
news data on what happened after each event by conducting searches in Lexis-Nexis for 
each target – activist pair and also researching the NIC banking organization history up to 
two years after the activism events. We classify the outcomes into four broad outcomes 
(the three from Panel A, Internal Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and Strategic 
Direction, plus an additional one named Other which could not be adequately fit into the 
others). These comprise of thirteen subcategories. The classifications are not mutually 
exclusive: for example, if a target gives board seats to the activist and also repurchases 
shares, this company will have two outcomes represented. We include the number of 
                                                 
52 Several researchers find that bank M&As may serve as a mechanism to increase the financial safety-net 
benefits to shareholders and lead them to shift risk to the safety-net, thus exposing taxpayers (who guarantee 
the safety-net) to potentially greater losses (e.g., Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995), Carbo-Valverde, Kane, 
and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2012), Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff (2013)). 
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unique banks that fall under each category and also the percentage out of all target banks 
and that of all target banks that were found to have news about the outcomes. 
For about 49.26% (166) of the target banks (generally smaller), no additional news 
are found about outcomes except that, in some cases, we find a reiteration of some of the 
13D filings by the activist. For the other 50.74% (171) banks, we find information about 
outcomes. The first category of outcomes comprises events that relate to changes in the 
Internal Corporate Governance of the target banks. In a very large number of cases (63), 
the activist is granted seats on the board either for himself or his nominees, while in 19 
cases, the activist is not successful to get board seats (he may withdraw his solicitation for 
seats or suffer a proxy fight defeat). In 14 cases, the CEO is changed, and in 7 cases, 
company by-laws are changed (e.g., remove a poison pill, de-stagger the board, or change 
in a majority voting rule). 
The second category of outcomes comprises events that relate to changes in the 
Capital Structure of the target banks. In 15 cases, the target announces that it repurchases 
shares and/or makes changes to the dividends paid out to shareholders. In another 21 cases, 
the activist induces the bank to raise capital or helps the bank with financing options, in 
most cases accompanied by the target acquiring another institution. 
The third category of outcomes comprises events that relate to changes in the 
Strategic Direction of the target banks. In 37 cases, the target is acquired and in 5 cases 
there is announcement that the company hired an investment banker to explore strategic 
alternatives and solicit potential buyers. In 7 cases, there are news which indicate that 
activist was not successful to get the company acquired. In one case, a spin-off is 
announced and in another 10 cases there are news about target acquiring other institutions. 
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The last category of outcomes, called Other comprises events that could not be 
adequately fit into the other three categories. In 49 cases, the activist and the target sign 
either a settlement or a standstill agreement. With a settlement, the target may be able to 
extract some concessions from the activists (e.g., board seats) that it was unlikely to have 
obtained if the original slates had gone to a vote. Moreover, the company management is 
able to save face by not officially "losing" the proxy contest. At the same time, the activists 
often can get everything they asked for and appear reasonable, which can only enhance 
their options in future negotiations. The standstill agreement is very similar, expect it is 
usually giving various concessions to the activist with the only restriction that the company 
does not want the activist to take over control53 and/or become a takeover target. In 45 
cases, the activist cuts position below 5% ownership, and this outcome can occur also 
immediately after the company becomes a takeover target. 
To summarize, ex-post classifications of activism based on the outcomes reveal that 
CEO and board changes, takeover target outcomes, capital changes and agreements 
between the activist and target bank are the most frequent mechanisms that activists use in 
banking to induce changes and increase market value. 
2.9 Conclusions 
Sound corporate governance of banks is critical for the economic growth and development, 
and poor governance may exacerbate the financial system vulnerability to shocks. This 
paper is the first empirical study to test shareholder activism as a channel of external 
                                                 
53 As per the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, a position of 10% ownership is considered a controlling 
position and regulatory approval may need to be obtained. Most of the activists have less than 10% stake in 
a bank. 
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corporate governance in banking, complementing internal governance, regulators, and 
other external governance structures.  
Using a unique hand-collected dataset on shareholder activism for all public 
commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US over the period 1994:Q1-
2010:Q4, we have the following findings: 1) We find that activism is important in banking: 
about one third of the public banks (337 unique banks) have some form of activism during 
the sample period. 2) Activists appear to target banks with agency problems and growth 
potential that are easy in which to implement changes to increase value. 3) We find that 
shareholder activism creates value for shareholders but has little impact on operating 
returns and increases bank default risk, consistent with the empirical dominance 
Hypothesis 3, the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict which predicts that activists may induce 
higher risk to increase market value at the expense of bank creditors. This suggests that 
activism may be generally a destabilizing force. 4) However, we find that activism differs 
significantly during financial crises, resulting in higher market value and no increase in 
risk, suggesting that activism was not a major source of risk during the financial crises. 
Therefore, the creditors (including the government) may lose during normal times, but not 
during financial crises. 
The paper contributes primarily to two strands of research. First, it contributes to 
the broader literature on shareholder activism by examining activism within one important 
industry rather than across a number of very different industries, which reduces the concern 
about confounding inter-industry differences. Although researchers point to the 
shareholder return benefits resulting from activism, our results suggest that other additional 
effects of activism, such as the increase in risk, should not be neglected. 
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Second, this paper also adds to the literature on bank risk and performance by 
introducing shareholder activism as a factor influencing risk and performance and sets the 
groundwork for further research on shareholder activism in banking. The current topic is 
important especially from a government policy perspective because poor governance may 
aggravate financial system fragility to shocks and pose systemic risk to the real economy 
(e.g., Laeven and Levine (2009), Kirkpatrick (2009), G30 Steering Committee on 
Corporate Governance (2011), Song and Li (2012)) and is regarded as a possible important 
contributing factor to the recent financial crisis. In addition, shareholder activism may be 
regarded with skepticism.54 Our findings suggest that activists in banking may increase risk 
and market value at the expense of creditors and may be a threat to financial stability. These 
results have important implications for the government policies targeting bank governance 
and regulation of activism regarding banks. Regulators may keep a close watch on activists 
because they may increase bank risk during normal times. However activists do not seem 
to increase risk during financial crises. This adds to the debate on the role of bank 
governance during financial crises and shows that at least one corporate governance 
mechanism, shareholder activism, may not have been a major cause of risk during the 
financial crisis (e.g., Beltratti and Stultz (2010)). 
 
                                                 
54 Some authors argue that activists should be subject to more rigorous public scrutiny and accountability 
(Weber (1922, 1947)). Anabtawi and Stout (2008) argue that an increase in shareholder power should come 
with an increase in fiduciary responsibility. In the banking industry, this concern may be even more acute. 
Moreover, shareholder activism has received increased attention in light of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act as well as recent SEC rulings which increase the rights of the investors. 
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Table 2.1 Hypotheses and Potential Channels 
 
 
Panel A: Hypotheses and Main Effects 
 
 
Panel B Potential Channels for Shareholder Activism in Banking 
 
 
 
  
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Effects  Predicted Sign Predicted Sign Predicted Sign Predicted Sign 
Market Value/Performance
TOBIN's Q + + + -
Operating Returns
ROA + + ? -
Default Risk
Z-SCORE - + - -
Variable
Shareholder-
Manager 
Conflict 1
Shareholder-
Manager 
Conflict 2
Shareholder-
Creditor 
Conflict
Activist-
Other Stakeholders
Conflict
Variable Creditor-Shareholder Conflict
Potential Channels Predicted Sign 
Internal Corporate Governance
CEO/Board Turnover ?
CEO Pay ?
CEO Pay-for-performance Sensitivity +
Changes in By-laws +
Capital Structure
Dividend Payout +
Stock Repurchases +
Cash Holdings -
Capital Ratio -
Strategic Direction
Risky Assets +
Cost Reduction/ Efficiency -
Divestitures/Spin-Off -
Acquisitions +
Takeover Target ?
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Table 2.2: Shareholder Activism (1994-2010) – Events by Year and Demand 
 
 
Panel A reports the number of activism events per year based on information in 13D and DFAN14A filings 
and Item 4 – Purpose of Transaction section. Panel B reports the number of activist demands for each year 
in our sample period, classified in seven well-defined categories shown below. The categories are considered 
non-exclusive, so an event can sometimes fall into multiple categories at a time. The sample period runs from 
t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for the detailed definitions of the variables.  
 
Panel A: Distribution of Shareholder Activism - Events by Year 
Year All Types of Activism 
 (Material Events) 
 No Unique Banks  
w/ Material Activism 
Total Unique  
Banks 
% Banks with 
Activism 
1994 10 7 391 0.018 
1995 29 19 392 0.048 
1996 57 25 401 0.062 
1997 75 49 442 0.111 
1998 76 42 472 0.089 
1999 82 47 459 0.102 
2000 91 42 445 0.094 
2001 97 46 446 0.103 
2002 73 41 435 0.094 
2003 70 41 440 0.093 
2004 53 28 455 0.062 
2005 42 32 443 0.072 
2006 91 40 451 0.089 
2007 93 34 428 0.079 
2008 103 39 402 0.097 
2009 84 42 382 0.110 
2010 78 41 374 0.110 
Total 1204 337 1002 Average = 0.085 
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Panel B: Shareholder Activism by Type of Demand & Year 
Year 1. Engage  
Management 
2. Strategic 
Changes 
3. Internal  
Governance 
4. Capital  
Allocation 
5. Proxy 
Fight 
6. Asset 
Sale 
  
7. 
Litigation/  
Bankruptcy 
1994 1 7 3         
1995 10 21 5     1   
1996 10 30 15 1 12 2 4 
1997 20 44 18 5 3 4 4 
1998 29 37 18 1 6 6 2 
1999 32 32 20 4 9 3   
2000 25 28 28 8 16 3   
2001 48 43 20 31 1 6 4 
2002 17 15 18 41 4 6 1 
2003 22 34 18 13 3 7 1 
2004 11 26 17 10 4 1 3 
2005 14 21 11 6   3 1 
2006 35 24 29 4 18 7 5 
2007 48 12 37 6 17 11 3 
2008 41 14 32 9 35 8 1 
2009 41 17 30 11 11 9 2 
2010 36 18 19 17 1 2   
Total 440 423 338 167 140 78 31 
%  36.5% 35.1% 28.1% 13.9% 11.6% 6.5% 2.6% 
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Table 2.3: Antecedents of Shareholder Activism 
 
 
This table reports probit estimates for the shareholder activism of banks using determinants previously 
identified for non-financials and additional ones specific to banks. The main activism measure (ACTIVISM) 
is a dummy equal to 1 in all quarters in which the bank has activism. SIZE is the log value of gross total 
assets (GTA). TOBIN's Q is a measure of financial performance determined as market value of common 
stock over equity book value. ROA is the ratio of annualized net income to gross total assets (GTA). 
GROWTH is the growth rate of GTA. CAPITALIZATION RATIO is equity capital over gross total assets 
(GTA). DIVYLD is the dividend yield, defined as (common dividend + preferred dividends)/(market value 
of common stocks + book value of preferred). INST OWNERSHIP is the proportion of shares held by 
institutions. AMIHUD is the Amihud (2002)’s measure of trading illiquidity determined as the yearly average 
(using daily data) of 1000*sqrt(|return|/dollar trading volume). NUMBER OF ANALYSTS is the number of 
analysts covering the company. AGE is age (in years) of the oldest bank owned by the BHC. 
BRANCHES/GTA are the ratio of total bank branches over GTA. NO_STATES is the log of the number of 
states in which the bank has branches. METROPOLITAN is a dummy equal to 1 when the majority of bank 
deposits (50% or more) are in MSA areas. DEPOSITS/GTA is total deposits over GTA. LOANS/GTA is a 
measure of the composition of bank assets determined as total loans over GTA. CASH_HOLDINGS is cash 
holdings divided by GTA. NPL is the ratio of nonperforming loans and loans in default to GTA. 
INCOME_DIVERSITY is 1 minus the absolute value of the ratio between the difference between net interest 
income and other operating income and total operating income. FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP is equal to 1 when 
foreign shareholdings exceed 50% of total bank ownership. HHI is bank concentration, measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for bank deposits. OCC is a dummy equal to 1 for banks supervised by OCC. 
FDIC is a dummy equal to 1 for banks supervised by FDIC. INCORP_DE is equal to 1 if the bank is 
incorporated in Delaware. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters and all regressions include time 
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by the bank. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. 
Appendix A provides definitions for all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:  (1) (2) (3) 
Dummy of being targeted Marg. Prob t-statistic Marg. Prob t-statistic Marg. Prob t-statistic 
BANK SIZE -0.005** (-2.136) -0.014*** (-3.327) -0.003 (-1.242) 
TOBIN's Q -0.159*** (-2.086) -0.131*** (-1.528) -0.200*** (-4.788) 
GROWTH -0.000 (-1.306) -0.000 (-1.232) -0.000 (-0.812) 
ROA -0.319*** (-4.013) -0.272*** (-3.150) -0.278*** (-4.438) 
EQRAT -0.028 (-0.255) -0.058 (-0.624) -0.065 (-0.759) 
DIVYLD -0.260** (-2.163) -0.116* (-0.987) -0.213** (-2.044) 
INST 0.036*** (2.924) 0.022* (1.724) 0.023** (2.274) 
AMIHUD -0.008* (-2.309) -0.003 (-0.583) -0.007** (-2.536) 
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS   0.001** (2.022)    
BANK AGE       -0.000 (-0.716) 
BRANCHES / GTA     0.038*** (3.918) 
NO_STATES     -0.010** (-2.260) 
URBAN     0.003 (0.318) 
DEPOSITS / GTA     -0.052** (-2.415) 
LOANS / GTA     0.026 (1.482) 
CASH_HOLDINGS     0.081** (2.417) 
NPL RATIO     0.055 (0.429) 
INCOME_DIVERSITY     -0.010 (-0.856) 
 61 
 
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP     -0.022 (-1.609) 
HHI DEPOSITS     0.063 (1.478) 
OCC_SUPERVISOR     0.011 (1.638) 
FDIC_SUPERVISOR     0.006 (1.131) 
INCORP_DE         0.008 (1.234) 
No. obs. & Pseudo-R-sq 22,492 0.047 14,879 0.067 21,999 0.084 
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Table 2.4: Effects of Shareholder Activism (Main Effects) 
 
 
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and financial performance (TOBIN’s Q), 
operating returns (ROA), and risk (Z-SCORE). We define the activism measure (ACTIVISM) as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank 
had material activist events. TOBIN's Q is a measure of financial performance determined as market value of common stock over equity book value. ROA is 
operating net income over GTA. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA, with a larger 
value indicates lower overall bank risk; BANK SIZE is the log value of Total Assets. AGE is age (in years) of the oldest bank owned by the bank holding company. 
DEPOSITS/GTA is a measure of the composition of bank liabilities determined as total deposits over GTA. LOANS/GTA is a measure of the composition of bank 
assets side determined as total loans over GTA. INCOME_DIVERSITY is the Leaven and Levine (2009)’s  measure of income diversity defined as 1 minus the 
absolute value of the ratio between the difference between net interest income and other operating income and total operating income. FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP 
is a dummy variable set to 1 when total foreign shareholding exceeds 50% of total bank ownership. OCC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for national 
banks that are supervised by OCC. FDIC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for state non-member banks that are supervised by FDIC. FRS is a dummy 
variable taking a value of 1 for state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. We use an OLS model with time and bank fixed effects. All independent 
variables are lagged 4 quarters. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all 
variables utilized in the regressions. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM 0.007*** -0.000 -4.317*** 
  (3.976) (-1.214) (-3.208) 
BANK SIZE -0.011* -0.001*** 1.072 
 (-1.923) (-5.775) (1.173) 
BANK AGE -0.009 0.000 6.799** 
 (-1.196) (1.308) (2.534) 
DEPOSITS / GTA -0.048** 0.001 -8.323** 
 (-2.281) (1.090) (-2.292) 
LOANS / GTA 0.078*** 0.003*** 19.273*** 
 (4.407) (7.912) (6.757) 
INCOME DIVERSITY 0.021** 0.002*** 5.526*** 
 (2.191) (8.500) (3.134) 
OVERHEAD COSTS 650.989*** -3.420*** -25,295.554*** 
 (2.854) (-2.759) (-2.955) 
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FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 0.028*** -0.001 -15.558*** 
 (2.679) (-1.030) (-2.632) 
OCC SUPERVISOR -0.008*** -0.000 -1.998 
 (-3.417) (-0.187) (-1.183) 
FDIC SUPERVISOR 0.003 0.000 4.171*** 
 (1.079) (0.577) (2.761) 
INTERCEPT 1.162*** 0.012*** -6.633 
 (12.945) (7.094) (-0.470) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,821 23,965 23,801 
R-squared 0.875 0.604 0.472 
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Table 2.5: Alternative Measures 
 
 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and their financial performance, operating 
returns, and risk. We show models with alternative measures. ACTIVISM is a dummy which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist 
events. We use an OLS model with time and bank fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. 
Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Different Measures of Market Performance 
  TOBIN'S Q BUY-AND-HOLD_RET BUY-AND-HOLD_AB_RET SHARPE RATIO 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
ACTIVISM 0.007*** 0.028** 0.023** 0.711*** 
  (3.976) (2.529) (2.157) (5.346) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,821 23,842 23,842 23,842 
R-squared  0.875 0.563 0.572 0.593 
 
 
Panel B: Different Measures of Accounting Performance 
  ROA ROE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 
      
ACTIVISM -0.000 -0.001 
  (-1.214) (-0.820) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 23,965 23,965 
R-squared  0.604 0.630 
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Panel C: Different Measures of Bank Risk-Taking 
  Z-SCORE VOLATILITY _STOCK_RET LLA RATIO NPL RATIO VOLATILITY ROA 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
ACTIVISM -4.317*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.003** 0.001** 
  (-3.208) (3.139) (3.035) (2.439) (2.403) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,801 23,933 23,965 23,965 23,963 
R-squared  0.472 0.549 0.607 0.462 0.533 
 
Panel D: Different Measures of Activism (Number of Activism Events) 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
NO_ACTIVISM_EVENTS 0.003*** 0.000 -1.645*** 
  (5.205) (0.774) (-5.390) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,819 23,963 23,799 
R-squared  0.875 0.604 0.472 
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Table 2.6: Different Econometric Approaches 
 
 
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and their financial performance, operating 
returns, and risk. We show models with alternative measures. ACTIVISM is a dummy which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist 
events.  Panel A shows using an event study (EVENTUS) the compound abnormal returns round activism events for several time windows, daily windows of 
(0,+1), (-1,+1), (-2,+2), and (-5,+5)  and monthly windows of (0,3), (0,6), (0,12), (0,24), (0,36), (-1,12). Panels B, C and D show alternative econometrical models 
for operating returns (ROA), and bank risk (Z-SCORE): OLS, OLS with Time and Bank Fixed Effects (FE), Simple OLS, Time fixed effects (FE) only, Random 
Effects (RE), model with two-way clusters (bank and time), and model with Newey-West standard errors. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The 
sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Market Performance (Event Studies) 
 
Panel A.1: Market Performance (Event Study) – Daily 
Market Adjusted Returns, Value Weighted Index     
Days N CAR t-test p-value 
(0,+1) 915 1.42% 8.302 <.0001 
(-1,+1) 915 1.79% 8.542 <.0001 
(-2,+2) 915 2.26% 8.370 <.0001 
(-5,+5) 915 2.89% 7.200 <.0001 
 
Panel A.2: Market Performance (Event Study) – Monthly 
Market Adjusted Returns, Value Weighted Index     
Months N CAR t-test p-value 
(0,+3) 939 4.22% 4.799 <.0001 
(0,+6) 939 4.88% 4.196 <.0001 
(0,+12) 939 6.77% 4.271 <.0001 
(0,+24) 939 8.93% 4.061 <.0001 
(0,+36) 939 13.11% 4.902 <.0001 
(-1,+12) 939 7.68% 4.670 <.0001 
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Panel B: Operating Performance (ROA) 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
  OLS w/ FE Simple OLS Time FE Only RE  Newey-West Two-way Clusters 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
ACTIVISM -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (-1.214) (-6.773) (-7.393) (-1.259) (-4.167) (-5.276) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Bank Effects Yes No No Yes No No 
Observations 23,965 23,965 23,965 23,045 23,045 23,045 
R-squared  0.604 0.157 0.297   0.294   
 
 
Panel C: Bank Risk-Taking (Z-SCORE) 
 
Dependent Variable: Z-SCORE 
  OLS w/ FE Simple OLS Time FE Only RE  Newey-West Two-way Clusters 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
ACTIVISM -4.317*** -5.920*** -5.647*** -3.570* -6.176*** -6.069* 
  (-3.208) (-4.042) (-3.888) (-1.678) (-3.280) (-1.733) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Bank Effects Yes No No Yes No No 
Observations 23,801 23,801 23,801 22,915 22,915 22,915 
R-squared  0.472 0.056 0.122 0.0998 0.05489119 0.121 
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Table 2.7: Endogeneity Treatments 
 
 
This table reports the regression estimates with endogeneity treatments of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and strategic 
consequences such as financial performance (TOBIN’s Q), operating returns (ROA), and their risk taking behavior (Z-SCORE). We define the main activism 
measure as a dummy which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk 
and it is determined as A(ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk. ROA is operating net income over GTA. We use an OLS 
model with time and bank FE. Panel A reports results when using a 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) estimation that controls for endogeneity of activism. We use 
as instrument % BUSY ACTIVISTS, which is the percentage of busy activists, that is, activists with five or more campaigns and/or 2 or more proxy fights at the 
same time. Panel B reports models using a propensity score matched sample. Panel C shows the results Heckman’s two-step treatment effect model used to correct 
the self-selection in activism. The selection (activism) equation uses a ACTIVISM dummy as a dependent variable and uses the same instrument as in the 
instrumental variable analysis. The outcome equation uses TOBIN’s Q, ROA, and Z-SCORE as dependent variables. We include all control variables from the main 
specification in all panel specifications. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A 
for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 
IV Analysis (First Stage)  
  Dependent Variable: ACTIVISM 
Independent Variables (1) 
    
% BUSY ACTIVISTS 0.044*** 
 (5.397) 
Controls Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 23,963 
R-squared 0.219 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 544.718*** 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 3605.73*** 
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IV Analysis (Second Stage) 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM 0.080*** -0.002 -50.260*** 
  (3.869) (-1.169) (-3.174) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,819 23,963 23,799 
R-squared 0.875 0.604 0.472 
 
Panel B: PSM Analysis 
 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM 0.006** -0.000** -4.883** 
  (2.252) (-2.052) (-2.310) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,701 4,958 4,958 
R-squared 0.897 0.668 0.548 
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Panel C: Heckman Selection 
 
Heckman Analysis (Selection Equation) 
  Dependent Variable: ACTIVISM (Probit) 
Independent Variables (1) 
    
% BUSY ACTIVISTS 0.047*** 
 (26.020) 
Controls Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects No 
Observations 23,962 
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 
 
Heckman Analysis (Outcome Equation)   
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM 0.008*** -0.000 -4.664*** 
  (4.479) (-1.351) (-3.437) 
LAMBDA 0.004*** -0.000* -1.576*** 
 (5.567) (-1.701) (-3.002) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects No No No 
Observations 22,818 23,962 23,798 
R-squared (or Pseudo) 0.875 0.604 0.472 
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Table 2.8: Subsamples Analysis for Effects of Activism 
 
 
This table reports the subsamples regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and strategic consequences: 
financial performance (TOBIN’s Q), operating returns (ROA), and risk taking behavior (Z-SCORE). We define the main activism measure as a dummy, which takes 
a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA) 
+ A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk. ROA is operating net income over GTA. We use an OLS model with time and bank FE. 
All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. Panel A reports results separately for hedge fund activists and non-hedge funds activists. Panel B reports results 
separately for more aggressive activism (DFAN14A) versus less aggressive activism (13D). Panel C looks at effects of activism using a sample that excludes TBTF 
banks. Panel D reports effects of activism by bank size: SMALL, MEDIUM and LARGE. SMALL represents banks with GTA up to $1 billion, MEDIUM represents 
banks with GTA exceeding $1 billion and up to $5 billion, and LARGE represents banks with GTA exceeding $5 billion. GTA equals total assets plus the allowance 
for loan and the lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A details on the 
definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Hedge Fund or Not 
 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
HF_ACTIVIST 0.010*** -0.000 -9.628*** 
  (5.689) (-0.333) (-4.854) 
NON_HF_ACTIVIST 0.008*** -0.001*** -3.619** 
  (3.698) (-3.242) (-2.420) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,821 23,965 23,801 
R-squared 0.875 0.604 0.472 
 
t-stat for equality of coefficients: 
0.663 1.758* 2.474** 
HF_ACTIVIST = NON_HF_ACTIVIST 
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Panel B: Effects by 13D vs. DFAN14A 
 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
DFAN14A 0.006* -0.000 -14.864*** 
  (1.656) (-0.368) (-4.336) 
13D 0.010*** -0.000* -4.867*** 
  (6.479) (-1.721) (-4.351) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,821 23,965 23,801 
R-squared 0.875 0.604 0.472 
 
t-stat for equality of coefficients:  
DFAN14A = 13D 
            1.179                     0.200                  2.886*** 
 
Panel C: Excluding Too-big-to-fail (TBTF) 
 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM 0.003** -0.000* -5.902*** 
 (1.964) (-1.748) (-4.289) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,716 20,736 20,579 
R-squared 0.883 0.607 0.476 
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Panel D: Effects by Bank Size 
 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
        
SMALL 0.005*** -0.000 -2.852* 
  (2.649) (-0.598) (-1.688) 
Observations 9,678 10,431 10,311 
R-squared (or Pseudo) 0.935 0.629 0.529 
        
MEDIUM -0.001 -0.000 -7.677*** 
  (-0.400) (-0.877) (-3.494) 
Observations 8,147 8,376 8,345 
R-squared (or Pseudo) 0.795 0.631 0.517 
        
LARGE 0.026*** 0.000 5.083 
 (4.185) (0.075) (1.380) 
Observations 4,996 5,158 5,145 
R-squared (or Pseudo) 0.792 0.597 0.511 
        
ALL SIZE GROUPS       
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.9: Shareholder Activism during Financial Crises 
 
 
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and strategic consequences: financial 
performance (TOBIN’s Q), operating returns (ROA), and their risk taking behavior (Z-SCORE) during crises versus normal times. We define the main activism 
measure (ACTIVISM) as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure 
of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk.  ROA is operating net income over 
GTA. We use an OLS model with time and bank FE. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. FINANCIAL_CRISES variable construction follows Berger 
and Bouwman (2013). FINANCIAL_CRISES 55 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for a crisis period and it includes both market (those originated in the 
capital markets) and banking crises (those originated in the banking sector). Panel A reports effects of activism during financial crises for the full sample. Panel B 
reports effects of activism during the subprime financial crisis (2006-2010). The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details 
on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Effects during Financial Crises (Full Sample) 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM 0.003 -0.000** -9.885*** 
  (1.408) (-2.015) (-6.337) 
ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES 0.009*** 0.000 12.263*** 
  (2.771) (1.578) (5.171) 
(ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES) 0.012*** 0.000 2.378 
t-stat (ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES = 0) 4.443 0.332 1.179 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,821 23,965 23,801 
R-squared 0.875 0.604 0.472 
 
  
                                                 
55 Banking crisis is the recent subprime lending crisis and market crises are the Russian debt crisis plus LTCM bailout in 1998, and the bursting of the dot.com 
bubble plus September 11. Normal times is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for all time periods that are not financial crises. 
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Panel B: Effects during the Subprime Financial Crisis (2006-2010) 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM -0.003 -0.002*** -9.941*** 
  (-1.490) (-4.443) (-3.499) 
ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES 0.010*** 0.002*** 10.821*** 
  (3.608) (4.258) (3.361) 
(ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES) 0.007*** 0.000 0.880 
t-stat (ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES = 0) 3.250 1.421 0.400 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,535 7,786 7,757 
R-squared 0.896 0.628 0.633 
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Panel C: Effects during Recent Financial Crisis (2006-2010) – TARP, Discount Window, and Term Auction Facility 
 
 
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and financial performance (TOBIN’s Q), 
operating returns (ROA), and risk taking (Z-SCORE) during crises versus normal times and considers impact of TARP, Discount Window and TAF support. We 
define the main activism measure (ACTIVISM) as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level 
Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk.  ROA is operating 
net income over GTA. We use an OLS model with time and bank FE. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. FINANCIAL_CRISES variable construction 
follows Berger and Bouwman (2013). FINANCIAL_CRISES 56 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for a crisis period and it includes both market (those 
originated in the capital markets) and banking crises (those originated in the banking sector). Panel A reports effects of activism during financial crises. The sample 
period runs from t = 2006 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM -0.000 -0.000 -7.688*** 
  (-0.176) (-0.723) (-3.865) 
ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES 0.008* -0.001 4.308 
  (1.907) (-1.262) (1.418) 
TARP * ACTIVISM -0.007 0.002*** -6.582 
  (-1.587) (3.652) (-1.398) 
TARP * ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES 0.008 -0.000 16.669*** 
  (1.141) (-0.704) (2.810) 
DW* ACTIVISM 0.005 -0.001* 3.981 
  (1.325) (-1.835) (1.069) 
DW* ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES -0.015*** 0.001* 0.376 
  (-2.603) (1.900) (0.071) 
TAF * ACTIVISM 0.011 -0.002*** -4.458 
  (1.278) (-3.074) (-0.582) 
TAF * ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES 0.021** 0.001 -4.160 
                                                 
56 Banking crisis is the recent subprime lending crisis and market crises are the Russian debt crisis plus LTCM bailout in 1998, and the bursting of the dot.com 
bubble plus September 11. Normal times is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for all time periods that are not financial crises. 
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  (1.987) (0.969) (-0.513) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,821 23,965 23,801 
R-squared 0.875 0.604 0.473 
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Table 2.10: Potential Channels and Actual Outcomes of Action for Activists 
 
 
This table reports channels for the effects of activism: Internal Corporate Governance, Capital Structure, and Strategic Direction. The sample includes the banks 
that are targeted by activists and the sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Panel A, presents a change analysis which investigates changes in means in the 
channels’ components, by comparing them 8 quarters (2 years) before the activism with 8 quarters (2 years) after the activism events to account for the fact that 
some outcomes for activism could take a longer time period. Panel B follows Greenwood and Schor (2009) and is based on Lexis Nexis news collected about what 
happened after each activism event.  
 
Panel A: Potential Channels of Activism (Change Analysis) 
Channel   
Before Activism After  Activism Difference in Means 
(Quarters: t-8, t-1) (Quarters: t+1, t+8) After - Before 
            
Variable N Mean Mean Difference t-stat 
Internal Corporate Governance           
CEO TURNOVER 5735 0.08 0.095 0.015** 2.031 
CEO/BOARD TURNOVER 5735 0.157 0.194 0.037*** 3.928 
LOG(1+CEO TOTAL PAY) 5735 13.183 13.229 0.046 1.285 
CASH BONUS/CEO TOTAL PAY 5701 0.131 0.119 -0.012*** -2.817 
CEO Pay-for-Performance: EQUITY-BASED 
COMPENSATION/CEO TOTAL PAY 
5700 0.151 0.167 0.016** 2.071 
Capital Structure           
Dividend Payout (DIVYLD) 6843 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.419 
STOCK REPURCHASES 6845 0.400 0.453 0.053* 1.652 
CASH HOLDINGS 6845 0.040 0.040 0.000 -0.321 
CAPITALIZATION RATIO 6845 0.093 0.091 -0.001*** -2.383 
Strategic Direction           
Risky Assets: COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS 6845 0.241 0.251 0.010*** 3.028 
Risky Assets: REAL ESTATE LOANS 6845 0.473 0.483 0.010** 2.39 
Risky Financing: NON-DEPOSIT FUNDING 6845 0.152 0.158 0.006** 2.251 
OVERHEAD COSTS 6845 0.061 0.035 -0.026*** -2.827 
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Strategic Direction (cont.)           
DIVESTITURES (BHCs have banks acquired by 
other institutions) 
~5% increase from 14% (46/337) up to 2 years before activism to 19% (64/337) of the BHCs have 
banks acquired by other institutions up to 2 years after shareholder activism. 
ACQUISITIONS 
~1% decrease from 12% (41/337) organizations making acquisitions up to 2 years after activism to 
13% (44/337) organizations making acquisitions up to 2 years before activism. 
TAKEOVER TARGET (the organization - BHC or 
commercial bank - is acquired by another institution) 
~10% (37 /337) of the organizations become takeover targets up to 2 year after shareholder. 
 
Panel B: Outcomes of Activism (Lexis-Nexis News) 
Outcome  Number of Unique Banks % of All Banks % of Banks with News 
No News 166 49.26%  
News: 171 50.74%  
Corporate Governance:    
Changes of CEO 14 4.15% 8.19% 
Board Seats Granted to Activist and/or his Nominees 63 18.69% 36.84% 
Activist Is Not Granted Board Seats/Withdrawal/Proxy Defeat 19 5.64% 11.11% 
Changes in By-Laws: Staggered Board, Poisson Pill etc. 7 2.08% 4.09% 
Capital Structure:    
Shares Repurchased / Dividend Policy 15 4.45% 8.77% 
Capital Raise / Financing Agreement 21 6.23% 12.28% 
Strategic Changes:     
Takeover of the Target Completed 37 10.98% 21.64% 
Activist Wants to Sell the Company and Does not Succeed 7 2.08% 4.09% 
Announcement that Company Hires IB for Strategic Alternatives 5 1.48% 2.92% 
Divestiture or Spinoff Completed or Announced 1 0.30% 0.58% 
Acquisitions of Other Institutions 10 2.97% 5.85% 
Other:    
Settlement / Standstill Agreement 49 14.54% 28.65% 
Activist Cuts Position Below 5% 45 13.35% 26.32% 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONALIZATION AND BANK RISK57,58 
3.1 Introduction 
Economists generally believe that diversification into activities with returns that are not 
highly correlated with those of the existing portfolio reduces risk. However, this might not 
always be the case. If the diversification is into activities with higher risk, it could increase 
overall portfolio risk even if the returns on the activities are not highly correlated with those 
of the existing portfolio. The recent global financial crisis has reinvigorated the debate on 
the benefits of financial integration. During this crisis, risk seemed to be contagious across 
countries, suggesting that diversification across international borders may not have been 
effective. As also observed during the crisis, bank risk can have a first-
                                                 
57 Allen N. Berger, Sadok El Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami, and Raluca A. Roman. Submitted to Management 
Science, 02/11/2015. 
  
58 We thank Jennie Bai, Nicolla Cetorelli, Lucy Chernykh, Saiying Deng, George Filis, Linda Goldberg, 
Chuck Kwok, Luc Laeven, Tanakorn Makaew, Sabur Mollah, Don Morgan, Frederike Niepmann, Jiaping 
Qiu, Kwangwoo Park, Andreas Pfingsten, Gordon Roberts, Asani Sarkar, Kenneth Singleton, Peter Wong, 
participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, North Carolina State University, Tokyo Keizai 
University, and University of South Carolina seminars, participants at the American Finance Association, 
Financial Management Association European Conference, Eastern Finance Association, International 
Finance and Banking Society, European Finance Management Association, Multinational Finance Society, 
Finance Management Association, Southern Finance Association, the Asia-Pacific Financial Markets 
(CAFM) of the Korean Securities Association (KSA), and the International Conference on Asian Financial 
Markets and World Conference on Risk, Banking, and Finance meetings for constructive comments and 
Christa Bouwman for some data help. We thank Justin Choma and Constantin Roman for excellent research 
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order effect on financial and economic stability (Laeven and Levine, 2009). To mitigate 
the destabilizing potential of such risk,national and international organizations have 
focused on implementing regulations to limit bank risk and avoid future financial crises.59 
Much of the focus of such reforms has been on constraining banks’ risk within one country. 
However, Houston, Lin, and Ma (2012) and Ongena, Popov, and Udell (2013) suggest that 
banks may engage in regulatory arbitrage, circumventing strict domestic regulations by 
taking more risk abroad. This raises the question of how bank internationalization affects 
the risk of individual banks. This is the question we address in this paper.  
The literature identifies a number of other determinants of bank risk, including bank 
capital (e.g., Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1997; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011; Mehran and Thakor, 2011; Berger and 
Bouwman, 2013), regulation and other government interventions (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Black and Hazelwood, 2013; Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck, 2014; Duchin 
and Sosyura, 2014), competition (e.g., Keeley, 1990; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Berger, 
Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010), bank size (e.g., 
Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2011; Bhagat, Bolton, and Lu, 2012), 
and governance (e.g., Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch, 2014).  
However, to our knowledge no prior study focuses on the direct link between 
internationalization and bank risk.60 Further, prior work has little to say about the effects 
                                                 
59 Examples include the Dodd-Frank requirement that systemically important financial institutions in the U.S. 
receive additional supervision from the Federal Reserve and the Bank for International Settlements’ Basel 
III capital and liquidity standards. 
 
60 A partial exception is Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2013). However, their focus is different – on risk and 
market power in an international context. As a side result, they find a weak negative relation between 
internationalization and risk for German banks. We find a very different result for U.S. banks.  
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of bank internationalization during financial crises. In addition, there is no research to our 
knowledge that examines agency problems in explaining bank internationalization 
decisions. This paper aims to fill these gaps in the literature. 
There is also a literature that considers the effect of internationalization on 
nonfinancial firm risk. There are two opposing views in this literature. On the one hand, 
Hughes, Logue, and Sweeney (1975), Rugman (1976), Agmon and Lessard (1977), 
Amihud and Lev (1981), and Michel and Shaked (1986) document a lower risk for 
multinational corporations (MNCs) relative to purely domestic corporations. The most 
cited argument for the observed lower risk is the diversification benefit of generating cash 
flows in different countries. On the other hand, Bartov, Bodnar, and Kaul (1996) and Reeb, 
Kwok, and Baek (1998) find a higher risk for these MNCs due to greater volatility of cash 
flows. The most commonly advanced arguments for the observed higher risk are: foreign 
exchange risk (Solnik, 1974; Eun and Resnik, 1988; Black, 1990), political risk (Mahajan, 
1990; Burgman, 1996; Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney, and Manrakhan, 2007), increased 
agency problems and difficulties in effectively monitoring managers abroad (Lee and 
Kwok, 1988), and the presence of asymmetric information due to competition and 
unfamiliarity with the foreign markets (Reeb, Kwok, and Baek, 1998). These factors can 
offset the benefit from the diversification of MNCs’ cash flows. Finally, Kwok and Reeb 
(2000) find that the effect of internationalization on the risk of MNCs might vary with 
home and host market conditions. 
In contrast to the literature on nonfinancial firms, this paper focuses on banks 
because bank risk is a central issue affecting financial stability, business cycle fluctuations, 
and economic growth (Laeven and Levine, 2009). This paper also contributes to the 
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broader literature on internationalization by examining risk within one important industry 
rather than across a number of very different industries with their confounding differences.  
To investigate the impact of internationalization on bank risk, we first consider a 
simple model of an international bank’s portfolio with two risky assets: a single foreign 
asset with expected return  and standard deviation  and a single domestic asset with 
expected return  and standard deviation . The correlation between the two assets is 
, and the bank invests proportion  in the foreign asset. Our (inverse) measure of risk 
is Z-score. Z-score is defined as the sum of a bank’s mean return on assets and mean 
capitalization ratio divided by the standard deviation of return on assets. We assess the 
impact of the degree of internationalization, captured by , on Z-score by computing the 
partial derivative of Z-score with respect to  . We cannot unambiguously sign this 
derivative, but we use Matlab to gain insight as to how the sign varies with different values 
of the underlying parameters. Most findings are consistent with intuition. 
From this model, we develop two hypotheses on the impact of internationalization 
on bank risk. The diversification hypothesis suggests that international banks may have 
lower risk because they diversify their portfolios (e.g., DeLong, 2001; Amihud, DeLong, 
and Saunders, 2002; Laeven and Levine, 2007). For example, if asset returns are not highly 
correlated across countries (  is low), internationally diversified banks may be safer 
because they are less exposed to domestic shocks (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Demsetz and 
Strahan, 1997) as long as the risk of the foreign asset is not too high relative to the risk of 
the domestic asset (i.e.,  is not too large relative to  and  is not too low relative to 
). 
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Alternatively, the market risk hypothesis suggests that international banks may 
have higher risk due to market-specific factors that make foreign assets relatively risky 
(i. e. ,  high relative to  and/or   low relative to ), unless this risk is offset by a low 
correlation    (e.g., Winton, 2000; Amihud, DeLong, and Saunders, 2002). Foreign 
market conditions may cause international banks to face greater risks on their foreign 
assets. As in the nonfinancial firm risk literature, foreign exchange risk may make foreign 
assets riskier to the extent that they are not denominated in the home currency (e.g., 
Brimmer and Dahl, 1975). Further, local competition in the foreign markets may affect the 
time it takes for a new entrant to establish market share and to create lending relationships 
(e.g., Berger, Klapper, and Udell, 2001; Chari and Gupta, 2008). Another important factor 
is the local culture (e.g., Li and Guisinger, 1992), since it takes time to learn the local 
market’s language, preferences, and informal institutions. Other market factors include the 
degree of regulatory, monetary, and legal complexity (e.g., Berger, Buch, DeLong, and 
DeYoung, 2004; Alibux, 2007), the degree of economic and political instability (e.g., 
Shapiro, 1985; Brewer and Rivoli, 1990), and the extent of market imperfections and 
asymmetric information problems in the foreign countries (e.g., Buch and DeLong, 2004; 
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins, 2006). In addition, there may be operational diseconomies 
associated with monitoring from a distance, consistent with the home field advantage 
hypothesis of Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell (2000).  
Importantly, both the diversification hypothesis and the market risk hypothesis may 
hold simultaneously for different sets of banks. All that we can do as researchers is 
determine which of these hypotheses has stronger empirical support, i.e., which hypothesis 
empirically dominates the other. To address this question, we use virtually all (15,988) 
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U.S. commercial banks for the period 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q4, and evaluate whether 
international or purely domestic banks have more risk. We find that international banks 
have much higher risk than purely domestic banks. In addition, we document that a greater 
marginal degree of internationalization within the subset of internationalized banks is 
associated with higher risk. These results are consistent with the empirical dominance of 
the market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. 
To ensure the robustness of our findings, we re-run our analyses using alternative 
proxies for bank internationalization and risk, alternative samples, and alternative 
estimation methods. We also address potential endogeneity issues using an instrumental 
variable estimation and a propensity score matching analysis. In each of these checks, we 
find evidence supporting our main findings. 
In additional analyses, we examine the impact of internationalization on the three 
components of Z-score – mean return on assets, mean capitalization ratio, and standard 
deviation of returns – to identify the sources of the higher risk of internationalization. We 
find that internationalization is associated with a higher volatility of bank earnings, which 
might reflect higher risks that international banks face in the foreign markets. We also find 
that internationalization is associated with lower mean profitability, consistent with prior 
empirical evidence that banks’ foreign operations are generally relatively inefficient (e.g., 
Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell, 2000). In addition, internationalization is associated 
with higher capitalization, perhaps designed to offset part of the higher risks from the other 
sources.  
We also examine publicly listed banks and banks in listed bank holding companies, 
since this subsample allows us to examine market-based risk measures. We find that listed 
 86 
 
 
international banks have higher market risk as measured by higher standard deviations of 
stock returns and lower Standard & Poor’s credit ratings than their purely domestic 
counterparts, consistent with market participants being aware of the higher risk of 
international banks. We also separately examine financial crisis periods and non-crisis 
periods to investigate whether internationalization affects risk differently during financial 
crises. Our results suggest that the relation between internationalization and risk is stronger 
during financial crises. Finally, we find that the positive relation between 
internationalization and bank risk is more pronounced in banks that are more likely to 
suffer from agency problems related to poor corporate governance, supporting an empire-
building explanation for the main results.  
In the remainder of this chapter, Section 3.2 presents a simple model of an 
international bank’s portfolio. Section 3.3 describes the data, variables, and summary 
statistics. Section 3.4 presents the main results and Section 3.5 provides the robustness 
tests. Section 3.6 discusses additional analyses. Section 3.7 concludes.  
3.2 A Simple Model of an International Bank’s Portfolio 
Assume that an international bank has a simple portfolio with two risky assets: a 
foreign asset with expected return  and standard deviation  and a domestic asset with 
expected return  and standard deviation . The correlation between the two assets is 
 and the bank’s ratio of foreign assets to total assets is , which ranges from 0 to 1. 
The expected return of the portfolio is:  
 =  + 1 −  . (3.1) 
The variance of the portfolio is: 
 87 
 
 
 =  + 1 −  + 21 −  . (3.2) 
The standard deviation of the portfolio  is: 
 =  + 1 −  + 21 −  . (3.3) 
Our (inverse) measure of risk is Z-score. Z-score for an international bank is: 
 =  +  ⁄  , (3.4) 
where  ⁄  represents the mean Capitalization Ratio. 
We rewrite Z from equation (3.4) as: 
 =  + 1 −  +  ⁄  + 1 −  + 21 −  . 
(3. 5) 
We attempt to assess the impact of internationalization on risk, that is, the effect of 
the foreign assets ratio, , on the Z-score:  
/ =  
 +  ⁄    . 
(3.6) 
We show in Appendix C that / can be written in terms of the basic parameters as: 
/ =  !1 −  + "! + 1 −  + 21 − "#$ 
−  ! + 1 − "! + 1 −  + 21 − "#$ 
−  ! − 1 −  + 1 − 2"! + 1 −  + 21 − "#$ / . 
(3.7) 
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We cannot unambiguously sign this derivative, but we use Matlab to solve equation 
(3.7) by entering the following parameters and conditions: 
 ∈ !0,1",    ∈ 0,1,   ∈ 0,1,  ∈ !−1,1",  ∈ 0, 0.5, ∈ 0,0.5, / ∈ 0,0.5. (3.8) 
We consider starting values of 0 for , 0.1 for , , , , and K/A, and -1 for , and 
increments of 0.1 for all. 
The effect of higher  on  depends crucially on both  and the relative risk of 
the foreign asset (i.e., magnitudes of   compared to   and  compared to ). There 
are two clear-cut cases in which the correlation and the relative risks intuitively point to 
reduced or increased risk from more investment in the foreign asset.  
Case 1 – Negative correlation and relatively low foreign asset risk:  ≤ 0;   <
 ;  > . 
Case 2 – Positive correlation and relatively high foreign asset risk:  > 0;   >
 ;  < . 
The findings are as follows. In Case 1, we find that / is mostly positive: 
75,876 positive solutions, 28,667 negative solutions, and 1 zero solution. This is intuitive 
and suggests that for most, but not all values, more of the foreign asset reduces overall 
portfolio risk when the correlations of returns are negative and the foreign asset is relatively 
safe. 
In Case 2, we find that / is mostly negative: 90,194 negative solutions, 4,832 
positive solutions, and 14 zero solutions. This is intuitive and suggests that for most, but 
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not all values, more of the foreign asset increases overall portfolio risk when the 
correlations of returns are positive and the foreign asset is relatively risky. 
We also consider other possible cases in which there is either positive correlation 
with relatively low foreign asset risk (  > 0 ;   <   ;  >  ) or negative 
correlation with relatively high foreign asset risk ( ≤ 0;   >  ;  < , as well 
as cases in which the mean and standard deviation relations go in the opposite directions 
and find mixed results.61  
The model suggests our two hypotheses regarding the effects of internationalization 
() on bank risk (): the diversification hypothesis and the market risk hypothesis. The 
diversification hypothesis that international banks have lower risk (/ > 0) will hold 
if asset returns are not highly correlated across countries ( is low) as long as the foreign 
asset is not risky relative to the domestic asset (i.e.,  is not too large relative to  and 
  is not too low relative to ). This is best exemplified by Case 1. The market risk 
hypothesis that international banks have higher risk (/ < 0) will hold if market-
specific factors make the foreign asset relatively risky (i.e.,  high relative to , and/or 
  low relative to   unless they are offset by a low correlation   . This is best 
exemplified by Case 2. 
  
                                                 
61 To briefly summarize, in Case 3, positive correlation and relatively low foreign asset risk, /  is 
positive for most parameter values.  In Case 4, negative correlation and relatively high foreign asset risk, / is mostly negative.  In Case 5, relatively high foreign asset return and relatively high foreign asset 
risk, / is mostly negative.  In Case 6, relatively low foreign asset return and relatively low foreign asset 
risk, / is mostly positive.  
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3.3 Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics  
3.3.1 Sample banks 
We acquire bank data from quarterly Call Reports, which contain financial 
information on all banks in the U.S. Our raw data cover the period 1986:Q1 to 2010:Q4, 
although our risk measure starts in 1989:Q1 because of the lag structure of our model. We 
adjust the data to be in real 2010:Q4 terms using the GDP price deflator. Our initial dataset 
comprises 1,069,609 bank-quarter observations. We omit observations that do not refer to 
commercial banks according to the Call Reports Indicator, which leaves 969,053 
observations. We next remove any bank-quarter observations with missing or incomplete 
financial data on basic accounting variables such as total assets and equity, as well as 
observations that have missing or negative data for income statement variables such as 
interest expenses, personnel expenses, and non-interest expenses, resulting in 964,150 
bank-quarter observations. Following the procedure in Berger and Bouwman (2009), we 
further refine our sample by excluding observations with i) gross total assets (GTA)62 less 
than or equal to $25 million and ii) no outstanding loans or deposits (i.e., entities not 
engaged in deposit-taking or loan-making, which are required for banks to be considered 
commercial banks). These screens leave us with a final sample of 778,664 bank-quarter 
observations for 15,988 commercial banks over the entire sample period. Finally, to avoid 
distortions in ratios that contain equity, for all observations with total equity less than 1% 
of total assets, we replace equity with 1% of total assets.  
                                                 
62 Gross total assets (GTA) equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated 
transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). Total assets on Call Reports deduct these two 
reserves, which are held to cover potential credit losses. We add these reserves back to measure the full value 
of the assets financed. 
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3.3.2 Bank variables  
3.3.2.1 Measures of risk 
As noted, our main (inverse) measure of bank risk is Z‐Score, with larger values 
indicating lower overall bank risk (e.g., Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). It is calculated as the sum of 
a bank’s mean ROA (net income over GTA) and mean Capitalization Ratio (equity capital 
over GTA) divided by Stdv. ROA (the volatility of ROA). In our main analysis, we compute 
Z‐Scores over a 12-quarter period, following a methodology similar to Berger, Klapper, 
and Turk-Ariss (2009) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010).  
We also employ several alternative measures of bank risk. We take the log of the 
12-quarter Z-score. We also construct Z-score over 8 quarters and 20 quarters. We use 
Stdv. ROE, the standard deviation of ROE over 12 quarters, where ROE is net income over 
total equity. We also use the Sharpe Ratio, calculated as the risk-adjusted rate of return on 
equity (mean ROE/Stdv. ROE), following Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010). In 
addition, we use NPL Ratio, the nonperforming loans ratio, a measure of financial stability 
calculated as the bank ratio of nonperforming loans (past due at least 90 days or in 
nonaccrual status) to total loans (e.g., Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009), and LLA 
Ratio, the ratio of the loan and lease loss allowance to total loans.  
3.3.2.2 Measures of internationalization 
We construct several measures of bank internationalization, following Cetorelli and 
Goldberg (2012). Our main measure is Foreign Assets Ratio, the ratio of a bank’s foreign 
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assets to GTA. 6364  A larger Foreign Assets Ratio indicates a higher degree of 
internationalization, while a ratio of 0 indicates that a bank has purely domestic operations. 
We also specify three alternative measures of internationalization. The first is Bank 
Internationalization Dummy, which takes the value 1 if Foreign Assets Ratio is positive, 
and 0 otherwise. The second is Foreign Loans Ratio, the ratio of a bank’s foreign loans to 
the total loans of the bank. The third is Foreign Deposits Ratio, the ratio of foreign deposits 
to total deposits. 
3.3.2.3 Control variables 
To isolate the role of internationalization in bank risk, we employ a number of 
control variables for bank characteristics shown to affect a bank’s risk outcome. We first 
control for Income Diversification. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and Baele, De 
Jonghe, and Vander Vennet (2007) find that a greater reliance on non-interest income is 
linked to more volatile returns. Stiroh (2006) finds a negative link between total bank risk 
and diversification of revenue.65  We follow Laeven and Levine (2007) and construct 
Income Diversification as 1 – |(Net Interest Income – Other Operating Income)/(Total 
Operating Income)|.66 
                                                 
63 Due to data limitations, we are only able to capture the assets in the foreign offices of U.S. banks, not the 
foreign assets in domestic offices. We also lack information on host countries where foreign offices of U.S. 
banks operate. 
 
64 Our data for the foreign assets is sourced from the Call Report, where this data is already converted into 
U.S. dollars, (eliminating the need for conversion from other currencies). 
 
65 In a study of European banks, LePetit, Nys, Rous, and Tarazi (2008) find that increased non-interest income 
exposure is positively linked to risk. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) also find that an increased share of volatile 
non-interest activities outweighs the diversification benefits. Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010) use a 
diversification index and find that diversification reduces risk. 
 
66 In unreported results, we also run our regression analysis using a measure of asset diversification, which 
is calculated as 1 – |(Net Loans – Other Operating Assets)/(Total Earning Assets)|. The relation between 
internationalization and risk does not change. 
 93 
 
 
Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), we include Size, measured as the 
log of GTA, since prior research shows that bank size is an important determinant of 
international competitive success (e.g., Hirtle, 1991), and that risk varies with bank size. 
In particular, prior work shows that larger banks have a greater capacity to absorb risk (e.g., 
Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck, 2014), economies of scale in foreign exchange 
management (e.g., Minh To and Tripe, 2002), and more stable earnings (e.g., De Haan and 
Poghosyan, 2012). Alternatively, larger banks may take on higher risk due to safety-net 
policies that can put them under the “too big to fail” umbrella (e.g., O’Hara and Shaw, 
1990).  
Our third control is the public status of the bank, Listed, since prior research shows 
that this factor affects risk (e.g., Nichols, Wahlen, and Wieland, 2009; Barry, Lepetit, and 
Tarazi, 2011). Banks that are publicly traded could have different risk behavior because 
they tend to be more informationally transparent, and are subject to more monitoring from 
capital markets. We construct Listed as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a bank is listed 
or is part of a bank holding company that is listed, and 0 otherwise.  
Fourth, we control for membership in a bank holding company, BHC. Such 
membership is expected to help a bank strengthen its position because the holding company 
is required to support its affiliates by injecting capital as needed. Consistent with this view, 
Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) find that bank loan growth depends on bank holding 
company membership. We construct BHC as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bank 
is part of a bank holding company, and 0 otherwise.  
Our fifth control is Overhead Costs, which captures the bank’s operating cost 
structure. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that banks with high overhead costs 
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are less stable. We construct Overhead Costs as the ratio of total bank operating expenses 
to GTA.  
Finally, we control for the effect of the regulatory environment on bank risk (e.g., 
Laeven and Levine, 2009; Berger and Bouwman, 2013). We control for potential 
differences in bank stability owing to a bank’s primary federal regulator with three proxies. 
We include FED and OCC, dummies that equal 1 if the Federal Reserve or the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, respectively, is the bank’s primary federal regulator. We 
omit FDIC, a dummy that equals 1 if the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is the 
bank’s primary federal regulator, to avoid perfect collinearity. 
3.3.3 Summary statistics  
Figure 3.1 plots the evolution of the numbers of U.S. commercial banks with 
foreign assets, foreign loans, and foreign deposits over our sample period (1989:Q1–
2010:Q4). There is a decline in the number of international commercial banks with foreign 
assets, from 181 in 1989:Q1 to 53 in 2010:Q4, which could be due to the consolidation of 
the banking sector.67 However, the total number of unique international banks over our 
entire sample period is 390, which is much larger than the number at the beginning of our 
sample period due to new entries and switches. A similar pattern obtains in the evolution 
of internationalization ratios in Figure 3.2, with Foreign Assets Ratio declining from 0.23% 
to 0.05%, Foreign Loans Ratio declining from 0.16% to 0.05%, and Foreign Deposits 
Ratio declining to a lesser degree, from 0.35% to 0.18%. 
                                                 
67 Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) report in their Table II that the number of global banks was 247 in 1985, 
170 in 1995, and 107 in 2005. Our numbers are slightly lower because we focus only on commercial banks, 
whereas Cetorelli and Goldberg include all banks in the Call Reports.  
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In Figure 3.3, we find that despite the decline in the number of international banks 
and internationalization ratios, there are increases in the dollar amounts of their foreign 
activities, foreign assets, foreign loans, and foreign deposits. Thus, the decline in the ratios 
was primarily due to domestic assets, loans, and deposits growing faster than 
corresponding foreign quantities over the sample period. 
Figure 3.4 compares the risk (Z-score) of international commercial banks with 
purely domestic peers. This figure also depicts crisis periods, with banking crises (crises 
originating in the banking sector) represented by dark gray shaded areas and market crises 
(crises originating in capital markets) by light gray shaded areas following the definitions 
in Berger and Bouwman (2013) (discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.3). The figure 
shows that the mean Z-score of international banks is lower than that of purely domestic 
banks each year in the sample, with the exception of a short period prior to the recent 
subprime mortgage crisis. This is generally consistent with the empirical dominance of the 
market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. Comparing financial crises with 
normal time periods, the figure also reveals a steeper decline in the mean Z-score for 
international banks during financial crises. These raw data are generally consistent with a 
stronger dominance of the market risk hypothesis during crises. 
Table 3.1 provides definitions and summary statistics for our variables. In terms of 
risk, commercial banks have a mean 12-quarter Z-score of 36.053, indicating that the 
average bank is very far from default, a mean Stdv. ROE of 0.035, and a mean NPL Ratio 
of 0.016. The internationalization measures indicate that on average 0.1–0.3% of U.S. 
commercial banks’ operations are international, with some banks having very intense 
foreign operations during some of the bank-quarters (unreported). In terms of bank 
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characteristics, the average commercial bank has a level of Income Diversification of 20%, 
and a Size of 11.9 (mean GTA of $0.968 billion). About 15% of the commercial banks are 
listed or part of a listed bank holding company (Listed) and about 70% are owned by a 
bank holding company (BHC). Also, the average commercial bank has Overhead Costs of 
1.62. Finally, 10.6%, 30.9%, and 58.5% of the banks have the FED, the OCC, and the 
FDIC as their primary regulator, respectively.68 
Table 3.2 presents correlations among the key variables. Banks with higher Foreign 
Assets Ratios exhibit lower Z-scores, suggesting that, consistent with Figure 4, these banks 
have a higher likelihood of default. Furthermore, international banks tend to have more 
Income Diversification, are larger (Size), are more likely to be publicly listed (Listed), are 
less likely to be members of bank holding companies (BHC), and have higher overhead 
costs (Overhead Costs). Banks that internationalize are also more likely to have the FED 
or the OCC as their primary regulator, likely because they tend to be among the larger 
banks that are either state-chartered members of the Federal Reserve or nationally-
chartered. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we empirically analyze the effect of internationalization on bank 
risk. We first perform univariate tests that compare the risk of international versus purely 
domestic banks. We then conduct multivariate regressions with control variables included.  
  
                                                 
68 These percentages do not sum up to exactly 100% due to rounding.  
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3.4.1 Univariate analysis 
We compare the means and medians of our measures of bank risk (Z-score, Stdv. 
ROE, Sharpe Ratio, NPL Ratio, and LLA Ratio) for the international bank and domestic 
bank subsamples in Table 3.3. The results in Panel A indicate that the mean (median) 12-
quarter Z-score is 28.69 (20.24) for international banks compared to 36.16 (28.41) for 
domestic banks. These differences, which are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
support the view that banks with international operations are riskier, consistent with the 
empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis. 
This result continues to hold using alternative measures of risk. For instance, the 
mean (median) logarithm of the 12-quarter Z-score is 0.35 (0.33) lower, the mean (median) 
8-quarter Z-score is 7.40 (9.05) lower, and the mean (median) 20-quarter Z-score is 6.90 
(6.88) lower for international banks. Moreover, the standard deviation of ROE is larger for 
international banks than their domestic peers, with the difference in the mean (median) of 
0.0049 (0.0053). The Sharpe Ratio is smaller for international banks compared to domestic 
peers, with the difference in the mean (median) of -0.49 (-0.72). We also find that the ratio 
of nonperforming loans (NPL Ratio) and the ratio of loan loss allowances (LLA Ratio) are 
higher for international than domestic banks, with the difference in the mean (median) of 
0.0106 (0.0060) and 0.0128 (0.0068), respectively. All of these differences are statistically 
significant, except for the mean difference of the Sharpe Ratio. Each of the findings above 
suggests that international banks are riskier, consistent with the empirical dominance of the 
market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. 
Furthermore, Panel B compares the means and medians of 12-quarter Z-score for 
international banks and domestic banks by different bank size categories to mitigate the 
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potential concern that our results are driven by a particular bank size group. We define 
small banks as having GTA less than $1 billion, medium-sized banks as having GTA 
between $1 billion and $5 billion, and large banks as having GTA greater than $5 billion. 
All size thresholds are measured in constant 2010:Q4 dollars. The results indicate that the 
mean (median) 12-quarter Z-score is 10.13 (8.85) lower for small international banks, 
14.98 (10.50) lower for medium international banks, and 6.71 (5.13) for large international 
banks. All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, our preliminary 
evidence provides consistent support for the view that international banks are riskier than 
purely domestic banks, consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk 
hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis.  
3.4.2 Regression analysis 
To examine the relation between internationalization and bank risk in a multivariate 
setting, we estimate several versions of the following model: 
,-./0,12345,1 = 6 + 75 ⋅ 9:;<=:>;-?:>@-A>;-?:0,123 + 7 ⋅ B?:;=?@.0,123 + C1+ D0,12345,1 
(3.9) 
where Risk is bank risk as measured by Z-score and the other proxies outlined in Section 
3.3.2.1, Internationalization is bank internationalization as measured by the proxies 
discussed in Section 3.3.2.2,
 
Controls is the vector of bank control variables described in 
Section 3.3.2.3, ω denotes time fixed effects, and ε is an error term. Because risk is likely 
correlated within a bank over time, we adjust standard errors for clustering at the bank 
level.69 The risk variables are measured over the k quarters from t-k+1 to t, while the 
                                                 
69 We consider alternative ways to adjust the standard errors for possible dependence in the residuals in 
Section 3.5.3. 
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independent variables are measured in the quarter t-k to ensure that they are predetermined 
relative to the dependent variable.70 We use k=12 in our main analysis and consider other 
values in Section 3.5.1. 
The results are presented in Table 3.4 Panel A. Model 1 reports results from 
regressing Z-score on Foreign Assets Ratio (our main internationalization measure) using 
ordinary least squares (OLS). After controlling for bank characteristics and time fixed 
effects, we find that the coefficient on Foreign Assets Ratio is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This result is also economically material – moving the Foreign 
Assets Ratio from 0 to 0.0992 (the mean of the Foreign Assets Ratio for the international 
banks in our sample), with all other independent variables held at their means, decreases 
Z-score by about 6.752 (from 38.429 to 31.677). This suggests that bank 
internationalization is associated with greater bank risk, consistent with the empirical 
dominance of the market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis.  
In Model 2, we replace Foreign Assets Ratio with Bank Internationalization 
Dummy. The coefficient estimate on Bank Internationalization Dummy is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This estimate is also economically material—
moving Bank Internationalization Dummy from 0 to 1 (i.e., the bank internationalizes), 
with all other independent variables held at their means, decreases Z-score by about half 
from 38.617 to 19.066, again consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk 
hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. 
                                                 
70  Some researchers argue that models with lagged independent variables help attenuate endogeneity 
concerns (e.g., Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy, 2010). However, we recognize that endogeneity might still be an 
issue. We methodically address this concern in Section 3.5.4. 
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In Model 3, we assess the impact of the Foreign Assets Ratio for the subsample of 
banks with nonzero Foreign Assets Ratio. We find that international banks with greater 
foreign assets ratios are riskier. This suggests that in addition to internationalization status, 
the degree of bank internationalization also matters for bank risk.  
Models 4 to 8 of Table 3.4 report additional results. In Model 4, we exclude too-
big-to-fail entities, defined as banks with GTA greater than $100 billion, consistent with 
banks that were subject to stress tests or the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 
(SCAP) and the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). In Model 5, we 
exclude the 20 most internationally active banking organizations, defined as entities with 
the largest Foreign Assets Ratio in each quarter. In Models 4 and 5, we continue to find 
that international banks are riskier, suggesting that our core result is not driven by too-big-
to-fail or the most internationally active banks. Next, we report results by bank size to 
assess whether our main evidence is concentrated in a particular bank size class, since 
previous studies find differences in portfolio composition by bank size (e.g., Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005). In Models 6 to 8, we find that bank internationalization 
is associated with higher risk across all size classes. 
Turning to the bank controls, we find across nearly all models in Table 3.4 that firm 
size has positive coefficients, consistent with larger banks having better risk management 
skills and/or greater capacity to absorb losses through risk diversification, consistent with 
Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2014). We also find that Listed has positive and 
significant coefficients, suggesting that public status is associated with less insolvency risk, 
consistent with Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010). We further find that BHC membership 
is associated with higher values of Z-score. Next, Overhead Costs enters with negative 
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coefficients, consistent with the finding in Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) that banks 
with higher overhead costs are less stable. Finally, we find that the regulatory environment 
matters for bank risk. Specifically, we find that FED and OCC enter with positive and 
statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that Federal Reserve- and OCC-regulated 
banks are less risky than FDIC-regulated banks.  
For bank holding companies, it might be that the risk of the group is more relevant 
than the risk of individual banks. To account for this possibility, we consolidate the 
commercial banks in multibank holding companies at the holding company level (BHC) 
and re-run all of the regressions. The results, reported in Table 3.4 Panel B, are consistent 
with our previous evidence, suggesting that internationalization is associated with greater 
risk.  
3.5 Robustness Tests  
3.5.1 Alternative measures of risk 
In Table 3.5, we examine whether our main results are sensitive to alternative 
measures of bank risk. Unless specifically stated otherwise, these measures are also 
computed over the 12-quarter interval from t–11 to t. In Model 1, we analyze the sensitivity 
of our results to using the log of Z-score as the dependent variable. This specification has 
the advantage of mitigating the impact of outliers. Next, we compute Z-score over 
alternative time intervals. Specifically, the dependent variable is Z-score computed over 8 
quarters (from t–7 to t) in Model 2 and Z-score computed over 20 quarters (from t–19 to t) 
in Model 3. Next, in Model 4 we use as the dependent variable Sharpe Ratio, the risk-
adjusted return on equity (mean ROE/Stdv. ROE). In Model 5, we use Stdv. ROE, the 
standard deviation of ROE. In Model 6, we use NPL Ratio, the bank ratio of nonperforming 
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loans to total loans. Finally, we report regression estimates using LLA Ratio, the ratio of 
loan and lease loss allowance to total loans, in Model 7. In Models 6 and 7, we measure 
the risk variables at the end of quarter t.71 In each of the specifications, we find that the 
coefficient on Foreign Assets Ratio is statistically significant at the 5% level or better in 
the direction of internationalization being associated with more risk, reinforcing our 
finding of an empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis over the diversification 
hypothesis.  
3.5.2 Alternative measures of internationalization 
In Table 3.6, we examine whether our findings persist when we consider alternative 
measures of internationalization. For ease of comparison, we repeat the results based on 
Foreign Assets Ratio, our primary measure of internationalization, in Model 1. We use 
Foreign Loans Ratio (the ratio of the bank’s total foreign loans to total loans) in Model 2 
and Foreign Deposits Ratio (the ratio of the bank’s foreign deposits to total deposits) in 
Model 3. In each of these regressions, the coefficient on the internationalization variable is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the positive relation 
between internationalization and risk is robust to using alternative measures of 
internationalization. 
  
                                                 
71 For Models 1, 4, and 5, the independent variables are constructed as of quarter t–12, since the dependent 
variable is computed over t–11 to t. For Model 2, the independent variables are constructed as of quarter t–
8, while for Model 3, the independent variables are constructed as of quarter t–20. Finally, for Models 6 and 
7, we lag the independent variables by 1 quarter as the dependent variables only contain contemporaneous 
components. 
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3.5.3 Alternative econometric specifications and standard errors 
Table 3.7 reports results from employing alternative econometric specifications and 
alternative standard errors. Model 1 again reports the results from our main specification 
to facilitate comparison. 
In Models 2 to 5, we use alternative methodologies to correct standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In Model 2, we report Newey-West standard errors 
to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In Model 3, we employ Prais-Winsten 
standard errors that extend the Newey-West correction by integrating the panel structure 
of the data. In Model 4, we make inferences based on the standard errors of the time series 
of coefficients to account for cross-sectional dependence (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). In 
Model 5, we implement two-way clustering by bank and time to allow for correlations 
among different banks in the same quarter and across quarters for the same bank 
(Thompson, 2011). The results confirm our earlier evidence: the coefficient on Foreign 
Assets Ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases.  
3.5.4 Endogeneity and sample selection concerns 
In this section, we perform tests to address the potential endogeneity of our 
internationalization variable, which could bias our findings. In particular, there could be a 
causal link from bank risk to internationalization. For example, banks with risky assets 
could have incentives to internationalize to diversify their risks. This may result in 
correlation between our internationalization proxy and the error term, leading to spurious 
inferences on the effect of internationalization on bank risk. We conduct tests to address 
this potential problem as well as the related concern of self-selection bias. 
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Instrumental variables. We use instrumental variable (IV) estimation to extract the 
exogenous component of bank internationalization in assessing the influence of 
internationalization on risk. A proper instrument should satisfy the requirements of 
relevance and exogeneity, that is, it must correlate with bank internationalization, but not 
be a direct cause of bank risk.  
Our instrument is Border State, a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is headquartered in 
one of the U.S. states bordering an ocean, Canada, or Mexico, and 0 otherwise.72 Border 
State should be positively correlated with internationalization, as banks in border states are 
more likely to have foreign operations. Also, the average bank in the sample was 
established 62.6 years ago, suggesting that for most cases, the bank choice of state 
headquarters location occurred long before the decision to internationalize, suggesting that 
the decision to locate in the state is not endogenous. 
The IV regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 3.8. To facilitate 
comparison, we include the OLS results from Model 1 of Table 4 in the first column. We 
report the first-stage regression results in Model 2 and the second-stage results for the 2SLS 
estimation in Model 3. 
The first-stage regression indicates that our instrumental variable, Border State, is 
positively and significantly (at the 1% level) related to internationalization. We perform 
two tests to check the suitability of the selected instrument. First, we conduct the 
Kleibergen-Paap under-identification test to evaluate the rank condition. We find that the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level (rk LM = 739.551 with 
                                                 
72 These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. 
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a p-value less than 0.001), indicating that the model is well identified. Second, using an 
instrument that is weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable can lead to 
large inconsistencies in the coefficient estimates. To examine the relevance of our IV, we 
conduct an F-test of the excluded exogenous variable in the first stage regression, in which 
the null hypothesis is that the instrument does not explain the variation in the Foreign 
Assets Ratio. We reject this null hypothesis at the 1% level (F = 720.795 with a p-value 
less than 0.001). The second-stage regression indicates that bank internationalization is 
associated with greater risk, consistent with our earlier evidence. The IV estimate is much 
larger in absolute value terms than the OLS estimate.73 This suggests that in our main 
regressions, OLS may underestimate the causal effect of bank internationalization on risk.  
Propensity score matching analysis. To confront the issue of self-selection bias, we 
use propensity score matching (PSM) analysis, developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), closely following Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011).74 We conduct both 
a univariate comparison between international and domestic banks and a regression 
analysis. 
PSM analysis involves matching observations based on the probability of 
undergoing the treatment, which in our case is the probability of internationalizing. 
Specifically, PSM estimates the effect of internationalization on a bank’s risk by comparing 
the risk (Z-score) of banks that expand into foreign markets (treatment group) with the risk 
                                                 
73 Documenting a much larger coefficient estimate for IV compared to OLS is consistent with Levitt (1996) 
and Berger and Bouwman (2009).  
 
74 As noted by Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011), PSM has important advantages such as: 1) the 
ability to produce samples in which the treated and untreated entities are similar, providing a natural 
framework to estimate the effects of treatment and firm characteristics; 2) independence from an explicit 
functional form (as opposed to Heckman selection models); and 3) the ability to estimate the treatment effects 
more directly as well as the ability to alleviate potential nonlinearities related to the treatment effects.  
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of banks that have a similar probability of going international, but for which no such event 
takes place (control group). This quasi-experiment is conducted by matching each 
international bank with one or more domestic banks sharing similar characteristics as 
indicated by their propensity scores. The effect of internationalization is calculated as the 
average difference between the international group and the matched control group. To 
estimate a bank’s propensity score, we use a probit model in which the dependent variable 
is Bank Internationalization Dummy, the indicator for whether the bank has positive 
foreign assets. The independent variables are bank characteristics from our main model, 
our instrumental variable, Border State, as well as time fixed effects.  
We use several matching techniques. First, we use one-to-one matching without 
replacement, matching each international bank (treated group) to the nearest domestic 
(untreated) control bank. This technique ensures that we do not have multiple domestic 
banks assigned to the same international bank, which can lead to a smaller control group 
than the treated group. Second, we use one-to-one matching with replacement, which 
differs in that each treated bank is matched to the nearest control bank even if the latter is 
used more than once (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Finally, we use nearest-neighbor 
matching with n=2 and n=3 with replacement, which match each international bank with 
the two and three domestic banks with the closest propensity scores, respectively.75  
We first estimate the internationalization effect on risk as the mean difference 
between international banks’ risk and that of their matched domestic peers. We then 
                                                 
75 In unreported tests, we compare the means of the bank characteristics used in the selection models across 
the international and domestic bank samples to assess the effectiveness of our propensity matching procedure. 
Reassuringly, these results indicate that the distributions of the bank characteristics are statistically 
indistinguishable between the international and domestic samples at conventional levels. 
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perform regressions on the matched samples to control for observable confounders in the 
process of estimating the causal effects. Panel B of Table 3.8 reports both univariate and 
regression tests.76 In the univariate tests, we report t-statistics for the differences in risk 
between the treated and control groups for each of the four PSM techniques. Using one-to-
one matching without replacement, we find that Z-score is 6.44 lower for international 
banks than for the control group. Applying the other three techniques, we obtain differences 
in Z-score of 5.96, 6.04, and 6.08, respectively. All differences are significant at the 1% 
level.  
Turning to the regression analysis, we regress the Z-score on the Foreign Assets 
Ratio and all control variables and time fixed effects used in the main regression 
specification using only the treated and control banks. In all matched samples (Models 1 
to 4), we continue to find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on Foreign 
Assets Ratio, consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis over 
the diversification hypothesis. This evidence helps dispel the competing explanation that 
our results above spuriously reflect differences in the characteristics of international banks 
and purely domestic banks, rather than the effect of internationalization on bank risk.77  
                                                 
76 The number of banks included is larger than (the number of unique international banks)+(n+1), where n is 
the number of matches for each bank. This is because matches are done individually quarter-by-quarter as 
characteristics of the banks can change over time and thus a bank can be matched to different banks in 
different quarters. For one-to-one matching without replacement, we have 8,886 observations in the treated 
group and 8,886 observations in the control group. For one-to-one matching with replacement, we have 8,886 
observations in the treated group and 5,835 observations in the control group. For nearest-neighbor matching 
with n=2 and replacement, and respectively nearest-neighbor matching with n=3 and replacement, we have 
8,886 observations in the treated group (international banks), and 10,219 observations, and respectively 
13,960 observations in the control group. 
 
77 In unreported results, we analyze changes in the Z-score when the internationalization status of our sample 
banks changes.  The results suggest that, on average, banks seem to increase risk when they become 
international, but do not decrease risk when they revert back to domestic status. In our analysis we focus on 
the full sample of international and purely domestic banks rather than the switches between the two categories 
because the small number of switches may not provide a meaningful analysis. 
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3.6 Additional Analyses 
3.6.1 Z-score decomposition 
To shed light on the channels through which bank internationalization affects risk, 
we decompose Z-score into its three components: mean ROA, mean Capitalization Ratio, 
and Stdv. ROA. In Table 3.9, we report results of regressions of these components of Z-
score on Foreign Assets Ratio. The regressions include the same control variables and time 
fixed effects as in our main specification.  
In Model 1, we find that bank internationalization is associated with lower 
profitability as measured by mean ROA, consistent with findings in DeYoung and Nolle 
(1996), Peek, Rosengren, and Kasirye (1999), and Berger, DeYoung, Genay, and Udell 
(2000). Our result is also consistent with Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013), who find that 
bank geographical diversification across U.S. states is detrimental to bank performance. In 
Model 2, we find that bank internationalization is associated with increased mean 
Capitalization Ratio, which reduces bank risk. To the extent that bank managers are aware 
that internationalization is associated with higher risk, they may want to partially offset 
this as a precautionary measure with a higher Capitalization Ratio. Similarly, to the extent 
that capital market participants and regulators are aware of the higher risks associated with 
internationalization activities, they may pressure banks to increase their capital as well. In 
Model 3, we find that bank internationalization is associated with increased volatility in 
bank profitability as measured by Stdv. ROA, which increases bank risk. 
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3.6.2 Listed banks and market measures of risk 
In Table 3.10, we investigate whether our main results are sensitive to examining 
the subsample of publicly listed banks and those in publicly traded holding companies. 
This allows us toanalyze the impact of internationalization on bank risk using several 
market-based risk measures. We aggregate banks in the Call Reports at the holding 
company level and merge the resulting sample with CRSP to obtain stock returns and with 
Compustat to obtain S&P credit ratings. We first employ the 12-quarter accounting Z-score 
as above as our dependent variable for this subsample of banks in Model 1. Despite the 
dramatic decrease in the number of observations (29,953 listed banks compared to 600,953 
in the full sample), our core evidence persists in this subsample of banks.  
We construct three measures of bank market risk based on stock returns. First, we 
estimate Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model for each bank at the end of each calendar 
quarter using daily stock returns over the previous 12 months. Specifically, we regress each 
bank’s stock returns on the Fama and French (1993) three factors (Market, HML, and 
SMB) and the momentum factor (UMD), and then construct Idiosyncratic Risk as the 
standard deviation of the regression’s residuals. Second, at the end of each calendar quarter, 
we compute Total Bank Risk as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 
previous 12 months (Esty, 1998). Third, we compute Merton Default Probability as the 
normal transform of the distance-to-default measure (Merton, 1974) using bank-level stock 
return data from CRSP and financial data from the Call Report.78  We use Idiosyncratic 
                                                 
78 We model the market equity value of a bank as a call option on the bank’s assets, where we use the market 
value of equity to proxy for the market value of the bank and total liabilities to proxy for the face value of 
debt following Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton (2013). The call option on the bank’s assets is given as 
follows: (i) EF = EG<2HIJ5 − K<2HIJ + 1 − <2HEG ; J5 = !@:EG K⁄  + = + .G 2⁄ L" .G√L⁄ ; J = J5 − .G√L, where EF is the market value of a bank, EG is the value of the bank’s total assets, K is the 
face value of debt proxied by the total bank liabilities, L equals 1 year, = is the market yield on U.S. Treasury 
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Risk, Total Bank Risk, and Merton Default Probability as our measures of bank risk in 
Models 2, 3, and 4 respectively. 
Finally, we create two measures of bank market risk based on credit ratings. First, 
we convert the quarter-end long-term issuer credit ratings compiled by Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) to a numeric scale. Specifically, we create S&P Credit Rating by assigning a value 
of 8 if the bank has an S&P rating of AAA, 7 if AA, 6 if A, 5 if BBB, 4 if BB, 3 if B, 2 if 
CCC, and 1 if CC. Second, we create the dummy S&P Investment Grade, which is equal 
to 1 if the bank has a credit rating of BBB or higher, and 0 otherwise. Higher values of 
these two variables indicate lower risk.79 We consider the effect of internationalization on 
S&P Credit Rating using an ordered probit analysis in Model 5 and S&P Investment Grade 
using a simple probit analysis in Model 6.  
The results in Table 3.10 indicate that international public banks have higher 
idiosyncratic risk, higher total bank risk, higher probability of default, and lower credit 
ratings than purely domestic public banks, suggesting that capital market participants 
recognize the higher risk of international banks. 
3.6.3 Internationalization and risk during financial crises 
In Table 3.11, we examine the effect of internationalization and bank risk during 
financial crises and normal times to explore whether internationalization affects risk 
                                                 
Securities at 1-year constant maturity, which we take to be the risk-free rate, .G is the volatility of the value 
of assets, which is related to equity volatility .F, which is the standard deviation of daily equity returns over 
each time period calculated as follows: (ii)  .F = !EG<2HIJ5.G"  EF⁄ . We simultaneously solve equations 
(i) and (ii) to obtain the values of EG and .G. Once we determine EG, we follow Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, 
and Lundstedt (2004) and Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton (2013) and compute a bank’s asset returns as N = N>OPQEG,1 EG,125⁄ R − 1, =S . Finally, we compute the Merton Default Probability as IP−@:!EG K⁄ " + !N − .G 2⁄ L" .G√L⁄ S. 
 
79 We exclude unrated banks from this analysis. 
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differently during financial crises. On the one hand, international banks may increase their 
risk less than purely domestic banks during financial crises because their exposure to 
shocks is lessened as they hold assets and deposits both in the domestic and foreign 
markets. This could offer them greater income diversification and risk-sharing, provide 
them with a stronger and more diversified deposit base, and ensure better liquidity 
provision through access to international capital markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011).  
On the other hand, international banks may further increase their risk during 
financial crises because of their organizational complexity, making it difficult for 
management to deal with financial crises. International banks may also rely more often on 
inter-bank and capital markets for their funding, while domestic banks may rely more on 
insured deposits, which are less volatile during financial crises. 
To identify financial crises, we follow Berger and Bouwman (2013). Specifically, 
we identify two banking crises (crises that originated in the banking sector) –  the credit 
crunch (1990:Q1–1992:Q4) and the subprime lending crisis (2007:Q3–2009:Q4) – and two 
market crises (crises that originated in the financial market) –  the Russian debt crisis/Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout (1998:Q3–1998:Q4), and the bursting of the 
dot.com bubble and September 11 (2000:Q2–2002:Q3). We first include the interaction 
term Foreign Assets Ratio × Financial Crises in Model 1 and focus on whether there is a 
difference in the effects of the Foreign Assets Ratio during financial crises. In Models 2 
and 3, we consider separate interaction terms with a Banking Crises dummy and a Market 
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Crises dummy, respectively. In Model 4, we include interactions with both the Banking 
Crises and Market Crises dummies.80  
The results suggest that the impact of bank internationalization on risk is higher 
during financial crises than in normal times, as indicated by the negative coefficient on the 
interaction term Foreign Assets Ratio × Financial Crises in Model 1.81 When we split 
financial crises into banking crises and market crises, the effect of internationalization on 
risk is more pronounced during market crises as indicated by Models 2, 3, and 4. Moreover, 
in unreported results we conduct a t-test for the equality of the effects of 
internationalization for the two types of crises from Model 4 and find that the coefficients 
of the two interaction terms are statistically significantly different from one another (t = 
2.702). Our result on market crises may be due to recent developments that have made 
banking organizations more dependent on the capital markets (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 2012; IMF Financial Stability Report, 2012). The lower increase in risk as a result 
of internationalization during banking crises may also be due to internationalized banks 
cutting back their risks more or receiving more government help during banking crises.  
3.6.4 Why do banks internationalize? 
Our findings raise the question of why banks internationalize. We offer three 
potential explanations. First, banks may internationalize to achieve higher returns. 
However, our results seem to contradict this explanation, given that we find lower mean 
                                                 
80 We do not include the financial crises dummies as stand-alone variables because they would be subsumed 
by the time fixed effects. However, in unreported tests, we replace the time fixed effects with the financial 
crises dummies and find consistent results. 
 
81 In a theoretical framework, Wagner (2011) discusses a possibility where the probability of joint liquidation 
of assets during a crisis may lead banks to forgo some diversification benefits. 
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profitability for internationalized banks. Second, banks may follow their important 
customers abroad as part of a defensive strategy by setting up offices in countries where 
their home country customers have foreign affiliates to avoid losing their clients’ business 
and maintain existing relationships (e.g., Brimmer and Dahl, 1975; Goldberg and Saunders, 
1981; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). Although this 
phenomenon might occur, it is unlikely to explain our results, as we would expect that such 
a strategy should at least translate into large enough financial benefits from servicing 
important customers abroad to offset the costs of bank internationalization. 82  Third, 
internationalization could be driven by empire-building behavior of bank managers (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Roll, 1986; Stulz, 1990). Managers that enlarge 
their banks through international activities may gain higher compensation and/or more 
prestige than domestic bank managers. This might occur if there are significant agency 
problems in banking, particularly if these agency problems are intensified by bank 
diversification (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007; Goetz, Laeven, and Levine, 2013). 
We investigate whether empire-building is a potential explanation for our results. 
Our empirical strategy involves estimating our model for subsamples of banks with varying 
levels of agency problems due to differences in corporate governance. This analysis is 
limited to publicly listed banks because corporate governance data are available only for 
these banks.  
                                                 
82  There is also some evidence that international banks do not always rely heavily on a “follow your 
customer” strategy to support their multinational expansion (e.g., Engwall and Wallenstål, 1988; Hellman, 
1996; Miller and Parkhe, 1998; Seth, Nolle, and Mohanty, 1998).  
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Following prior research, we consider various measures of corporate governance.83 
We first construct three measures of institutional ownership: Institutional Ownership, the 
ratio of institutional share holdings to bank outstanding shares; Pension Fund Ownership, 
the ratio of public pension funds’ holdings to bank outstanding shares, where the list of 
public pension funds is from Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007); and Long Term Institutional 
Ownership, the ratio of holdings by long-term institutions to bank outstanding shares 
following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005). Prior evidence suggests that institutional 
investors, particularly activist investors such as public pension funds and long-term 
institutional investors, have the incentives and ability to monitor managers (e.g., Gillan and 
Starks, 2000; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2005; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). For all three 
measures, a lower ownership ratio would indicate less monitoring by institutional investors 
and potentially higher agency problems. 
We also construct a measure of analyst coverage, Number of Analysts, which is the 
number of financial analysts providing earnings forecasts for the bank in each quarter. Prior 
research suggests that analyst coverage enhances corporate transparency, making 
managerial extraction of private benefits more difficult (e.g., Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2004).  
Our next measure, CEO Duality, is an indicator variable for whether the CEO is 
also chairman of the board. CEO duality may be indicative of agency problems because it 
may restrict the information flow to directors and undermine the effectiveness of board 
oversight (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997). 
                                                 
83 We obtain data on corporate governance from multiple sources. We retrieve the institutional ownership 
data from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database and the analyst coverage data from 
I/B/E/S. In addition, we manually collect data on CEO duality and insider ownership from SEC EDGAR 
DEF 14A proxy filings and 10K reports for the time period 1994–2010. Our corporate governance data starts 
in 1994, which corresponds to the date when the data became publicly available on the SEC EDGAR. 
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Our final measure of corporate governance relates to insider ownership. Insider 
Ownership is the ratio of shares owned by insiders (all directors and executive officers as 
a group as reported in the DEF 14A report) divided by shares outstanding of the bank. Prior 
research finds a curvilinear relation between firm valuation and insider ownership (e.g., 
Stulz, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), suggesting that insiders with relatively low 
ownership and relatively high ownership are entrenched. With very low ownership, 
insiders externalize much of the outcome of their actions. With very high ownership, they 
secure enough control of the firm to be able to misuse the firm assets for their personal 
benefit.    
Based on prior corporate governance literature, we identify the following groups of 
banks as being more likely to have severe agency problems: lower institutional ownership, 
lower public pension fund ownership, lower long-term institutional ownership, lower 
analyst coverage, CEO is Chairman, and very low and very high levels of insider 
ownership.  
Our results are reported in Table 3.12. In Panel A we use Institutional Ownership 
in Models 1 and 2, Pension Fund Ownership in Models 3 and 4, and Long Term 
Institutional Ownership in Models 5 and 6. For each ownership variable, we report the 
results for subsamples of below-median (higher agency problems) and above-median 
(lower agency problems) ownership. We find that the coefficient estimates on Foreign 
Assets Ratio are negative and significant at the 1% level, but are larger in absolute value in 
the subsamples of banks with higher agency problems (Models 1, 3, and 5) relative to the 
subsamples with lower agency problems (Models 2, 4, and 6). Importantly, for the three 
ownership variables, the difference in the Foreign Assets Ratio coefficient between the 
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subsamples is statistically significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that the positive 
relation between internationalization and bank risk is stronger for banks that are more likely 
to have higher agency problems, supporting the empire-building explanation.84  
In Panel B, we use the Number of Analysts and CEO is Chairman as indicators of 
agency problems. We find that the coefficient estimate on Foreign Assets Ratio is negative 
and larger in absolute value in the subsamples of banks with below-median analyst 
coverage (Model 1) and CEO duality (Model 4). These differences between the subsamples 
are significant at the 1% level. Again, these results suggest that the relation between 
internationalization and bank risk is stronger in banks suffering from more severe agency 
problems, supporting the empire-building explanation. 
Finally, in Panel C we use Insider Ownership to indicate agency problems. To 
account for nonlinearity of the relation between insider ownership and firm value 
documented in prior studies (Stulz, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), we split the 
sample according to the 20th and 80th percentiles of insider ownership to capture different 
incentives of insiders across the ownership range.85 We consider insider ownership below 
the 20th percentile and above the 80th percentile to be indicative of more agency problems. 
We find that the coefficient estimates on our internationalization proxy, Foreign Assets 
Ratio, are negative and significant only in the subsamples of banks with more agency 
problems (Models 1 and 3), consistent with the curvilinear relation between firm valuation 
and insider ownership previously documented in the literature. An F-test rejects the null 
                                                 
84 In unreported results, we also run tests alternatively using the numbers of institutional investors, pension 
funds, and long-term institutional investors and obtain qualitatively similar results.  
 
85 In unreported results, we use alternative cutoffs of the 25th and 75th percentiles. The results are qualitatively 
similar. 
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hypothesis of equality of these coefficients at the 1% level. Again, these results suggest 
that the internationalization-risk relation is stronger for banks that are more likely to have 
severe agency problems.  
In summary, our results suggest that the positive relation between 
internationalization and bank risk is consistently stronger for banks that are more likely to 
have high agency problems due to poor corporate governance, supporting the empire-
building explanation.86 87  
3.7 Conclusions 
This paper is the first to assess the role of internationalization in bank risk using 
U.S. bank data. We find strong, robust evidence that the more internationalized the bank, 
the higher the risk. We use a number of different measures of internationalization and risk, 
employ various econometric procedures to control for potential endogeneity and sample 
selection biases, and consider different subsamples of the data. The data persistently 
suggest that internationalization is associated with higher bank risk, consistent with the 
empirical dominance of the market risk hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. This 
effect appears to be more pronounced during financial crises, particularly market crises. 
Additional results suggest that capital market participants recognize the difference in risk 
between international and domestic banks. 
                                                 
86 In unreported results, we repeat these tests using interactions and we obtain similar evidence. 
 
87 In unreported tests, we created dummies for each of the corporate governance variables which indicate 
governance attributes that are most likely to indicate severe agency problems and regressed 
internationalization on these dummies, the instrumental variable, and the other controls from the main 
specification. For most of these, but the analyst coverage and very low levels of insider ownership, banks 
more likely to have worse governance (less institutional ownership, less public pension fund ownership, less 
long-term institutional ownership, CEO is Chairman and very high levels of insider ownership) appear to be 
associated with more internationalization. 
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Our finding that internationalization is associated with higher risk raises the 
question of why banks internationalize. We rule out higher returns and follow-your-
customer as primary explanations because of our finding that returns are lower for 
internationalized banks. A third potential explanation is empire building by bank managers 
to gain higher compensation and/or more prestige, which may occur if there are significant 
agency problems in these banks due to poor corporate governance. We test this explanation 
and find that the positive relation between internationalization and bank risk tends to be 
much stronger for banks that are more likely to have severe agency problems, supporting 
the empire-building explanation. The results about increased risk from international 
diversification may or may not apply to other countries which may have very different 
domestic versus international risks. 
This paper contributes primarily to two related strands of research. First, it adds to 
the literature on bank risk by introducing internationalization as a factor influencing risk 
and sets the groundwork for further research on bank internationalization. Although some 
policymakers, practitioners, and researchers point to the benefits of geographical risk 
diversification resulting from the internationalization of banks, our results suggest that this 
effect is dominated by other factors. Specifically, our results suggest that the additional 
local market risks taken on following international expansion outweigh the benefits of 
diversification.  
Second, this paper contributes to the broader internationalization literature by 
examining risk within one important industry rather than across diverse industries with 
their confounding differences. We find that bank internationalization is associated with 
higher risk in an industry in which risk is highly monitored by bank supervisors as well as 
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shareholders and debtholders. These findings suggest that authorities might consider 
internationalization as an additional factor in bank supervision and regulation. 
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Figure 3.1: Numbers of International U.S. Commercial Banks over  
Time  
 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of bank internationalization over our sample period. It plots 
the number of international U.S. commercial banks for each quarter in our sample period. 
Three dimensions of bank internationalization are considered: foreign assets, foreign loans, 
and foreign deposits. The sample period illustrated is 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q4. 
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Figure 3.2: Different Internationalization Ratios over Time  
 
Figure 3.2 plots the mean internationalization ratios of U.S. commercial banks by quarter. 
Three dimensions of bank internationalization are considered: foreign assets, foreign loans, 
and foreign deposits. The sample period illustrated is 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q4. 
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Figure 3.3: Total Volumes of International Activities over Time 
 
Figure 3.3 plots the actual dollar amount (billions) of U.S. commercial banks’ foreign 
activities by quarter. Three dimensions of bank internationalization are considered: foreign 
assets, foreign loans, and foreign deposits. The sample period illustrated is 1989:Q1 to 
2010:Q4. 
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Figure 3.4: Mean Z-score for International Banks vs. Domestic Banks 
over Time 
 
Figure 3.4 compares the risk (mean Z-score) of international commercial banks versus purely 
domestic banks during our sample period. This figure depicts financial crisis periods in 
shaded gray areas: Banking Crises in dark gray and Market Crises in light gray. The sample 
period illustrated is 1989:Q1 to 2010:Q4. 
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Table 3.1: Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
 
This table presents variable definitions and reports summary statistics for the full sample of U.S. commercial banks used in the analysis. All variables using dollar 
amounts are expressed in real 2010:Q4 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator.  
 
Variable  Definition Mean Median Std 25p 75p 
Risk Variables 
Z-score ( 12 
quarters) 
A bank measure of financial risk calculated as [Avg.(ROA) + 
Avg.(Equity/GTA)]/Stdv. ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall 
bank risk. Means of ROA and Equity/GTA as well as the standard 
deviation of ROA are computed over the previous 12 quarters (t-11 to t). 
36.053 28.287 30.754 14.459 48.771 
Log of Z-score (12 
quarters) 
A bank measure of financial risk calculated as the logarithm of Z-score 
(12 quarters). 
3.198 3.343 1.001 2.674 3.888 
Z-score (8 quarters) A bank measure of financial risk calculated as [Avg.(ROA) + 
Avg.(Equity/GTA)]/Stdv. ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall 
bank risk. Means of ROA and Equity/GTA as well as the standard 
deviation of ROA are computed over the previous 8 quarters (t-7 to t). 
42.561 32.564 38.504 16.415 56.988 
Z-score (20 quarters) A bank measure of financial risk calculated as [Avg.(ROA) + 
Avg.(Equity/GTA)]/Stdv. ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall 
bank risk. Means of ROA and Equity/GTA as well as the standard 
deviation of ROA are computed over the previous 20 quarters (t-19 to t). 
29.805 23.830 24.374 12.425 40.460 
Sharpe Ratio The risk-adjusted return on equity defined as ROE/Stdv. ROE. ROE is 
defined as the ratio of net operating income to total equity.  
6.477 3.238 157.687 1.911 5.937 
Stdv. ROE The standard deviation of ROE calculated over the previous 12 quarters 
(t-11 to t.) ROE is defined as the ratio of net operating income to total 
equity. 
0.035 0.031 0.021 0.019 0.048 
NPL Ratio A measure of financial stability defined as the ratio of nonperforming 
loans (past due at least 90 days or in nonaccrual status) to total loans; a 
higher value indicates a riskier loan portfolio.  
0.016 0.009 0.025 0.003 0.020 
LLA Ratio A measure of risk defined as the ratio of loan and lease loss allowance to 
bank total loans; a higher value indicates higher risk. 
0.022 0.018 0.021 0.014 0.024 
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Variable  Definition Mean Median Std 25p 75p 
Risk Variables (cont.) 
Idiosyncratic Risk A measure of bank idiosyncratic risk calculated at the end of each 
calendar quarter using bank stock daily returns over the previous 12 
months. Specifically, we regress each bank’s stock returns on the Fama-
French three factors (Market, HML, and SMB) and the momentum factor 
(UMD), and then construct Idiosyncratic Risk as the standard deviation 
of the regression’s residuals. 
0.025 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.029 
Total Bank Risk The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous 12 months 
(Esty, 1998) computed at the end of each calendar quarter.  
0.027 0.022 0.020 0.016 0.030 
Merton Default 
Probability 
The normal transform of the distance-to-default measure using bank-
level stock return data from CRSP and financial data from the Call 
Report. Details for this measure are shown in footnote 20 in the text. . 
0.033 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.009 
S&P Credit Rating Based on S&P Domestic Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating, S&P Credit 
Rating equals 8 if the bank has an S&P rating of AAA, 7 if AA, 6 if A, 5 
if BBB, 4 if BB, 3 if B, 2 if CCC, and 1 if CC. 
2.282 1.000 1.814 1.000 4.000 
S&P Investment 
Grade 
A dummy equal to 1 if the bank has a credit rating of BBB or higher 
(investment grade), and 0 otherwise.  
0.354 0.000 0.478 0.000 1.000 
Internationalization Variables 
Foreign Assets Ratio  
(full sample) 
A measure of bank internationalization defined as the ratio of foreign 
total assets to GTA of the bank; a larger value indicates a higher degree 
of internationalization and a ratio of 0 refers to purely domestic banks.  
0.001 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Assets Ratio  
(international banks 
only) 
A measure of bank internationalization defined as the ratio of foreign 
total assets to GTA of the bank; a larger value indicates a higher degree 
of internationalization.  
0.099 0.035 0.145 0.006 0.126 
Bank 
Internationalization 
Dummy 
A dummy that takes a value of 1 if ratio of the foreign total assets to GTA 
of the bank is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
0.015 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.000 
Foreign Loans  
Ratio 
A measure of bank internationalization defined as the ratio of foreign 
total loans to total loans of the bank; a larger value indicates a higher 
degree of internationalization.  
0.002 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.000 
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Variable  Definition Mean Median Std 25p 75p 
Internationalization Variables (cont.) 
Foreign Deposits 
Ratio 
A measure of bank internationalization defined as the ratio of foreign 
total deposits to total deposits of the bank; a larger value indicates a 
higher degree of internationalization.  
0.003 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.000 
Control Variables 
Income 
Diversification 
A measure of diversification across different sources of income, 
calculated as 1- | (Net Interest Income - Other Operating Income)/Total 
Operating Income|.  
0.200 0.216 0.158 0.079 0.332 
Size The logarithm of GTA.  11.904 11.649 1.168 11.094 12.386 
Listed A dummy that takes a value of 1 if the bank is listed on a stock exchange 
or is part of a bank holding company that is listed on a stock exchange, 
and 0 otherwise.  
0.146 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.000 
BHC A dummy that takes a value of 1 if the bank is owned by a bank holding 
company, and 0 otherwise.  
0.695 1.000 0.460 0.000 1.000 
Overhead Costs A proxy for the bank’s cost structure calculated as the ratio of overhead 
expenses to GTA.  
1.621 1.592 0.362 1.323 1.922 
FED A dummy indicating whether the bank is a state-chartered Federal 
Reserve member, that is, the Federal Reserve is the bank’s primary 
federal regulator, and 0 otherwise.  
0.106 0.000 0.308 0.000 0.000 
OCC A dummy indicating whether the bank has a national bank charter, that 
is, the bank’s primary federal regulator is the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC), and 0 otherwise. 
0.309 0.000 0.462 0.000 1.000 
FDIC A dummy that takes a value of 1 for non-member banks that have the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as a primary regulator, 
and 0 otherwise. 
0.585 1.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Time FE Time fixed effects, dummies for each quarter of the sample period.      
Instrumental Variable 
Border State A dummy that takes a value of 1 if a bank is headquartered in one of the 
U.S. states having a border with an ocean, Canada, or Mexico, and 0 
otherwise.  
0.471 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
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Variable  Definition Mean Median Std 25p 75p 
Other Variables 
ROA Ratio of net income to bank GTA.  0.009 0.011 0.027 0.007 0.014 
Capitalization Ratio The bank capitalization ratio, measured as equity capital to GTA; a lower 
ratio indicates higher bank distress.  
0.098 0.089 0.042 0.089 0.042 
Stdv. ROA The standard deviation of ROA calculated over the previous 12 quarters 
(t-11 to t). ROA is defined as the ratio of net operating income to GTA. 
0.008 0.004 0.016 0.002 0.008 
Financial Crises A dummy that takes a value of 1 for a financial crisis period, and 0 
otherwise, following Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
0.346 0.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 
Banking Crises A dummy that takes a value of 1 for a banking crisis period, and 0 
otherwise. A banking crisis is a crisis that originated in the banking 
sector, following Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
0.223 0.000 0.416 0.000 0.000 
Market Crises A dummy that takes a value of 1 for a market crisis period. A market 
crisis is a crisis that originated in the capital markets, following Berger 
and Bouwman (2013). 
0.123 0.000 0.328 0.000 0.000 
Normal Times A dummy that takes a value of 1 for a normal time period, and 0 
otherwise. A normal time period is a period other than a financial crisis 
period, following Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
0.654 1.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 
Institutional 
Ownership 
The ratio of institutional share holdings to bank outstanding shares. 0.200 0.138 0.203 0.041 0.302 
Pension Fund 
Ownership 
The ratio of public pension funds’ holdings to bank outstanding shares. 
The list of public pension funds is from Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
0.007 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.007 
Long-term 
Institutional 
Ownership 
The ratio of holdings by long-term institutions to bank outstanding shares 
following Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005). 
0.070 0.044 0.079 0.009 0.110 
Analyst Coverage The number of financial analysts providing earnings forecasts for the 
bank in each quarter. 
6.027 3.000 6.928 1.000 8.000 
CEO Duality An indicator variable for whether the CEO is the chairman of the board. 0.445 0.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 
Insider Ownership The ratio of shares owned by insiders (all directors and executive officers 
as a group as reported in the DEF 14A report) to bank outstanding shares. 
0.167 0.130 0.133 0.069 0.232 
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Table 3.2: Correlations among Selected Variables 
 
 
This table reports pair-wise correlations among the key variables used in the regression analysis. Table 1 shows definitions for all variables. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Z-score 1         
Foreign Assets Ratio -0.0226*** 1        
Income Diversification 0.0401*** 0.0765*** 1       
Size 0.1275*** 0.2292*** 0.1739*** 1      
Listed 0.0625*** 0.0486*** 0.1303*** 0.4234*** 1     
BHC 0.0770*** -0.0060*** 0.0293*** 0.0559*** 0.0696*** 1    
Overhead Costs -0.2585*** 0.0190*** 0.4312*** -0.0722*** 0.0379*** -0.0811*** 1   
FED 0.0358*** 0.0365*** -0.0284*** 0.0760*** 0.0643*** 0.0228*** -0.0464*** 1  
OCC 0.0179*** 0.0068*** 0.0561*** 0.1301*** 0.0922*** -0.0228*** 0.0859*** -0.2308*** 1 
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Table 3.3: Internationalization and Bank Risk: Univariate Analysis 
 
 
This table reports univariate comparison tests for bank risk and other controls between international banks and purely domestic banks. Panel A reports results for 
the full sample. Panel B reports differences in Z-score by bank size. Table 1 shows definitions for all variables. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  International Banks Purely Domestic Banks 
Difference in Means Difference in Medians 
International - Domestic International - Domestic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Difference T-Stat Difference Wilcoxon M-W Stat 
Z- score (12 quarters) 10,376 28.6939 20.2356 690,300 36.1638 28.4147 -7.4699*** -24.6 -8.1791*** -33.9 
Log of Z-score (12 quarters) 10,337 2.8558 3.0133 689,604 3.2037 3.3480 -0.3479*** -35.1 -0.3347*** -33.5 
Z- score (8 quarters) 10,376 35.2728 23.6481 690,300 42.6703 32.6969 -7.3975*** -19.4 -9.0488*** -30.7 
Z- score (20 quarters) 10,376 23.0126 17.0507 690,300 29.9072 23.9328 -6.8946*** -28.6 -6.8821*** -35.8 
Stdv. ROE 10,376 0.0397 0.0367 690,300 0.0348 0.0314 0.0049*** 24.8 0.0053*** 21.1 
Sharpe Ratio 10,212 6.9604 2.5289 678,290 6.4694 3.2498     0.4910 0.3 -0.7208*** -21.7 
NPL Ratio 11,499 0.0269 0.0149 767,162 0.0163 0.0089 0.0106*** 44.5 0.0060*** 43.4 
LLA Ratio 11,499 0.0344 0.0244 767,165 0.0216 0.0176 0.0128*** 65.4 0.0068*** 59.7 
 
Panel B: Risk (Z- score (12 quarters) by Different Bank Sizes 
  International Banks Purely Domestic Banks 
Difference in Means Difference in Medians 
International - Domestic International - Domestic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Bank Size (GTA) N Mean Median N Mean Median Difference t-stat Difference Wilcoxon M-W Stat 
Small (≤ 1 Billion) 2,400 25.7071 19.4527 651,483 35.8357 28.2982 -10.1286*** -16.4 -8.8455*** -19.8 
Medium (1-5 Billion) 1,740 28.0117 21.9034 30,616 42.9889 32.3988 -14.9771*** -15.8 -10.4954*** -16.9 
Large (> 5 Billion) 6,236 30.0338 20.1937 8,201 36.7430 25.3221 -6.7092*** -11.6 -5.1284*** -13.8 
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Table 3.4: Internationalization and Bank Risk: Regression Analysis 
 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The dependent variable is Z-score (12 quarters). Panel A reports 
estimates using data at the commercial bank level, while Panel B shows estimates using data aggregated at the bank holding company (BHC) level. The main 
internationalization measure is the Foreign Assets Ratio. Model 1 is an OLS regression with time fixed effects, Model 2 uses Bank Internationalization Dummy as 
a proxy of internationalization, Model 3 includes international banks only, Model 4 excludes too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, Model 5 excludes the top 20 banks with 
the most intensive foreign activity each quarter, Model 6 includes small banks defined as banks with GTA <1 Billion, Model 7 includes medium-sized banks 
defined as banks with GTA between 1 and 5 Billion, and Model 8 includes large banks defined as banks with GTA over 5 Billion. Table 1 provides definitions for 
all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Panel A: Internationalization and Bank Risk: Regression Analysis (Commercial Bank Level) 
 Dependent Variable:  Z-Score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         Exclude Top 20 Small Medium Large 
 Full  Full  International  Exclude International Size Size Size 
Independent Variables: Sample Sample Banks Only TBTF Banks (GTA ≤ 1 Bill)  (1 Bill < GTA ≤ 5 Bill) (GTA > 5 Bill) 
Foreign Assets Ratio -68.064***  -15.884** -61.465*** -90.924*** -47.035*** -49.981*** -31.945*** 
 (-8.725)   (-2.167) (-6.139) (-7.072) (-4.105) (-4.704) (-2.706) 
International Bank Dummy  -19.551***       
    (-11.808)             
Income Diversification 0.957 0.923 -4.624 1.327 0.910 1.782 -12.203* -16.791* 
 (0.720) (0.695) (-0.550) (0.996) (0.683) (1.345) (-1.701) (-1.652) 
Size 2.496*** 3.038*** -0.017 3.250*** 2.604*** 5.447*** 2.757*** 1.323 
 (11.514) (13.714) (-0.024) (14.254) (11.958) (20.255) (2.710) (1.476) 
Listed 2.893*** 2.847*** 7.210*** 2.827*** 2.821*** 4.264*** 2.253 6.214*** 
 (4.672) (4.641) (2.912) (4.528) (4.549) (6.512) (1.269) (2.989) 
BHC 1.300*** 1.120*** -2.149 1.125*** 1.295*** 0.615 4.485** 0.674 
 (3.457) (2.988) (-0.824) (2.993) (3.444) (1.634) (2.060) (0.272) 
Overhead Costs -38.817*** -38.526*** -26.203*** -38.647*** -38.899*** -38.379*** -31.110*** -25.345*** 
 (-54.022) (-53.653) (-6.478) (-53.434) (-53.984) (-51.450) (-12.741) (-7.874) 
FED 2.475*** 2.472*** -2.936 2.455*** 2.530*** 2.473*** -0.541 0.505 
 (3.743) (3.753) (-0.613) (3.709) (3.818) (3.619) (-0.226) (0.124) 
OCC 1.300*** 1.380*** -7.626** 1.430*** 1.299*** 1.543*** -0.665 -8.614*** 
 (2.996) (3.194) (-2.027) (3.304) (2.995) (3.551) (-0.329) (-2.646) 
Constant 53.255*** 46.567*** 64.909*** 44.337*** 58.119*** 24.793*** 61.110*** 40.689*** 
 (19.109) (16.353) (5.434) (15.163) (21.352) (7.450) (4.663) (2.720) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 600,055 600,055 8,886 593,939 598,340 557,607 29,295 13,153 
R-squared 0.148 0.150 0.154 0.151 0.148 0.161 0.147 0.166 
N-Clusters(Bank) 13,448 13,448 319 13,402 13,439 12,901 1,324 428 
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Panel B: Internationalization and Bank Risk: Regression Analysis (BHC Level) 
  Dependent Variable:  Z-Score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Full  Full  International  Exclude Exclude Top 20 Small Medium Large 
Independent Variables: 
Sample Sample Banks Only TBTF 
International  
Banks 
Size 
(GTA ≤ 1 Bill) 
Size 
(1 Bill < GTA ≤ 5 Bill) 
Size 
(GTA > 5 Bill) 
Foreign Assets Ratio -87.159***  -27.186*** -70.464*** -116.299*** -62.405*** -68.028*** -47.006*** 
 (-9.406)  (-3.195) (-6.195) (-6.491) (-4.153) (-5.251) (-3.451) 
International Bank Dummy   -23.007***             
    (-11.148)             
Income Diversification 0.767 0.608 -6.434 0.935 0.745 1.760 -8.115 1.882 
 (0.508) (0.402) (-0.624) (0.618) (0.492) (1.193) (-0.864) (0.137) 
Size 4.145*** 4.686*** 0.438 5.154*** 4.302*** 6.233*** 2.180 -2.017 
 (15.963) (17.979) (0.448) (19.267) (16.600) (21.055) (1.634) (-1.414) 
Listed 1.762 2.222** 11.656*** 2.203* 1.656 1.826 6.968*** 7.870** 
 (1.539) (1.974) (3.280) (1.894) (1.443) (1.307) (3.478) (2.256) 
BHC -1.274** -1.337*** 8.202* -1.419*** -1.302*** -1.610*** -1.253 9.029 
 (-2.525) (-2.653) (1.807) (-2.819) (-2.581) (-3.229) (-0.293) (1.326) 
Overhead Costs -40.431*** -40.013*** -26.374*** -40.146*** -40.473*** -40.105*** -38.313*** -29.501*** 
 (-48.580) (-48.169) (-5.560) (-48.223) (-48.475) (-46.995) (-11.841) (-5.602) 
FED 2.427*** 2.478*** -9.241** 2.580*** 2.546*** 2.605*** 1.764 2.008 
 (3.178) (3.260) (-2.069) (3.377) (3.329) (3.305) (0.612) (0.415) 
OCC 2.444*** 2.644*** -9.448** 2.641*** 2.481*** 2.514*** 4.017* -0.993 
 (4.858) (5.288) (-2.539) (5.272) (4.933) (4.997) (1.749) (-0.236) 
Constant 60.897*** 53.971*** 72.818*** 48.516*** 59.174*** 35.385*** 93.941*** 121.499*** 
 (17.375) (15.414) (5.139) (13.559) (16.880) (9.017) (4.907) (5.069) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 471,599 471,615 7,049 464,974 469,985 436,331 24,554 10,714 
R-squared 0.165 0.168 0.164 0.170 0.166 0.171 0.153 0.147 
N-Clusters(Bank) 12,873 12,875 268 12,776 12,860 12,281 1,122 348 
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Table 3.5: Alternative Measures of Risk 
 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The dependent variable are Log of Z-score (over prior 12 quarters) 
in Model 1, Z-score (over prior 8 quarters) in Model 2, Z-score (over prior 20 quarters) in Model 3, Sharpe Ratio (over prior 12 quarters) in Model 4, Stdv. ROE 
in Model 5, NPL Ratio in Model 6, and LLA Ratio.is Z-score (12 quarters) in Model 7. Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank internationalization. All models 
include time fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Alternative Measures of Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Log of Z-score Z-score Z-score Sharpe Stdv. ROE NPL Ratio LLA Ratio 
Independent Variables: (over 12  (over 8  (over 20   Ratio (12  (over 12 (Nonperforming (Loan Loss  
  quarters) quarters) quarters) quarters) quarters) Loans) Allowance) 
Foreign Assets Ratio -1.999*** -78.231*** -59.208*** -29.948*** 0.035*** 0.055** 0.061*** 
  (-6.544) (-8.224) (-8.759) (-3.706) (6.420) (2.135) (2.865) 
Income Diversification 0.197*** -0.617 3.357*** 2.543 0.001 -0.003** -0.000 
 (5.029) (-0.423) (2.625) (0.812) (0.778) (-2.503) (-0.357) 
Size 0.024*** 3.282*** 1.894*** 1.507** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 (4.278) (13.780) (9.136) (2.417) (-9.392) (6.056) (2.639) 
Listed 0.076*** 5.055*** 0.496 2.636* -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.001*** 
 (4.626) (7.533) (0.819) (1.727) (-7.547) (-13.455) (2.696) 
BHC 0.060*** 1.783*** 0.664* -0.631 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (5.751) (4.339) (1.869) (-0.575) (-3.369) (-5.024) (-6.690) 
Overhead Costs -1.334*** -44.649*** -32.296*** -5.240*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.006*** 
 (-63.319) (-56.272) (-47.134) (-4.574) (44.892) (25.312) (7.661) 
FED 0.063*** 2.573*** 2.461*** -1.654*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (3.692) (3.594) (3.881) (-2.857) (-4.070) (-3.385) (-2.005) 
OCC 0.021* 1.208** 1.396*** -0.293 -0.001** 0.000* 0.001*** 
 (1.797) (2.531) (3.419) (-0.334) (-2.219) (1.955) (4.328) 
Constant 4.391*** 49.990*** 40.611*** -3.071 0.017*** 0.004* 0.009*** 
 (58.182) (16.309) (15.686) (-0.394) (10.864) (1.954) (4.618) 
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Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 599,746 656,175 498,015 591,760 600,055 762,671 762,674 
R-squared 0.185 0.138 0.144 0.000 0.125 0.115 0.063 
N-Clusters(Bank) 13,423 14,389 11,868 13,365 13,448 15,750 15,750 
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Table 3.6: Alternative Measures of Bank Internationalization 
 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The 
dependent variable is Z-score (12 quarters). The internationalization measures are Foreign Assets Ratio in 
Model 1, Foreign Loans Ratio in Model 2, and Foreign Deposits Ratio in Model 3. All models include time 
fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Z-Score  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Foreign Assets Foreign Loans Foreign Deposits  
Independent Variables: Ratio Ratio Ratio 
Internationalization Ratio -68.064*** -50.636*** -43.267*** 
  (-8.725) (-9.045) (-8.281) 
Income Diversification 0.957 0.883 1.220 
 (0.720) (0.665) (0.918) 
Size 2.496*** 2.375*** 2.571*** 
 (11.514) (10.996) (11.762) 
Listed 2.893*** 3.019*** 2.855*** 
 (4.672) (4.867) (4.613) 
BHC 1.300*** 1.296*** 1.241*** 
 (3.457) (3.448) (3.304) 
Overhead Costs -38.817*** -38.732*** -38.746*** 
 (-54.022) (-53.890) (-54.025) 
FED 2.475*** 2.482*** 2.469*** 
 (3.743) (3.748) (3.733) 
OCC 1.300*** 1.370*** 1.263*** 
 (2.996) (3.155) (2.912) 
Constant 53.255*** 54.567*** 52.318*** 
  (19.109) (19.646) (18.621) 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Observations 600,055 600,055 600,055 
R-squared 0.148 0.147 0.148 
N-Clusters(Bank) 13,448 13,448 13,448 
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Table 3.7: Alternative Econometric Specifications and Standard Errors 
 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The 
dependent variable is Z-score (12 quarters). Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank internationalization. 
Model 1 (baseline model) is an OLS regression with time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by bank, 
Model 2 uses Newey-West standard errors, Model 3 uses Prais-Winsten standard errors, Model 4 uses Fama-
MacBeth standard errors, and  Model 5 uses two-way clustered standard errors by bank and time. Table 1 
provides definitions for all variables. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent Variable:  Z-Score  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS w/ Newey-     Two-way 
 Time FE & West Prais- Fama  Clustering 
Independent Variables: Bank Clusters w/Lags  Winsten MacBeth By Bank & Time 
Foreign Assets Ratio -68.064*** -61.317*** -31.286*** -66.712*** -61.317*** 
  (-8.725) (-25.476) (-5.818) (-16.430) (-7.015) 
Income Diversification 0.957 15.963*** -5.907*** 2.082 15.963*** 
 (0.720) (42.188) (-26.760) (1.588) (9.819) 
Size 2.496*** 1.531*** 2.609*** 2.748*** 1.531*** 
 (11.514) (22.949) (28.974) (11.020) (4.015) 
Listed 2.893*** 4.212*** 2.985*** 2.070*** 4.212*** 
 (4.672) (18.769) (10.157) (5.562) (5.759) 
BHC 1.300*** 0.629*** 0.756*** 1.239*** 0.629 
 (3.457) (5.199) (5.373) (7.266) (1.434) 
Overhead Costs -38.817*** -28.725*** -4.763*** -38.502*** -28.725*** 
 (-54.022) (-168.170) (-36.639) (-59.272) (-26.439) 
FED 2.475*** 2.691*** 1.885*** 2.479*** 2.691*** 
 (3.743) (13.065) (7.196) (18.656) (3.950) 
OCC 1.300*** 2.083*** 0.554*** 1.457*** 2.083*** 
 (2.996) (16.168) (3.290) (9.583) (4.061) 
Constant 53.255*** 62.457*** 15.067*** 66.084*** 62.457*** 
 (19.109) (75.380) (13.716) (27.934) (17.232) 
Time Effects YES NO NO NO NO 
Observations 600,055 600,055 600,055 600,055 600,055 
R-squared 0.148  0.162 0.105 0.102 
N-Clusters(Bank) 13,448       13,447 
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Table 3.8: Endogeneity 
 
 
Panel A: IV Model 
 
 
Panel A presents the results of instrumental variable (IV) estimation that controls for the endogeneity of bank 
internationalization. The instrument is Border State, a binary indicator for whether a bank is headquartered 
in a state that borders an ocean, Canada, or Mexico. Model 1 (baseline model) is an OLS regression. Models 
2 and 3 are the first- and second-stage regressions of the IV estimation. The row labeled “F-statistic” reports 
the F-statistic of the test on whether the IV is significant in the first-stage regression. All models include time 
fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Independent  IV 2SLS IV 2SLS 
Variables: OLS First Stage Second Stage 
Foreign Assets Ratio -68.064***  -200.382*** 
  (-8.725)   (-4.115) 
Border State  0.001***  
    (26.988)   
Income Diversification 0.957 0.004*** 1.413*** 
 (0.720) (14.493) (3.820) 
Size 2.496*** 0.005*** 3.249*** 
 (11.514) (43.595) (11.659) 
Listed 2.893*** -0.004*** 2.251*** 
 (4.672) (-29.665) (8.030) 
BHC 1.300*** -0.000*** 1.197*** 
 (3.457) (-6.075) (13.463) 
Overhead Costs -38.817*** 0.001*** -38.694*** 
 (-54.022) (4.402) (-216.549) 
FED 2.475*** 0.002*** 2.669*** 
 (3.743) (11.352) (17.620) 
OCC 1.300*** -0.001*** 1.128*** 
 (2.996) (-23.130) (10.733) 
Constant 53.255*** -0.060*** 44.179*** 
 (19.109) (-42.759) (12.999) 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Observations 600,055 600,055 600,055 
R-squared 0.148 0.065 0.139 
F-Statistic   720.795***   
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Panel B: Propensity Score Matching 
 
 
Panel B reports the difference in Z-score between international banks and matched purely domestic banks. 
Four different propensity score matching (PSM) methods are used to construct the control sample of purely 
domestic banks: 1:1 matching without replacement, 1:1 matching with replacement, nearest neighbor (n=2), 
and nearest neighbor (n=3). The propensity scores are computed from a probit model that uses the same 
control variables as in the baseline model (Model 1 in Table 4) plus the instrumental variable, Border State. 
Panel B also shows regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk on the four 
PSM samples. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Z-score  
Propensity Score Matching Estimation Treated (International) Controls Difference t-stat 
1:1 Matching without replacement 29.33 35.77 -6.44*** -12.28 
1:1 Matching with replacement 29.33 35.28 -5.96*** -4.42 
Nearest neighbor (n=2) 29.33 35.36 -6.04*** -5.53 
Nearest neighbor (n=3) 29.33 35.41 -6.08*** -6.15 
 
Dependent Variable:  Z-Score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1:1 Matching 1:1 Matching Nearest Nearest 
Independent without with neighbor neighbor 
Variables: replacement replacement (n=2) (n=3) 
Foreign Assets Ratio -24.552*** -24.329*** -27.596*** -28.733*** 
  (-3.483) (-3.531) (-3.918) (-4.085) 
Income Diversification -9.697 -10.014 -10.977* -11.538** 
 (-1.493) (-1.543) (-1.826) (-2.013) 
Size -0.912* -0.836 -1.199** -1.336*** 
 (-1.779) (-1.627) (-2.533) (-2.951) 
Listed 5.515*** 5.362*** 4.343*** 3.743*** 
 (3.341) (3.179) (2.861) (2.648) 
BHC 0.887 -0.022 1.454 1.896 
 (0.516) (-0.012) (0.937) (1.340) 
Overhead Costs -28.404*** -29.423*** -31.123*** -32.228*** 
 (-11.067) (-10.451) (-12.578) (-14.335) 
FED 1.681 0.213 1.768 1.948 
 (0.540) (0.065) (0.639) (0.790) 
OCC -5.327** -5.304** -4.000** -3.404** 
 (-2.557) (-2.417) (-2.135) (-2.015) 
Constant 77.760*** 79.442*** 89.190*** 93.349*** 
 (9.570) (10.011) (12.257) (13.866) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 17,772 14,721 19,105 22,846 
R-squared 0.149 0.154 0.153 0.155 
N-Clusters(Bank) 2,020 1,999 2,750 3,220 
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Table 3.9: Z-score Decomposition 
 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and the components of Z-
score. The dependent variables are mean ROA in Model 1, mean Capitalization Ratio in Model 2, and Stdv. 
ROA in Model 3. Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank internationalization. All models include time 
fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Z-Score Components 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables: Mean ROA Mean Capitalization Ratio Stdv. ROA 
        
Foreign Assets Ratio -0.018*** 0.050** 0.009** 
  (-6.152) (2.016) (2.475) 
Income Diversification 0.011*** 0.002 0.000 
 (14.418) (0.703) (0.575) 
Size 0.000* -0.004*** 0.000** 
 (1.743) (-11.474) (2.309) 
Listed 0.000 -0.003*** -0.000 
 (0.551) (-3.660) (-1.378) 
BHC 0.000 -0.011*** -0.001*** 
 (0.323) (-17.886) (-8.397) 
Overhead Costs -0.006*** -0.030*** 0.010*** 
 (-11.590) (-13.605) (18.781) 
FED -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 
 (-4.208) (-2.606) (-2.903) 
OCC 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
 (0.330) (-2.080) (0.510) 
Constant 0.010*** 0.208*** -0.005*** 
 (7.150) (37.888) (-2.962) 
Time FE YES YES NO 
Observations 600,055 600,055 600,055 
R-squared 0.101 0.136 0.036 
N-Clusters(Bank) 13,448 13,448 13,448 
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Table 3.10: Accounting and Market Risk Measures for Listed Banks 
 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk. The 
dependent variables are Z-score in Model 1 (baseline model), Idiosyncratic Risk in Model 2, Total Bank Risk 
in Model 3, Merton Default Probability in Model 4, S&P Credit Rating in Model 5, and S&P Investment 
Grade in Model 6. Models 1 to 4 are OLS regressions. Model 5 is an ordered logit regression (intercepts of 
this model are not shown). Model 6 is a logit regression. Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank 
internationalization. All models include time fixed effects. Table 1 provides definitions for all variables. 
Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
  
Idiosyncrati
c 
Total  
Bank 
Merton 
Default 
S&P  
Credit 
S&P Investment 
vs. 
Independent 
Variables: 
Z-score Risk Risk Probability Rating Speculative 
              
Foreign Assets Ratio -60.236*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.032** 
-
0.694*** -6.189*** 
  (-4.534) (4.167) (3.633) (2.026) (-2.971) (-19.603) 
Income Diversification 14.606** -0.005 -0.005 -0.021 1.317*** 0.715*** 
 (1.983) (-1.220) (-1.212) (-1.035) (8.458) (3.103) 
Size -0.659 -0.003*** 
-
0.002*** -0.008*** 0.594*** 0.999*** 
 (-0.907) (-9.065) (-6.766) (-4.346) (38.863) (35.655) 
BHC -0.600 -0.004 -0.004* -0.011 
-
0.448*** -0.523*** 
 (-0.176) (-1.628) (-1.777) (-1.265) (-6.980) (-3.436) 
Overhead Costs -46.186*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.048*** 0.076 0.516*** 
 (-12.036) (6.557) (6.725) (5.479) (0.923) (3.750) 
FED 5.632** -0.001 -0.001* -0.005 0.318*** 0.087 
 (2.072) (-1.329) (-1.794) (-1.335) (9.953) (1.406) 
OCC 8.195*** -0.002*** 
-
0.003*** -0.014*** 0.135*** 0.099* 
 (3.149) (-3.264) (-3.591) (-3.286) (4.244) (1.915) 
Constant 
137.480**
* 0.052*** 0.041*** 0.072***  -26.387*** 
 (10.593) (11.667) (9.075) (3.360)  (-45.523) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 29,953 29,816 29,816 29,176 10,022 10,022 
R-squared 0.155 0.350 0.154 0.174 0.379 0.722 
N-Clusters(Bank) 941 941 941 933     
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Table 3.11: Internationalization and Bank Risk during Financial Crises 
 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk during 
financial crises and normal times. The construction of the financial crisis periods follows Berger and 
Bouwman (2013). The dependent variable is Z-score (12 quarters). All models include time fixed effects. 
Foreign Assets Ratio is the measure of bank internationalization. Table 1 provides definitions for all 
variables. Robust t-statistics adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:  Z-score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Financial Banking Market Banking Crises and 
Independent Variables: Crises Crises Crises Market Crises 
Foreign Assets Ratio -61.650*** -65.164*** -65.985*** -61.647*** 
 (-7.452) (-7.875) (-8.443) (-7.452) 
Foreign Assets Ratio × Financial Crises -16.856***    
  (-3.490)       
Foreign Assets Ratio × Banking Crises   -10.967*   -14.491** 
    (-1.662)   (-2.260) 
Foreign Assets Ratio × Market Crises   -17.903** -22.259*** 
      (-2.032) (-2.672) 
Income Diversification 0.950 0.949 0.963 0.953 
 (0.714) (0.714) (0.725) (0.717) 
Size 2.498*** 2.498*** 2.496*** 2.498*** 
 (11.525) (11.520) (11.514) (11.523) 
Listed 2.893*** 2.893*** 2.894*** 2.894*** 
 (4.673) (4.672) (4.674) (4.674) 
BHC 1.300*** 1.299*** 1.301*** 1.300*** 
 (3.458) (3.456) (3.460) (3.459) 
Overhead Costs -38.809*** -38.815*** -38.812*** -38.808*** 
 (-54.002) (-54.015) (-54.014) (-54.003) 
FED 2.475*** 2.473*** 2.478*** 2.476*** 
 (3.742) (3.740) (3.747) (3.744) 
OCC 1.300*** 1.300*** 1.300*** 1.300*** 
 (2.996) (2.996) (2.996) (2.996) 
Constant 53.214*** 53.234*** 53.247*** 53.216*** 
 (19.097) (19.100) (19.109) (19.098) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 600,055 600,055 600,055 600,055 
R-squared 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 
N-Clusters(Bank) 13,448 13,448 13,448 13,448 
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Table 3.12: Role of Corporate Governance for the Impact of Internationalization on Bank Risk 
 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the relation between internationalization and bank risk conditional on the magnitude of agency problems. The dependent 
variable is Z-score (12 quarters). The main internationalization measure is the Foreign Assets Ratio. The following are banks that are more likely to suffer from 
agency problems: less institutional ownership, less public pension fund ownership, and less long-term institutional ownership (Panel A); less analyst coverage and 
CEO is Chairman (Panel B); and relatively low and relatively high levels of insider ownership (Panel C). All models include time fixed effects. Robust t-statistics 
adjusted for bank clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Institutional Ownership 
  Institutional Ownership Pension Fund Ownership Long-Term Institutional Ownership 
 ≤ median > median ≤ median > median ≤ median > median 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variables: Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score 
              
Foreign Assets Ratio -174.189*** -47.810*** -250.119*** -42.306*** -264.529*** -43.954*** 
  (-7.639) (-3.601) (-5.653) (-3.171) (-4.433) (-3.381) 
Income Diversification 22.637** 6.360 18.040** 5.665 16.066* 9.408 
 (2.389) (0.648) (2.008) (0.599) (1.778) (0.974) 
Size 3.184** -1.399 5.162*** -2.252** 4.772*** -2.212** 
 (2.277) (-1.500) (3.674) (-2.506) (3.502) (-2.392) 
BHC 1.197 -4.088 -2.410 -4.757 0.291 -5.373 
 (0.287) (-0.831) (-0.635) (-0.971) (0.076) (-1.087) 
Overhead Costs -51.130*** -40.862*** -57.691*** -34.777*** -51.913*** -39.418*** 
 (-9.737) (-7.896) (-10.987) (-7.855) (-10.180) (-7.837) 
FED 4.073 5.321 9.342** 2.041 3.964 5.348* 
 (1.036) (1.617) (2.424) (0.648) (1.099) (1.721) 
OCC 5.323 9.415*** 8.953** 7.979*** 3.349 10.934*** 
 (1.520) (2.763) (2.521) (2.595) (0.998) (3.432) 
Constant 74.228*** 134.312*** 86.329*** 149.069*** 22.616 151.726*** 
 (3.607) (8.039) (3.925) (8.835) (1.103) (9.969) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 12,519 17,434 11,685 18,268 11,879 18,074 
R-squared 0.182 0.146 0.191 0.159 0.175 0.159 
N-Clusters(Bank) 718 656 747 678 757 700 
    
  Institutional Ownership Pension Fund Ownership Long-Term Institutional Ownership 
t-test for equality of the Foreign Assets  
Ratio coefficients across subsamples 
       -4.789*** -4.497*** -3.612*** 
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Panel B: Analyst Coverage and CEO Duality 
  Number of Analysts CEO Duality 
 ≤ median > median NO YES 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables: Z-score Z-score Z-score Z-score 
          
Foreign Assets Ratio -167.039*** -43.260*** 2.148 -54.929*** 
  (-7.453) (-3.029) (0.096) (-3.337) 
Income Diversification 15.467 -6.304 -15.047 21.926* 
 (1.274) (-0.469) (-1.496) (1.682) 
Size 1.137 -2.395* -0.262 -1.849* 
 (0.688) (-1.742) (-0.220) (-1.678) 
BHC 0.909 -10.863 0.778 -7.767 
 (0.186) (-1.386) (0.105) (-1.272) 
Overhead Costs -45.901*** -32.286*** -43.367*** -46.187*** 
 (-6.829) (-4.893) (-8.789) (-7.660) 
FED 4.140 5.431 -3.476 6.136 
 (0.982) (1.297) (-0.785) (1.465) 
OCC 7.197* 7.366* 5.275 7.882* 
 (1.800) (1.760) (1.260) (1.925) 
Constant 115.740*** 145.439*** 134.051*** 158.309*** 
 (4.043) (6.792) (5.761) (8.597) 
Time FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 8,933 9,082 11,004 9,822 
R-squared 0.171 0.157 0.158 0.152 
N-Clusters(Bank) 613 374 550 435 
 
                    Number of Analysts CEO Duality 
t-test for equality of the Foreign Assets  
Ratio coefficients across subsamples 
                            -4.658*** -2.0493** 
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Panel C: Insider Ownership 
  Insider Ownership 
 ≤  p20 (p20, p80] > p80 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables: Z-score Z-score Z-score 
        
Foreign Assets Ratio -26.200* 16.037 -316.526*** 
  (-1.755) (0.653) (-5.751) 
Income Diversification 9.306 7.407 -29.911** 
 (0.617) (0.667) (-2.461) 
Size -4.308*** 0.458 4.300** 
 (-3.071) (0.359) (2.368) 
BHC -8.654 -8.302 -0.487 
 (-0.882) (-1.167) (-0.044) 
Overhead Costs -35.687*** -47.123*** -34.272*** 
 (-5.201) (-7.683) (-6.590) 
FED 6.987 -1.419 -3.572 
 (1.219) (-0.339) (-0.675) 
OCC 12.256** 3.848 1.706 
 (2.166) (0.981) (0.356) 
Constant 178.817*** 129.416*** 86.203*** 
 (7.619) (5.195) (2.792) 
Time FE YES YES YES 
Observations 4,718 12,327 3,631 
R-squared 0.171 0.148 0.210 
N-Clusters(Bank) 224 575 216 
 
  Insider Ownership 
F-test for equality of the Foreign Assets  
Ratio coefficients across subsamples 
15.56*** 
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CHAPTER 4 
DID TARP BANKS GET COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES?88,89 
4.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates whether the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) – one of the 
largest government interventions in the US during the recent financial crisis – may have 
given its recipients competitive advantages.  Also, if such competitive advantages were 
conferred, which channel(s) brought about these changes? The main component of TARP, 
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), is a preferred stock and equity warrant purchase 
program led by the US Treasury's Office of Financial Stability. We use the name TARP 
henceforth to refer to CPP, since this is the name ultimately widely used in the media 
(although CPP is only one of the interventions).   
The main objectives of TARP were to improve the stability of the financial system 
and increase the availability of credit. However, it may also have had unintended effects 
on bank competition and resource allocation, given that the literature on regulatory
                                                 
88
 Allen N. Berger, and Raluca A. Roman. A modified version has been accepted for publication by Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 08/13/2014. 
 
89 The authors thank an anonymous referee, Kin Blackburn, Yaap Bos, Christa Bouwman, Nick Coleman, 
Michael Koetter, Myron Kwast, Orgul Ozturk, Tony Saunders, Klaus Schaeck, Larry Wall, and conference 
participants at the Chicago Federal Reserve Conference, Finance Management Association Conference, 
FDIC/JFSR Annual Banking Research Meetings, and ASSA Annual Meetings for helpful comments and Ran 
Duchin and Denis Sosyura for data on their political connections index and Lamont Black, Christa Bouwman, 
and Jen Dlugosz for data on Discount Window and Term Auction Facility (TAF) programs. 
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interventions in the banking sector often opines that public guarantees distort competition 
(TARP funds may be relatively expensive).90 The competitive advantages appear to be 
primarily or entirely due to TARP banks that repaid early, suggesting that these banks had 
reduced importance of the cost disadvantage channel and had increased importance of the 
safety channel.  Our results suggest a possible distortion in competition due to the 
government intervention, which may have misallocated resources. The results may also 
help explain other findings in the literature on the effects of TARP on bank risk and 
lending, and yield important policy implications.  
Our hypotheses suggest diverging predictions regarding the effect of TARP on bank 
competitive indicators, market share and market power. TARP can either increase or 
decrease these measures of competitive advantage. We consider separately the cases of 
market share and market power as our different channels may influence them in the same 
or opposite directions. 
We first consider market share as measured by local market share of assets. Three 
potential channels may lead to higher market shares for TARP recipients: the predation 
channel (TARP banks may compete more aggressively), the safety channel (TARP banks 
may be considered safer), and the cost advantage channel (TARP funds may be cheaper 
than non-TARP funds). In contrast, three different channels may lead to lower market 
shares for TARP banks: the charter value / quiet life channel (bailout may increase charter 
value and/or allow for a “quiet life”), the stigma channel (TARP banks may be perceived 
as riskier), and the cost disadvantage channel (TARP funds may be more expensive than 
non-TARP funds). Importantly, the safety and stigma channels are opposites and the cost 
                                                 
90 These and other channels are described in detail in Section 4.4. 
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advantage and cost disadvantage channels are opposites, and only one of each pair can 
hold for a given bank at a given time. 
We then consider market power as measured by Lerner Index. TARP banks may 
increase their market power relative to non-TARP banks due to four different channels, 
three of which also affect market share as described above: the safety channel, the 
increased moral hazard channel (reduction in discipline results in shifts into riskier 
portfolios), the charter value / quiet life channel, and the cost advantage channel. 
Alternatively, TARP banks may decrease their market power relative to non-TARP banks 
due to four different channels, three of which also affect market share as described above: 
the predation channel, the decreased moral hazard channel (increase in capital results in 
shifts into safer portfolios), the stigma channel, and the cost disadvantage channel. The 
increased moral hazard and decreased moral hazard channels are opposites, and only one 
can hold for a given bank at a given time.91 
Some of the market share and market power channels go in the same direction and 
some go in the opposite direction, and we formulate hypotheses that take these channels 
into consideration. We test the hypotheses and try to distinguish which of the channels 
empirically dominate using a difference-in-difference (DID) regression model. The model 
uses the two indicators of competitive advantage – local market share of assets as a proxy 
for market share and Lerner index as a proxy for market power – as the key dependent 
variables. The exogenous variables include a TARP Recipient dummy and a DID term, Post 
TARP x TARP Recipient (where Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the 
                                                 
91 The predation and charter value/quiet life channels may also be regarded as opposites because they have 
opposing implications for both market share and market power and because only one can hold for a given 
bank at a given time. 
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period after the TARP program initiation), to capture the effect of the TARP treatment. We 
also control for proxies for CAMELS, the declared set of financial criteria used by 
regulators to assess the health of banking organizations, as well as a rich set of other bank 
characteristics and time fixed effects. 
Our results suggest that TARP banks did get competitive advantages and increased 
both their market shares and market power. When splitting the TARP participants by 
whether or not they repaid early, we find that the competitive advantages are primarily or 
entirely due to recipients that repaid early, suggesting that these banks had significantly 
reduced importance of the cost disadvantage channel and had increased importance of the 
safety channel. When assessing which of the channels above are the strongest and weakest, 
we find that: 1) the moral hazard channels seem to be unimportant, 2) the cost 
disadvantage channel seems to dominate the cost advantage channel, at least for the banks 
that repaid early, and 3) the safety channel dominates the stigma and cost disadvantage 
channels.  
 We perform a number of robustness checks. We address the potential endogeneity 
between our independent variable (TARP recipient) and the dependent variables for 
competitive advantage using instrumental variable analysis (following Bayazitova and 
Shivdasani (2012), Li (2013), Duchin and Sosyura (2014)). We address potential selection-
bias issues using a propensity score matching analysis. We attempt to rule out the 
possibility that alternative forces may drive our results using placebo experiments. We also 
check the sensitivity of our results to alternative proxies of TARP – TARP infusion amount 
divided by gross total assets (GTA) and TARP infusion amount divided by risk-weighted 
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assets – instead of a TARP recipient dummy.92 We try alternative proxies of market share 
– local market shares of loans, deposits, and uninsured deposits – instead of the local 
market share of assets. We use alternative econometric models – bank fixed effects and 
random effects models – as well as a model with standard errors clustered at the bank level. 
We also perform tests to capture the effects of different bank sizes. Finally, we also conduct 
several subsample analyses such as: excluding involuntary participants, excluding stress-
tested banks, and subsample analyses based on bank capitalization and local market 
concentration. Our results are robust to all these checks. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe 
TARP and in Section 4.3, we review the related literature. In Section 4.4, we develop the 
empirical hypotheses. In Section 4.5, we describe the econometric framework. In Section 
4.6, we discuss the data. In Section 4.7, we present the main empirical results and in Section 
4.8, we focus on robustness tests. In Section 4.9, we draw conclusions, describe how our 
findings may explain other results in the TARP literature, and give policy implications. 
  
                                                 
92 Gross total assets (GTA) equals total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated 
transfer risk reserve (a reserve for certain foreign loans). Total assets on Call Reports deduct these two 
reserves, which are held to cover potential credit losses. We add these reserves back to measure the full value 
of the assets financed.  Risk-weighted assets are based on the Basel I requirements. 
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4.2 Description of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was established in October 2008 pursuant to 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). It was one of the largest 
government interventions to address the subprime mortgage crisis. Its primary purposes 
were to improve financial stability by purchasing up to $700 billion of the banking 
organizations’ “troubled assets” (to stabilize their balance sheets and avoid further losses) 
and encourage banks to increase lending.  
Rather than purchasing "troubled assets,” the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of 
TARP authorized the U.S. Treasury to invest up to $250 billion (out of the $700 billion 
bailout package) in the preferred equity of selected financial institutions to enhance their 
capital ratios. This included $125 billion in $10 billion and $25 billion increments to nine 
large involuntary participants (Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, 
Goldman Sachs Group, Morgan Stanley, Wachovia Corporation, State Street Corporation, 
and Merrill Lynch).These initial recipients did not follow the formal CPP evaluation 
process, while the rest followed the formal process and applied for CPP funds from the 
U.S. Treasury. During 2008:Q4-2009:Q4, TARP infused capital of $204.9 billion into 709 
banking organizations. Approval to receive TARP took into account the health of the 
banking organizations, with the viable, healthier ones being more likely to receive capital. 
In addition, Duchin and Sosyura (2012, 2014), Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), and Li 
(2013) find that banks with more political influence were more likely to receive TARP 
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funds. The CPP investment in preferred shares was determined by the Treasury, ranging 
from 1-3% of a firm’s risk-weighted assets or $25 billion (whichever was smaller).93 
In return for the capital infusion, banks provided the Treasury with non-voting 
preferred stock (paying dividends at an annual yield of 5% for the first five years and 9% 
afterwards) and ten-year life warrants for the common stock (allowing the purchase of 
common stock for an amount equal to 15% of the preferred equity infusion), giving 
taxpayers the opportunity to benefit from the banks’ future growth. TARP participants were 
also subject to compensation restrictions. Some of these were outlined at program inception 
in October 2008: limiting tax deductibility of compensation for senior executives to 
$500,000, requiring bonus claw-backs, and limiting golden parachute payments. In 
February 2009, the Treasury revised the rules and limited total annual compensation for 
senior executives at TARP banks to $500,000 excluding certain incentive awards. The 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) further prohibited bonuses, retention 
awards, and incentive compensation other than long-term restricted stock awards that 
exceed one-third of annual compensation. As of December 31, 2012, the Treasury had 
received over $220 billion back on $204.9 billion TARP invested in banking 
organizations.94  
4.3 Related Literature 
A number of papers look at TARP determinants and effects. First, several papers look at 
factors that affect the initial decisions to apply for and receive TARP funds by banks. 
                                                 
93  TARP investments outside the CPP were not subject to these limits (e.g., AIG, GMAC (now Ally 
Financial)). In addition, Citigroup and Bank of America initially received $25 billion, but later got 
installments of additional funds. 
 
94 http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Monthly-Report-to-Congress.aspx 
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Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), Duchin and Sosyura (2012, 2014), Li (2013), and 
Berger and Roman (2014) find that banks with more political connections were more likely 
to receive TARP funds. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) find that banks that posed 
systemic risk and faced high financial distress costs, but had strong asset quality, obtained 
TARP equity infusions. Cornett, Li, and Tehranian (2013) find that financial characteristics 
related to the probability of receiving TARP differ for the healthiest (‘‘over-achiever’’) 
versus the least healthy (‘‘under-achiever’’) banks. TARP under-achievers had weaknesses 
in income production and experienced liquidity issues while TARP over-achievers’ loans 
performed well, but liquidity issues hurt the abilities of these banks to continue lending. 
Other papers look at “exit from TARP” decisions. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) and 
Wilson and Wu (2012) find that banks with high levels of CEO pay were more likely to 
exit early, presumably due to TARP restrictions on executive pay. 
Second, some papers look at valuation effects of TARP. Ng, Vasvari, and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2013) find that TARP banks had lower equity returns in the 
program initiation and increased their valuations later. Harrisa, Huertab, and Ngob (2013) 
find deteriorating operating efficiency for TARP banks. Veronesi and Zingales (2010) find 
that as of the end of 2009, TARP increased the value of the top 10 banks’ financial claims 
by $130 billion at a taxpayers’ cost of $21 billion - $44 billion with a net benefit between 
$86 billion and $109 billion. Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang (2013) find that TARP led 
to spillover effects from banking to the corporate sector, leading to a significantly positive 
impact on borrowing firms’ stock returns. In contrast, Lin (2013) finds that firms that have 
relationships with TARP banks suffer a significant valuation loss of 2.5% in 3-day 
abnormal returns around TARP approval announcements. 
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Third, other papers investigate the impacts of TARP on bank risk and/or lending. 
Duchin and Sosyura (2014) use a sample of 529 publicly traded financial firms (which tend 
to be the largest firms) over the period 2006-2010, and find that TARP banks approved 
riskier loans, but find no evidence of an increase in credit supply. Black and Hazelwood 
(2013) analyze risk-taking by bank size using 81 banks from the Survey of Terms of Bank 
Lending survey over 2007-2010. They find that risk of loans originated increased for large 
TARP banks, but decreased for small TARP banks. They also find that outstanding 
commercial and industrial loans (C&I) increased at small TARP banks, but decreased at 
large TARP banks relative to non-TARP banks. Li (2013) looks at TARP’s effect on bank 
loan supply using 7,062 banks (both public and private), of which 647 are TARP recipients. 
He focuses on banks with below-median Tier 1 ratios (less well capitalized) because these 
are more likely to receive TARP, and finds that these TARP banks expanded their credit 
supply, and this increase was registered in all major types of loans. Puddu, and Walchli 
(2013) find that TARP banks provide on average 12% more small business loan 
originations than non-TARP banks. Chang, Contessi, and Francis (2014) find that banks 
that received TARP funds maintained lower cash-to-assets ratios (and thus lower excess 
reserves ratios), consistent with the view that the TARP capital injection possibly resulted 
in more lending for the TARP beneficiaries. Presumably, the results in these last three 
studies were dominated by the effects on small banks, which constitute the vast majority 
of banks. 
Fourth, one paper examines the effects of TARP on local economic conditions 
(Berger and Roman (2015)). (Berger and Roman, 2015) that investigates the impact of 
TARP on real economic conditions. They find that banks’ TARP bailouts were followed 
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by improvements in economic conditions in the local markets in which they operate. TARP 
increased net job creation and net hiring establishments, and decreased business and 
personal bankruptcies.   
Another relevant paper is Koetter and Noth (2014) which finds competitive 
distortions as a result of TARP for unsupported banks. They find that higher bailout 
expectations for unsupported banks are associated with increases in banks’ interest 
margins: loan rates increase and deposit rates decrease. We focus on the competitive effects 
(market power and market share) for the TARP recipient banks. 
Related literature looks at government interventions in other nations on bank risk-
taking, lending, and liquidity creation (e.g., Brandao-Marques, Correa, and Sapriza (2012), 
Dam and Koetter (2014), Hryckiewicz (2012), Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck 
(2014)) and find either reductions or increases in risk-taking, and reductions in credit 
growth and liquidity creation. Others look at effects on competition (e.g., Cordella and 
Yeyati (2003), Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011), Calderon and Schaeck (2012), King 
(2013)) and find less aggressive competitive conduct when banks are subject to bailouts, 
and lower market power or more aggressive conduct for competitors of bailed out 
institutions, and mixed competitive effects on shareholders. 
Also relevant are papers studying the impact of capital on competition, given that 
TARP increased bank capital (e.g., Calomiris and Mason (2003), Calomiris and Wilson 
(2004), Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011), Mehran and Thakor (2012), Berger and 
Bouwman (2013)), which generally report positive effects of capital on banks’ market 
share or ability to compete. 
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Finally, there is research examining the effect of competition on financial stability, 
which is relevant because TARP may distort competition, with further implications for 
financial stability. Two opposing strands of literature relate competition to stability. The 
“competition-fragility” view (e.g., Marcus (1984), Keeley (1990), Demsetz, Saidenberg, 
and Strahan (1996), Carletti and Hartmann (2003)) contends that more banking 
competition increases bank instability, while the “competition-stability” view (e.g., Boyd 
and De Nicolo (2005), Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal (2006), Schaeck and Cihak (2010)) 
asserts that lower competition is associated with financial instability. Berger, Klapper, and 
Turk-Ariss (2009) find that the two views do not necessarily yield opposing predictions 
and find evidence supporting both. Others predict a potential nonmonotonic U-shape 
relationship between market power and risk-taking (e.g., Martinez-Miera and Repullo 
(2010)). Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2014) account for competition as a factor 
impacting bank failure during the recent financial crisis, and find results consistent with 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) that the effect of concentration increased the 
probability of failure at high levels and decreased it at low levels. 
We raise the possibility that the effects on bank risk and lending may be related to 
the effects on competition. As discussed in the conclusions in Section 4.9 below, if TARP 
banks obtained competitive advantages and the relationship between market power and 
risk-taking was nonmonotonic during the crisis, this may help explain the results on risk 
and lending by large and small banks. 
4.4 Hypothesis Development 
Our hypotheses examine the impact of TARP on competition, measured by market share 
and market power. We first consider market share. Government capital infusions can help 
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TARP banks increase their market shares (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Boot and Marinc 
(2008), Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011), Mehran and Thakor (2012), Berger and 
Bouwman (2013)). Three potential channels could lead to this. First, the predation channel 
(Telser (1966), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)) suggests that better capitalized banks may 
have used TARP capital to act aggressively to take market share away from financially 
constrained peers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some TARP recipients used the funds 
to acquire peers with poorer capital ratios.95 Second, under the safety channel, TARP banks 
may be perceived as safer due to the extra capital and/or the selection criteria which 
targeted “healthy, viable institutions.” The safety channel includes the effects of both the 
banks’ decision to apply for TARP and whether the application is accepted. Customers 
may take more loans and loan commitments from TARP banks because they are less likely 
to fail or become distressed, and creditors are more likely to lend to them because they are 
more likely to pay back, both suggesting higher market shares for the TARP banks. Finally, 
under the cost advantage channel, TARP funds may be cheaper than other funds, so TARP 
banks have an incentive to expand their portfolios, yielding higher market shares. 
A contrasting view is that higher capital as a result of capital infusions decreases 
the market shares of TARP banks. There are three different channels that can lead to this. 
First, under the charter value / quiet life channel (Hicks (1935), Keeley (1990), Cordella 
and Yeyati (2003)), bailouts may increase charter values and/or allow for “quiet lives,” 
decreasing incentives for aggressive behavior, leading to lower market shares.96 Second, 
                                                 
95 As examples, MB Financial acquired in 2009 several failing institutions: Benchmark Bank, Corus Bank 
NA, InBank, and Heritage Community Bank. M&T Bank Corp, New York also acquired all the outstanding 
common stock of Provident Bankshares Corp in 2009 and Wilmington Trust Corporation in 2010. 
 
96 In addition, the bailout may induce more aggressive behavior by competitors, leading to lower market 
shares for the TARP banks (Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011)). 
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there may be a stigma channel if market participants perceive TARP banks as riskier.97  
The stigma channel, like the safety channel, includes the effects of both the decisions to 
apply for and to accept bailout funds. Customers may take less credit from TARP banks 
because they may be more likely to fail or become financially distressed, and creditors to 
be more reluctant to lend to them because they are less likely to pay back. Finally, under 
the cost disadvantage channel, TARP funds may be more expensive than other funds, 
leading TARP banks to decrease their portfolio sizes, resulting in lower market shares. As 
noted above, the safety and stigma channels are opposites and the cost advantage and cost 
disadvantage channels are opposites, and only one of each pair can hold for a given bank 
at a given time.98 
We test empirically the impact of the TARP on market share to understand which 
view finds empirical support and which channels dominate. Our first hypotheses (H1a-
H1b) are: 
H1a: TARP banks increased their market shares relative to non-TARP banks. 
H1b: TARP banks decreased their market shares relative to non-TARP banks. 
We next consider market power, proxied by Lerner GTA, Price minus MC 
(marginal cost) divided by Price (discussed in Section 4.6.2). TARP banks may increase 
their market power due to four different channels (three of which also affect market share 
above). First, under the safety channel, customers may pay more for credit from TARP 
                                                 
97 Hoshi and Kashyap (2010), in their study about lessons from Japan crisis, mention that a bank may refuse 
government assistance if it generates stigma or an adverse signal that the bank is expected to have high future 
losses. 
 
98 As discussed above, the predation and charter value/quiet life channels may also be regarded as opposites 
because they have opposing implications and only one can hold for a given bank at a given time. 
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banks because these banks are less likely to fail or become distressed, and creditors may 
charge them lower interest rates because TARP banks are more likely to pay back, both 
leading to higher market power. Second, under the increased moral hazard channel, there 
may be reductions in market and regulatory discipline due to the increased probability of 
future bailouts, resulting in shifts into riskier portfolios. This leads to higher measured 
market power because the riskier pool of customers pay higher interest rates. Creditors may 
also charge more if they perceive the TARP banks as riskier, but this increase will be less 
than enough to compensate for the riskier asset portfolio. Third, under the charter value / 
quiet life channel, TARP bailout may decrease incentives for aggressive behavior. This 
may lead to higher market power as TARP banks maintain higher rates and fees for credit 
and maintain lower deposit and non-deposit funding rates rather than going after business.  
Finally, under the cost advantage channel, TARP banks have decreased marginal costs and 
may reduce price (by a lesser amount) to attract more business, yielding higher market 
power. 
Alternatively, TARP banks may have decreased market power due to four different 
channels (three of which are from the market share hypotheses above). First, under the 
predation channel, TARP banks may use the capital infusions to compete more 
aggressively by offering customers lower rates and fees on loans and loan commitments 
and higher rates on deposits and other funds, resulting in lower market power. Second, 
under the decreased moral hazard channel, the increase in capital may result in shifts into 
safer portfolios. This leads to lower measured market power because the safer pool of 
customers pay less for loans and loan commitments, which is partially offset by lower 
interest rates from creditors. Third, under the stigma channel, customers may demand 
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lower rates on credit from TARP banks because they are perceived as riskier, and creditors 
may charge them more for funds, leading to lower market power. Finally, under the cost 
disadvantage channel, TARP banks have an increase in marginal cost and may increase 
price (by a lesser amount), leading to lower market power. The increased moral hazard 
and decreased moral hazard channels are opposites, and only one can hold for a given 
bank at a given time. 
We test empirically the impact of the TARP on market power to try to understand 
which view finds more empirical support. Our second series of hypotheses (H2a-H2b) are: 
H2a: TARP banks increased their market power relative to non-TARP banks. 
H2b: TARP banks decreased their market power relative to non-TARP banks. 
The eight channels may influence market share and market power in the same or 
opposite directions, as shown in Graph A of Figure 4.1. The only exceptions are the moral 
hazard channels, for which we only have predictions for market power.  
We also distinguish between TARP banks that repaid early and those that did not. 
We expect that those that repaid early would have shed some of the cost advantages or 
disadvantages of the program by leaving it.  In addition, any stigma attached to the program 
would likely largely be lifted, and there may be an increased safety channel from 
demonstrating the ability to repay.  The changes in the importance of the channels from 
early repayment are shown with the smaller and larger arrows in Graph B of Figure 4.1. 
We expect that for those that repaid early, the cost disadvantage channel and/or the stigma 
channel was likely in force encouraging the repayment. Since the cost disadvantage 
channel and stigma channel have negative influences on both market share and market 
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power, the reduction of the importance of these channels and any increase in the importance 
of the safety channel should make the overall impact of TARP more positive or less 
negative for those that repaid early. These arguments lead to our third hypothesis: 
H3: TARP banks that repaid early incurred more positive or less negative market share 
and market power outcomes. 
4.5 Econometric Framework 
We test the effects of TARP on competition using data for virtually all US banking 
organizations. The changes in banks’ behavior after TARP are studied using a difference-
in-difference (DID) analysis. A DID estimator is commonly used in the program evaluation 
literature (e.g., Meyer (1995)) to compare a treatment group to a control group before and 
after treatment. Recently, it has been used in the banking literature (e.g., Beck, Levine, and 
Levkov (2010), Gilje (2012), Schaeck, Cihak, Maehler, and Stolz (2012), Berger, Kick, 
and Schaeck (forthcoming)). In this case, the treated group consists of banks that received 
TARP funds, and the control group consists of other banks. An advantage of this approach 
is that by analyzing the time difference of the group differences, the DID estimator 
accounts for omitted factors that affect treated and untreated banks alike.  
The first DID regression model considers TARP banks that repaid early and those 
that did not equally,  and accounts for Hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a, and H2b: 
0 1 2
3 1 4
(4.1)it it it it
t itit
Y TARP Recipient Post TARP xTARP Recipient
X Time
β β β
β β ε
−
= + ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
  
Yit  is a competitive advantage indicator (market share or market power), TARP Recipientit 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post 
TARPit x TARP Recipientit is the DID term and captures the effect of the treatment (TARP) 
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on the treated (TARP recipients) compared to the untreated (non-TARP banks) after 
treatment. Post TARPit is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after the TARP 
program initiation (following Duchin and Sosyura (2014)), but considering a longer period 
for estimation. Xit-1 are control variables, Timet is a series of time fixed effects, and εit 
represents a white noise error term.99 A positive coefficient on the DID term would show 
the presence of a competitive advantage associated with TARP. 
The second DID regression model analyzes the different behavior of TARP banks 
that repaid early and those that did not repay early, and accounts for Hypothesis H3: 
0 1 2
3
54 1 6
_ _ (4.2)
_
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Y TARP Recipient Not Repaid TARP Recipient Repaid
Post TARP xTARP Recipient Not Repaid
Post TARP xTARP Recipient Repaid X Time
δ δ δ
δ
δ δ δ η
−
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All the variables are the same as in equation (1), except that TARP Recipient_Not Repaidit 
(a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010) and TARP 
Recipient_Repaidit (a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid early in 2009-2010) replace 
TARP Recipientit. Post TARPit x TARP Recipient_Not Repaidit and Post TARPit x TARP 
Recipient_Repaidit are the DID terms and capture the effects of the treatment (TARP 
capital infusion) on the treated (TARP recipients that did not repay early and TARP 
recipients that repaid early) compared to the rest. Positive coefficients on these DID terms 
would show competitive advantages. Under Hypothesis H3, the effect of TARP is more 
positive or less negative for those that repaid early, predicting that δ4 > δ3. 
  
                                                 
99 The term Post TARP is not included in the model by itself because it is subsumed by the time fixed 
effects. 
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4.6 Data and Sample 
4.6.1 Data Sources 
Data are collected from multiple sources. We obtain TARP transactions data for October 
2008 to December 2010 and TARP recipients list from the Treasury’s website.100 We 
match by name and location the institutions in the list with their corresponding RSSD9001 
(Call Report ID) where available. The TARP report has 756 transactions included for 709 
unique institutions (572 bank holding companies (BHCs), 87 commercial banks, 50 S&Ls 
and thrifts), since some institutions have multiple transactions – some received more than 
one TARP capital purchase and some made one or more repayment transactions.101 We 
exclude S&Ls and thrifts because datasets are not comparable with banks and these 
institutions compete in different ways than commercial banks. 
We obtain bank data from quarterly Call Reports for the period 2005:Q1 to 
2012:Q4. Given that the majority of our TARP recipients are BHCs, we aggregate Call 
Report data of all the banks in each BHC at the holding company level. This aggregation 
is done for all bank-level variables, including competitive indicators. If the commercial 
bank is independent, we keep the data for the commercial bank. For convenience, we use 
the term bank to refer to either type of entity.  
We exclude observations that do not refer to commercial banks (RSSD9331 ≠ 1), 
have missing or incomplete financial data for total assets or common equity, have missing 
                                                 
100 http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/Pages/default.aspx 
101 A few special cases are resolved as follows:  For Union First Market Bancshares Corporation (First Market 
Bank, FSB) located in Bowling Green, VA, we include the RSSD9001 of the branch of the commercial bank 
First Market Bank because this is the institution located in Bowling Green, VA. In two other cases where 
M&As occurred (the bank was acquired by another BHC according to the National Information Center 
(NIC)), and TARP money were received by the unconsolidated institution, we included the RSSD9001 of 
this unconsolidated institution. 
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or negative data for the income statement items such as interest expenses, personnel 
expenses, and non-interest expenses, or if the bank failed before 2009:Q1 (before 
observation of TARP effects).  To avoid distortions for the Equity to GTA ratio, for all 
observations with equity less than 0.01 * GTA, we replace equity with 1% of GTA (e.g., 
Berger and Bouwman, 2013). In addition, we normalize financial variables using 
seasonally adjusted GDP deflator to be in real 2012:Q4 dollars.  
We also use data from several other sources for additional control variables and 
instruments: FDIC Summary of Deposits, List of Corrective Actions, House of 
Representatives website, Missouri Census Data Center, Execucomp, DEF 14A Filings 
from SEC Edgar website, Center for Responsible Politics, and the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia website. The regressions lose one quarter of observations because of the 
use of lagged values for some of the exogenous variables. We end up with a final regression 
sample of 178,604 firm-quarter observations for 7,323 unique banks. 
4.6.2. Main Dependent Variables 
For dependent variables, we first consider market share proxied by local market asset share 
of each bank (Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), New England County Metropolitan 
Area (NECMA), or rural county). In the cases of multimarket banks, we use the weighted 
average local market asset share, where the weights are the proportions of deposits in the 
different local markets (locations of assets are not available).102,103  
                                                 
102 As alternative method in unreported results, we construct the weighted average local market asset share 
using as weights the proportions of branches that banks have in their local markets, and results are robust. 
 
103 We assume that assets and loans are distributed the same as deposits according to the “cluster” approach 
in the industrial organization literature. This originated in the Supreme Court’s 1963 Philadelphia National 
Bank decision, which confirmed that antitrust laws are applicable also to banking mergers and defined both 
the product and geographical markets to be used in the structural analysis of bank mergers. The Court found 
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Our second way of measuring competitive advantage is market power. We proxy 
market power by the Lerner Index for GTA, and calculated as the price-cost margin divided 
by price:  
(4.3)it it
it
it
Price MC
Lerner GTA
Price
−
=   
where Priceit is the price of GTA proxied by the ratio of total revenues (interest and non-
interest income) to GTA for bank i at time t  and MCit represents marginal cost of assets 
for bank i at time t . The main advantage of this method is that it can be calculated for each 
bank at each point in time and does not require the assumption of long-run equilibrium, 
unlike other indicators such as the Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic (Dick and Hannan (2010)). 
A firm in perfect competition has an index value of 0 and thus no market power (as Price 
= MC) and a firm with market power has a positive index. The detailed calculation of the 
Lerner Index is explained in Appendix D. 
4.6.3. Main Independent Variables 
As discussed above, we use several TARP variables for our analysis: TARP Recipient, 
TARP Recipient_Repaid, and TARP Recipient_Not Repaid and the interaction terms of 
Post_TARP with these variables.  These are defined above in Section 4.5.   
  
                                                 
that banks produce a “cluster” of services that are traded in “local markets” and established this cluster 
analytical approach. This method defines that the relevant product market includes in that market all products 
and services provided by the commercial banks. In addition, there is a large literature on whether bank deposit 
and lending markets are geographically segmented, with some researchers finding that bank product markets 
have become more integrated over time and that local monopoly power remains (e.g., Eichengreen (1984), 
Berger and Hannan (1989), Cyrnak and Hannan (1999)). 
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4.6.4. Control Variables 
We include a broad set of control variables to mitigate potential omitted variable problems. 
We control for proxies for CAMELS (the declared set of financial criteria used by 
regulators for evaluating banks) as in Duchin and Sosyura (2014) because these are widely 
perceived as good indicators of a bank’s financial health. We control for Capital Adequacy 
– the ratio of equity capital divided by GTA – to account for the extent to which a bank 
can absorb potential losses and compete more vigorously. We control for Asset Quality – 
the fraction of nonperforming loans to total loans – to account for the overall condition of 
a bank’s portfolio. We control for Management Quality/Regulatory Action, a dummy 
taking a value of -1 if a bank had a corrective action by the corresponding banking regulator 
(FED, FDIC, and OCC) during the quarter and 0 otherwise.104 Earnings is proxied by 
return on assets (ROA), the ratio of the annualized net income to GTA. We account for 
bank Liquidity, the ratio of cash over total deposits. Finally, Sensitivity to Market Risk is 
the ratio of the absolute difference (gap) between short-term assets and short-term 
liabilities to GTA. 
We also control for several other bank characteristics following the literature. We 
include Bank Size, the natural log of GTA, because prior research shows there may be a 
connection between size and capacity to gain a competitive advantage (Berger and 
Bouwman (2009, 2013)). Second, we control for Bank Age, the age (in years) of the 
commercial bank or the oldest bank owned by the BHC (when there are multiple banks 
owned by a BHC). This is important because market share usually rises as a bank 
                                                 
104 The list of enforcement actions are taken by FDIC, FED, and OCC regulators against banks. We consider 
that this variable captures management quality also as bank regulators would not take regulatory actions 
against banks unless they judged that bank management would not take appropriate action in the absence of 
the enforcement actions.  
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accumulates years in a market (Berger and Dick (2007)). Third, we control for DWTAF – 
a dummy for whether a bank received discount window loans and/or Term Auction Facility 
(TAF) funding during the crisis. Berger, Black, Bouwman, and Dlugosz (2014) find that 
banks that received these funds increased their lending significantly, raising the possibility 
that these programs may have also affected competitive advantages in terms of market 
share and market power.105 Fourth, we control for Merger, a dummy equal to 1 from the 
time that the bank acquired another institution. Institutions that acquire others may gain 
market share and market power.106 Fifth, we control for BHC, a dummy equal to 1 if the 
entity is a BHC, as this may help a bank strengthen its competitive position because the 
holding company may support its affiliates by injecting capital through internal capital 
markets (Houston, James, and Marcus (1997)). Sixth, we control for the public status of 
the bank or its holding company (Listed), as listed entities have better access to capital 
markets and more public information available, which may affect their competitive 
advantages. Listed is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank is listed or is part of a BHC that is listed 
on a stock exchange.107 Seventh, we control for Metropolitan – a dummy equal to 1 if the 
majority of bank deposits are in MSAs or NECMAs – as banks in metropolitan locations 
may have more opportunities for expansion and growth. Eighth, we control for HHI 
Deposits, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index determined using the bank deposit data from 
the FDIC Summary of Deposits, which may affect the pricing strategy of the bank. HHI is 
                                                 
105 Data on these programs during the crisis were made public due to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests and a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, and the data were generously provided to us by those authors. 
 
106As an alternative way to control for mergers in unreported results, we exclude the quarter of the acquisition. 
Results are robust to this alternative method. 
 
107 In order to split banks by listed versus non-listed status, we match banks in the Call Reports with the 
CRSP dataset using the CRSP-FRB link from the University of Chicago. 
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weighted by the share of bank deposits in each local market over bank’s total deposits over 
all the markets in which the bank operates. Ninth, we control for Branches/GTA – the ratio 
of the number of branches that the bank has over GTA multiplied by 1000 – as banks with 
more branches per dollar of assets may have more complex organizational structures, 
which may also affect banks’ ability to compete (e.g., Degryse and Ongena (2005, 2007), 
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007), Degryse, Laeven, and Ongena (2009), 
Berger and Bouwman (2013)).  
4.7 Empirical Results 
4.7.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 provides definitions and summary statistics for the variables. We present means, 
medians, standard deviations, and numbers of observations across all banks in the sample 
for the variables used in the analyses. In terms of competitive advantage indicators, the 
average bank has a Local Market Share of Assets of 0.049 and a Lerner GTA of 0.051. As 
for the TARP indicators, TARP Recipient dummy shows that 9.7% of the banks received 
TARP money – 1.8% repaid early (TARP Recipient_Repaid) and the remaining 7.9% did 
not repay early (TARP Recipient_Not Repaid). 
Looking at the proxies for CAMELS ratings for the sample banks, we find that the 
average bank has Capital Adequacy of 0.109, Asset Quality of 0.003, Management 
Quality/Regulatory Action of -0.005, Earnings of 0.017, Liquidity of 0.137, and Sensitivity 
to Market Risk of 0.130. These statistics suggest that, on average over the sample period, 
banks were well capitalized and did not have many performance problems, although the 
means mask problems for individual banks at different points in time. Turning to the other 
bank variables, we find that the average bank has a Bank Size (logarithm of the GTA) of 
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12.053 (GTA of $1.89 billion) and a Bank Age of 76.26 years. In addition, 23.7% of the 
banks obtained Discount Window and/or TAF funds  (DWTAF), 21.90% of the banks in 
the sample acquired another institution (Merger), 86.3% of the banks are BHCs or part of 
a BHC (BHC), 6.80% are listed (Listed), and 67.3% are in metropolitan locations 
(Metropolitan). The average bank also has a local market concentration (HHI Deposits) of 
1,162 and a ratio of Branches/GTA of 0.029.  
4.7.2. Regression Analysis 
Table 4.2 tabulates the main estimation results for equation (2) that tests our Hypotheses 
(time fixed effects are not shown for brevity). Panel A columns (1) and (3) show that the 
DID term, Post TARPit * TARP Recipientit, is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level, indicating that TARP banks gained a competitive advantage and increased both 
market share and market power after TARP capital injections. These results are also 
economically significant. The coefficient on Post TARPit * TARP Recipientit of 0.0045 in 
the market share equation increases the local market share by 9.14%, evaluated at the 
average market share of 0.0492. In addition, the coefficient on Post TARPit * TARP 
Recipientit of 0.0384 in the market power equation increases the Lerner Index by 74.85%, 
evaluated at the average Lerner Index of 0.0513. Results are consistent with the empirical 
dominance of Hypothesis H1a over Hypothesis H1b and Hypothesis H2a over Hypothesis 
H2b. Panel A columns (2) and (4) and Panel B showing t-tests for the equality of the effects 
for the two types of TARP banks indicate that the competitive advantage is predominantly 
for the TARP banks that repaid early, suggesting that these banks significantly reduced 
their cost disadvantages and increased their revenues more than those that did not repay 
early, consistent with Hypothesis H3. 
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While we are primarily interested in the DID terms, Post TARP * TARP, the 
coefficients of the TARP dummy are also of interest. The TARP dummies from both the 
market share and market power regressions suggest that prior to TARP, recipients had 
lower market share and market power. The sums of the TARP dummies and the interaction 
coefficients indicate that after TARP, the recipients still had lower market share, although 
closer to that of the non-recipients, while they surpassed their competitors in terms of 
market power. When splitting between TARP banks that repaid early and those that did 
not, we find that all TARP recipients had lower market share and power prior to the 
program, and in all cases except for the market share for TARP recipients that did not repay 
early, they increase their market share and market power. 
Turning to the bank control variables, we find that most of the proxies for CAMELS 
indicate that banks with better asset quality, better management quality, higher earnings, 
higher liquidity, and lower sensitivity to market risk may be better able to gain competitive 
advantages in both market share and market power. The only CAMELS variable that 
differs across the two competitive advantage indicators is capital adequacy, which tends to 
decrease market share and increase market power.  Looking at the other control variables, 
across both market share and market power regressions we find that banks with more 
experience (as proxied by the Bank Age), higher local market concentration, lower 
metropolitan coverage, without a BHC membership, not engaging in M&As, and with a 
less complex organizational structure are more likely to gain competitive advantages.108 
The DWTAF variable does not appear to affect market share significantly, but it has a 
                                                 
108 We also try dropping the local market concentration variable (HHI Deposits) to mitigate the potential 
concern that it is an alternative measure of competition that may bias our regression estimates. The results 
are robust (not shown). 
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negative impact on market power. As for the effects of size and public status on market 
share, estimates suggest that it may be harder for larger and public banks to increase their 
market shares due to different growth and expansion strategies, consistent with Berger and 
Bouwman (2013). However, in terms of market power, larger and public banks are more 
likely to increase market power due to better ability to set higher prices for products or 
obtain cheaper funding from the capital markets.  
4.7.3. Lerner Index Decomposition 
In Table 4.3, we decompose Lerner GTA into its components, Price and MC, to shed light 
on the source of the market power competitive advantage that TARP banks obtain. An 
increase in Price would come from charging higher interest rates and fees for loans and 
loan commitments, while a lower MC may come from paying lower interest rates on 
deposits or non-deposit funds. Results in Panel A columns (1) and (3) suggest that the 
competitive advantage findings are primarily due to marginal costs going down, suggesting 
that the market power gain is mainly on the input side (lower prices for deposits and/or 
other sources of funding). When splitting the banks between banks that repaid early and 
those that did not, both groups had an increase in their market power on the input side and 
banks that repaid early also had an increase in market power on the output side.  
4.7.4. Channels Analysis 
In Graph C of Figure 4.1, we examine which of the possible channels of TARP on 
competition appear to be relatively important and unimportant for explaining our empirical 
results. The shaded areas surrounded by dotted lines illustrate the channels most consistent 
with our findings, while the crossed-out areas illustrate the channels least consistent with 
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our findings.109  We have several important findings. First, the moral hazard channels seem 
to be unimportant because Price does not change nearly as much as MC and goes in two 
different directions for those that did not repay and those that repaid. Second, the cost 
disadvantage channel seems to dominate the cost advantage channel, at least for the banks 
that repaid early, because when the cost effects are reduced by early repayment, the 
competitive advantages are amplified. Finally, the safety channel, the only remaining one 
with positive influences on both market share and market power appears to dominate the 
stigma and cost disadvantage channels, which have negative influences on both. For banks 
that did not repay, the safety channel seems to primarily come in the form of lower interest 
rates for deposits and/or other types of financing, which more than offset the higher cost 
of TARP funds. Banks that repaid also appear to have gotten a boost in their revenues from 
an enhanced safety channel. In sum, the safety channel and the cost disadvantage channel 
are the most important to explain the results. 
4.8 Robustness Tests 
In this section, we provide a number of robustness tests. We include all control variables 
from the main regressions in these tests, but they are not shown for brevity. 
4.8.1. Instrumental Variable (IV) Analysis 
We first address the potential endogeneity of our TARP Recipient variables, which could 
bias our findings. For example, TARP capital might be more often provided to the strongest 
banks, which may be more likely to gain a competitive advantage, yielding a spurious 
relationship. To deal with this, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) analysis.  
                                                 
109 The remaining channels are generally not strongly consistent with our findings because the predicted 
market share and market power effects of these channels go in opposite directions, counter to our results. 
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To find instruments, we first note that prior research on TARP finds that bank’s 
political and regulatory connections can affect the bank’s probability of receiving TARP 
funds. Following this research, we use the following instruments for the TARP Recipient 
variables: Subcommitee on Financial Institutions or Capital Markets, a dummy variable 
which takes a value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a district of a House member who 
served on the Financial Institutions Subcommittee or the Capital Markets Subcommittee 
of the House Financial Services Committee in 2008 or 2009, following Sosyura and Duchin 
(2014); Democrat, a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a bank's local 
Representative was a Democrat in the 2007-2008 campaign election cycle, following Li 
(2013); Fed Director, a dummy which takes a value of 1 if one of the bank’s directors was 
on the board of directors of one of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks (FRB) or a branch in 2008 
or 2009, following Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), Duchin and Sosyura (2012), and Li 
(2013).110  
Because we consider the TARP recipients that did and did not repay early 
separately, we include two additional instrumental variables that account for exit from the 
TARP program. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) show that costs of participation in the 
TARP program are a major determinant for whether banks chose to remain in the program. 
Thus, revised compensation rules announced in February 2009 may pose restrictions for 
management compensation and freedom of decisions in TARP banks with highly 
compensated executives. We include CEO Compensation, a dummy which takes a value 
                                                 
110 We use the MABLE/Geocorr2k software on the Missouri Census Data Center website to match banks 
with congressional districts using the zip codes of their headquarters. The final regression sample for this test 
is 167,112 bank-quarter observations, less than the main regression sample. This is due to two reasons: First, 
some of the banks could not be mapped into a congressional district (either due to an invalid headquarters 
zipcode or because we could not match it to a congressional district), a problem reported also by Li (2013). 
Second, we use an indicator of local market conditions for the 2007-2010 period, although some entities may 
not be present during this entire period. 
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of one if bank’s CEO had a total compensation greater than $500,000 in 2008111,112 because 
banks with high CEO compensation are more likely to exit the program, following Wilson 
and Wu (2010) and Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012). We also use the change in state 
economic conditions, Coincident Index (weighted), which combines four state-level 
indicators to summarize economic conditions in a single statistic.113 The Coincident Index 
(weighted) is calculated as the weighted average of the changes in the Philadelphia Federal 
Reserve’s state coincident indexes from December 2007 to December 2010 with the share 
of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights, following Bayazitova and Shivdasani 
(2012), because banks in states that experience more economic growth may exit the 
program earlier since they can raise cheaper financing in the local market, have more 
internal growth in funding, and/or have fewer loan performance problems.  
Because the potential endogenous explanatory variable in equation (1) is binary and 
we need the instrument to predict treatment, we employ a dummy endogenous variable 
model as suggested in section 18.4.1 of Wooldridge (2002). For the first stage, we use a 
probit model in which we regress the TARP Recipient dummy on the political and 
regulatory instruments discussed and all control variables from the main regression model. 
We then use the predicted probability obtained from the first stage as an instrument for the 
                                                 
111 To construct this variable, we consider banks with GTA greater than $1 billion and use ExecuComp 
complemented with DEF14A Filings in SEC Edgar to determine the compensation package for the CEO in 
2008 for all banks with information available. We assume for the rest that 2008 CEO Compensation is less 
than $500,000, based on the reasoning that small banks are less likely to receive such a high level of 
compensation. 
 
112 In unreported results, we also use a continuous variable, Excess CEO Compensation, the log of the 1 plus 
the excess of $500,000 of 2008 CEO total compensation. Results are comparable using this alternative 
instrument.  
 
113  The four indicators are: nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the 
unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index.   
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second stage. Similarly, for equation (2), we conduct probit regressions for each of the two 
types of TARP banks, TARP Recipient_Not Repaid and TARP Recipient_Repaid on all 
political instruments and regulatory instruments discussed and the two extra instruments 
for early program exit decisions. We also include all control variables from the main 
regression model. We then use the predicted probabilities obtained from the first stage as 
instruments for the second stage.  
The results of the IV regressions are reported in Table 4.4. We report the first-stage 
regression results in Table 4.4 Panel A columns (1)-(3), and the second-stage results for 
the IV specification in Table 4.4 Panel B, with columns (1) and (3) for market share and 
columns (2) and (4) for market power, respectively. The first-stage regressions in column 
(1) indicate that the instrumental variables are positively related to TARP injections, and 
the F-tests indicates that the instruments are valid.  Similarly, the first-stage regression in 
columns (2) and (3) indicate that the additional instruments for repayment of TARP, CEO 
Compensation and Coincident Index (weighted) are related to TARP repayment decisions, 
so that TARP recipients that repaid early are more likely to have had higher CEO 
compensation and higher growth in local markets, while the opposite is true for the TARP 
banks that did not repay early. The F-tests from the first stage again indicate that the 
instruments are valid.  
The second stage results in Panel B and the tests of equality for different types of 
TARP banks in Panel C show that the main results about our DID terms are robust. The 
Post_TARP* TARP Recipient terms remain positive and significant for both market share 
and power. Also the results for the Post_TARP* TARP Recipient_Repaid terms remain 
positive and significant in both equations, showing that TARP recipients that repaid early 
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obtained a competitive advantage. Some of our secondary results, however, are not robust. 
For example, the TARP Recipient dummies switch sign from negative to positive in the IV 
estimation. This result might be consistent with endogeneity concerns, and hence the IV 
estimates may be better able to identify the true effects. 
4.8.2. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Analysis 
We address the related potential concern of selection bias using a propensity score 
matching analysis. We follow Black and Hazelwood (2013) and Duchin and Sosyura 
(2014) and match each TARP recipient based on the propensity score probabilities to one 
or more non-TARP banks with similar characteristics to help dispel the competing 
explanation that our results spuriously reflect differences in the characteristics of recipients 
and non-recipients rather than the effect of TARP per se on competitive advantage 
indicators. Using a probit regression, we estimate the propensity scores of all banks using 
the proxies for CAMELS, Bank Size, and DWTAF.114 The propensity score is the probability 
of a bank receiving TARP funds, based on the bank’s pre-treatment characteristics. TARP 
banks are assigned their corresponding non-TARP bank matches based on the absolute 
difference in propensity scores. Banks with the smallest differences are considered matches 
and are selected to be part of our analysis. 
We use several matching techniques: 1) Nearest-neighbor Matching with N=1, 
which matches each treatment unit to the nearest control unit, 2) Nearest-neighbor 
Matching with N=2, which match each TARP bank with 2 non-TARP banks with the 
closest propensity scores, and 3) Nearest-neighbor Matching with N=3, which match each 
                                                 
114 As an alternative, in unreported results, we also estimate the propensity scores using only the bank 
characteristics of size, capitalization level, and profitability. The PSM results are robust to this method. 
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TARP bank with 3 non-TARP banks with the closest propensity scores. The matches are 
done with replacement, so that a non-TARP bank could be the closest match for multiple 
TARP banks. We rerun all main regressions using these matched samples. Table 4.5 Panel 
A shows the results for market share using the three different PSM samples (columns (1)-
(6)) and we find that market share results continue to hold, except that in some instances 
only TARP recipients that repaid early continue to show a competitive advantage. Table 
4.5 Panel B shows the results for market power using the three different PSM samples 
(columns 1-6) and we find that market power results continue to hold. The t-tests of 
equality for the different groups of TARP banks reported in Panel C again indicate that the 
competitive advantage is greater for TARP banks that repaid early. 
4.8.3. Placebo Experiments 
We are also concerned that alternative forces may drive the effects we document. To 
mitigate this potential problem, we conduct two types of placebo experiments. 
First, we do a placebo experiment following Puddu, and Walchli (2013). We 
fictionally assume that the TARP participation took place four years earlier, while still 
distinguishing between banks that received TARP and those that did not and banks that 
repaid early versus those that did not according to the “true" TARP program. To mimic our 
main analysis, we use an eight-year period immediately preceding the TARP program from 
2001-2008, and assume that the fictional Post TARP period begins four years before the 
actual program. We rerun the regressions using the placebo sample (2001-2008) and define 
Placebo Post TARP as a dummy equal to one in 2005-2008, the period after the fictional 
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TARP program initiation.115 If our main results reflect the true program, we should not find 
positively significant results for the DID terms.  
The results of the first placebo experiment, reported in Table 4.6 Panel A, confirm 
that indeed there are no positively significant results on market share and measured market 
power for the fictional TARP.  In the case of market share, the fictional TARP effect is 
negative and statistically significant, and in the case of measured market power, the effect 
is insignificantly different from zero. The negative effects for market share may reflect that 
these banks may have been in relatively poor condition in the period just before the TARP 
program started. Results are similar when we distinguish between TARP banks that repaid 
early and those that did not. The t-tests in Panel C confirm that there is no statistically 
significant difference in terms of competitive advantages between the two groups.  
As an alternative placebo experiment, we allocate the TARP treatment randomly to 
banks and then re-estimate the regressions with boot-strapped confidence intervals using 
1000 replications. Results are reported in Table 6 Panel B and confirm that indeed there 
are no positively significant results on market share and market power for the randomly 
assigned TARP banks.  The t-tests in Panel C confirm that there is no statistically 
significant difference in terms of competitive advantages between TARP banks that repaid 
early and those that did not. In sum, the two types of placebo experiments suggest that our 
main results do not appear to be driven by alternative forces.  
  
                                                 
115 In the regressions, we include all controls as in our main analysis, except that we are not able to include 
Management Quality/Regulatory Action because of data limitations on enforcement actions (only available 
from 2005 onwards). 
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4.8.4. Alternative Measures of TARP 
We next test the robustness of our main results to the use of alternative measures of TARP. 
In Table 4.7, we replace the TARP Recipient dummies with: Bailout Amount / GTA and 
Bailout Amount / Risk-Weighted Assets. Our results hold, except that in some instances 
only TARP banks that repaid early continue to show a competitive advantage.  
4.8.5. Alternative Measures of Market Share 
We test the robustness of our results to the use of alternative measures of market share. In 
Table 4.8, we replace the Local Market Share Assets with Local Market Share Loans, 
Local Market Share Deposits, and Local Market Share Uninsured Deposits. Uninsured 
deposits may be particularly sensitive to the safety and stigma channels because these 
depositors are not explicitly protected by FDIC deposit insurance.116 Our main results 
hold, except that in some instances, only TARP recipients that repaid early show a 
competitive advantage. Moreover, results that TARP recipients increased their Local 
                                                 
116 To calculate uninsured deposits, we take all the funds in accounts that are partially insured and subtract 
off the amount that is insured. This requires separate treatment for several time periods because of the changes 
in deposit insurance limits over time. For the period 2005:Q1-2006:Q1, we calculate the uninsured deposits 
as the amount of bank deposit accounts (demand, savings, and time) with a balance on the report date of more 
than $100,000 minus the number of such deposit accounts multiplied by $100,000. For the period 2006:Q2-
2009:Q2, we take into account the different treatment of deposit retirement accounts versus the rest. Thus, 
we calculate the uninsured deposits as the amount of bank deposit accounts (demand, savings, and time, 
excluding retirement accounts) with a balance on the report date of more than $100,000 minus the number 
of such deposit accounts multiplied by $100,000 plus the amount of bank deposit retirement accounts with a 
balance on the report date of more than $250,000 minus the number of such deposit accounts multiplied by 
$250,000. For the period 2009:Q3 onwards, we account for the deposit insurance limit increase from 
$100,000 to $250,000 for all deposits except foreign ones. Thus, we calculate the uninsured deposits as the 
amount of bank deposit accounts (demand, savings, and time, including retirement accounts) with a balance 
on the report date of more than $250,000 minus the number of such deposit accounts multiplied by $250,000. 
While the last change in deposit insurance took place in October 2008, the Call Report did not change to 
reflect it until 2009:Q3. For all time periods, we also add the foreign deposits to the uninsured deposits 
because foreign deposits are not covered by the FDIC deposit insurance. 
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Market Share Uninsured Deposits confirm that the safety channel is one of the most 
important channels to explain our findings. 
4.8.6. Alternative Econometric Models  
To help alleviate the concern that omitted unobserved bank-specific determinants might be 
explain our results, we also test robustness using specifications with bank fixed effects in 
Table 4.9 Panel A columns (1)-(4) and random effects (using a generalized least squares 
approach) in Table 4.9 Panel A columns (5)-(8). We also present a model with time fixed 
effects and White standard errors which are robust to within-cluster correlation at the bank 
level (Rogers standard errors) in Table 4.9 Panel A columns (9)-(12).  Panel B shows the 
tests of the equality of the coefficients for different types of TARP banks. In all 
specifications, we continue to find support for our main results.  
4.8.7. Dynamics of TARP and Competitive Indicators 
We next examine the dynamics of the relation between TARP and competitive advantage 
indicators for the TARP banks in a similar fashion to Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2010). 
We do this by including a series of dummy variables in the standard regression to trace out 
the quarter-by-quarter effects of TARP on the competitive indicators for the TARP 
recipients. In the regression, we replace the DID term Post TARPit x TARP Recipientit from 
equation (1) with DID terms created by interacting the TARP Recipientit  with quarter 
dummies for each of the time periods before and after the TARP.  
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where Yit, TARP Recipientit, Xit-1, and Timet  are defined as above. The “Ds” are dummies 
defined such that D−j equals one for banks in the jth quarter before 2008:Q4 and D+j equals 
one for banks in the jth quarter after 2008:Q4, and 
it
ζ  represents a white noise error term. 
We plot the DID coefficients, adjusted for seasonality, with their 95% confidence intervals 
and trends in Graphs A and C of Figure 4.2 for market share and market power, 
respectively.117 We repeat the exercise by separating out the TARP recipients that repaid 
early and those that did not in Graphs B and D of Figure 4.2. 
Graph A of Figure 4.2 illustrates that the increase in the market share of TARP 
banks did not precede TARP. The impact of TARP on market share takes time to 
materialize and only becomes significantly positive in 2010:Q1, and this effect remains at 
a high level until the end of the sample period. This may suggest that taking share away 
from competitors is a medium- to long-term strategic process.  
As for the impact of TARP on market power, Graph C of Figure 2 illustrates that 
there is an increase in TARP banks’ market power after TARP. This materializes very 
quickly, from the first quarter after TARP (2009:Q1), possibly because it may immediately 
affect banks’ costs of funds. The effect eventually disappears in 2011. In sum, market share 
and market power record different patterns of increase post TARP, but both show a positive 
trend. 
Graph B of Figure 4.2 illustrates an increase in market share post TARP for both 
those that repaid early and those that did not, but the increase is much higher for the TARP 
banks that repaid early. For timing, both groups experience an increase in market share by 
same time (2010:Q1), but the TARP banks that did not repay early quickly lose this 
                                                 
117 To deseasonalize the data, we follow use the X11 procedure developed by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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advantage, while TARP banks that repaid early maintain the advantage until the end of the 
sample period. Similarly, Graph D of Figure 2 illustrates that there is an increase in market 
power post TARP for both groups, but the increase is much higher for TARP banks that 
repaid early. Although initially both TARP groups experience an increase in market power 
up to 2009:Q4, after this, TARP banks that did not repay early experience a decline in 
market power to preceding levels or below, while TARP banks that repaid early maintain 
or enhance their competitive advantage for market power up until the end of the sample 
period. In sum, the competitive advantage effects of TARP last for TARP banks that repaid 
early, and are only short-lived for TARP banks that did not. 
4.8.8 Other Robustness Tests 
In Appendix E, we conduct several additional analyses to see the types of banks for which 
TARP offered most competitive advantages. We find that the impact of TARP increases 
with bank size, and is robust to excluding involuntary participants and those subject to 
stress tests (SCAP). We also find that only TARP banks with high capitalization ratios 
obtain competitive advantages and TARP banks in more concentrated local markets gain 
greater competitive advantages. 
4.9 Conclusions 
This paper investigates whether TARP may have given its recipients competitive 
advantages and if so, which channel(s) brought about these changes. Our difference-in-
difference (DID) regression analysis yields several important results:  
1. TARP recipients did get competitive advantages and increased both their market shares 
and market power relative to non-TARP recipients, consistent with the empirical 
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dominance of Hypothesis H1a over Hypothesis H1b and Hypothesis H2a over Hypothesis 
H2b. 
2. The positive market share and market power findings may be driven primarily by the 
safety channel (TARP banks may be perceived as safer), which is partially offset by the 
cost disadvantage channel (TARP funds may be relatively expensive). Thus, the safety 
channel and the cost disadvantage channel are the most important to explain the results. 
3. The competitive advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP recipients that repaid 
early, suggesting that these banks significantly reduced the importance of the cost 
disadvantage channel and increased the importance of the safety channel, consistent with 
Hypothesis H3. 
Overall, our results suggest that TARP may have resulted in a possible distortion 
in competition, which may have misallocated resources, and may help explain other 
findings in the literature on the effects of TARP on bank risk and bank lending. First, our 
findings may help explain the results in the literature that TARP increased risk for the large 
banks (Black and Hazelwood (2013), Duchin and Sosyura (2014)) and decreased risk for 
the small banks (Black and Hazelwood (2013)). As discussed above, results in the literature 
suggest that a nonmonotonic effect of market power on risk may have been in effect during 
the crisis period – higher market power may be associated with higher risk for banks at 
high levels of market power, while higher market power may be associated with lower risk 
at low levels of market power (Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), Berger, Imbierowicz, 
and Rauch (2014)). Given that large (small) banks typically have higher (lower) levels of 
market power, TARP may have led to an increase (decrease) in risk for large (small) banks. 
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Our results also may help explain the findings in the literature that TARP resulted 
in reduced or no change in lending by large banks (Black and Hazelwood (2013), Duchin 
and Sosyura (2014)) and increased lending by small banks (Black and Hazelwood (2013), 
Li (2013), Puddu, and Walchli (2013), Chang, Contessi, and Francis (2014)). According to 
the standard structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, an increase in market power 
should lead to a reduced supply of credit. However, for relationship borrowers, the supply 
of credit may be increased by larger market share and larger market power because limits 
on competition help banks force implicit contracts with relationship borrowers that result 
in greater credit availability (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1995)). This may help explain the 
increase in lending by small banks which tend to specialize in relationship lending, and the 
decrease or no change in lending by the large banks, which more often engage in 
transactional lending (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005)).  
 In terms of policy implications, determination about which, if any, banks to be 
bailed out should rely on a comprehensive analysis of both benefits and costs. Some of 
these costs and benefits – those for competition, risk taking, and lending – may be evaluated 
based on our results and those in the literature. Based on the findings for these three effects, 
any bailouts may be focused primarily on the small banks, where the effects seem to be 
less distortionary and more toward the public interest, since the increase in market share 
and market power is the least, risk may be decreased, and lending may be increased. 
However, for one of the other major benefits of bailouts, increasing the stability of the 
financial system, presumably the benefits would be greater for the large banks. However, 
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also the distortions in competition may be greater, and risk taking and lending implications 
may be less favorable. Policymakers may balance all these different effects.118
                                                 
118 Some of the other benefits and costs, such as the net gains to the Treasury, recipient banks, and their 
customers are also generally beneficial. However, in the literature, these effects are generally not 
differentiated by bank size, so they do not give a guide as to which bank sizes, if any, should be bailed out. 
Finally, in regards to effects on local economic conditions, TARP led to only economically insignificant 
improvements in economic conditions in the local markets in which it was applied (Berger and Roman 
(2015)). 
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Figure 4.1: Channels and Indicators of Competitive Advantage 
 
Graph A. TARP Banks that Did and Did Not Repay Early Considered Equally 
 
Graph A of Figure 4.1 displays the eight channels which may influence market share 
and market power of TARP banks in the same or opposite directions. The only 
exceptions are the moral hazard channels, for which we only have predictions for 
market power. 
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Figure 4.1: Channels and Indicators of Competitive Advantage 
 
Graph B. TARP Banks that Repaid Early 
Graph B of Figure 4.1 displays the changes in the importance of the channels from early 
TARP repayment. The decrease in the importance of a channel is shown with the 
smaller arrows, while the increase in the importance of a channel is shown with larger 
arrows. 
  
  
 
1
8
8
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Channels and Indicators of Competitive Advantage 
 
Graph C. Channels and Indicators of Competitive Advantage Considering the Empirical 
Results 
 
Graph C of Figure 4.1 displays which of the possible channels of TARP on competition 
appear to be relatively important and unimportant for explaining the results. The shaded areas 
surrounded by dotted lines illustrate the channels most consistent with our findings, while the 
crossed-out areas illustrate the channels least consistent with our findings. 
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Figure 4.2: The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share 
and Market Power 
 
Graph A. The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share (TARP Banks that 
Did and Did Not Repay Early Considered Equally) 
 
Graph A of Figure 4.2 plots the DID coefficients for the dynamic impact of TARP on 
bank market share, adjusted for seasonality (represented by small circles), with their 
95% confidence intervals (represented by the dashed lines) and trend (represented by 
the solid straight line). We consider both TARP banks that repaid early and those that 
did not repay early equally. DID coefficients are created by interacting the TARP 
Recipient variable with quarter dummies for each of the time periods before and after 
the TARP program.  
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Figure 4.2: The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share 
and Market Power 
 
Graph B. The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share (TARP Banks that 
Repaid Early vs. Those that Did Not) 
 
Graph B of Figure 4.2 plots the DID coefficients for the dynamic impact of TARP on 
bank market share, adjusted for seasonality (represented by small circles), with their 
95% confidence intervals (represented by the dashed lines). We separate the TARP 
recipients that repaid early (TARP Recipient_Repaid) from those that did not (TARP 
Recipient_Not Repaid).  
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Figure 4.2: The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share 
and Market Power 
 
Graph C. The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Power (TARP Banks that 
Did and Did Not Repay Early Considered Equally) 
 
Graph C of Figure 4.2 plots the DID coefficients for the dynamic impact of TARP on 
bank market power, adjusted for seasonality (represented by small circles), with their 
95% confidence intervals (represented by the dashed lines) and trend (represented by 
the solid straight line). We consider all TARP banks equally. DID coefficients are 
created by interacting the TARP Recipient variable with quarter dummies for each of 
the time periods before and after the TARP program.  
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Figure 4.2: The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Share 
and Market Power 
 
Graph D. The Dynamic Impacts of TARP on Bank Market Power (TARP Banks that 
Repaid Early vs. Those that Did Not) 
 
Graph D of Figure 4.2 plots the DID coefficients for the dynamic impact of TARP on 
bank market power, adjusted for seasonality (represented by small circles), with their 
95% confidence intervals (represented by the dashed lines). We separate the TARP 
recipients that repaid early (TARP Recipient_Repaid) from those that did not (TARP 
Recipient_Not Repaid). DID coefficients are created by interacting the TARP 
Recipient variable with quarter dummies for each of the time periods before and after 
the TARP program. 
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Table 4.1: Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the full US bank sample. This table reports summary statistics of the variables for the full US bank sample. All variables 
are constructed via aggregation of all the banks in the BHC at the holding company level if the BHC has more than one commercial bank owned. Otherwise, the 
data for the commercial bank is retained. All variables using dollar amounts are expressed in real 2012:Q4 dollars using the implicit GDP price deflator.  
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for the Full Sample (2005-2012) 
Type Variable  Definition Mean Median Std N 
Competition 
Variables 
(Source: Call 
Reports and 
Summary of 
Deposits)  
Local Market 
Share Assets 
Bank’s GTA local market share, measured as the bank’s average market share 
given the weight of the bank deposits in each local market.  GTA equals total 
assets plus the allowance for loan and the lease losses and the allocated 
transfer risk reserve. 
0.049 0.014 0.099 178,604 
Local Market 
Share Loans 
Bank’s total loans local market share, measured as the bank’s average market 
share given the weight of the bank deposits in each local market.  
0.048 0.014 0.094 178,604 
Local Market 
Share Deposits 
Bank’s total deposits local market share, measured as the bank’s average 
market share given the weight of the bank deposits in each local market.  
0.027 0.009 0.060 178,604 
Local Market 
Share Uninsured 
Deposits 
Bank’s total uninsured deposits local market share, measured as the bank’s 
average market share given the weight of the bank deposits in each local 
market. Uninsured deposits are calculated as discussed in Footnote 25 in the 
text.  
0.040 0.009 0.095 178,278 
Lerner GTA A proxy for the bank level competition measured as the observed price-cost 
margin for total assets. A bank in perfect price competition would have an 
index value of 0 and thus no market power (as Price = MC) and a bank that 
has market power will show a positive index value.  
0.051 0.098 0.358 178,604 
Price A subcomponent of Lerner GTA, represents average price of bank activities 
and is a proxy for market power in the loan market.  
0.015 0.015 0.003 178,604 
MC A subcomponent of Lerner GTA, a proxy for the cost of funding (among other 
costs).  
0.014 0.013 0.005 178,604 
 
  
 
1
9
4
 
Type Variable  Definition Mean Median Std N 
TARP  
Variables 
(Source: US 
Department of 
the Treasury) 
TARP Recipient  A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bank was provided TARP 
capital support. 0.097 0.000 0.297 178,604 
TARP 
Recipient_Not 
Repaid 
A dummy taking a value of 1 if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. 
0.079 0.000 0.270 178,604 
TARP 
Recipient_Repaid 
A dummy taking a value of 1 if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. 
0.018 0.000 0.133 178,604 
Bailout 
Amount/GTA 
A ratio of the bank dollar bailout support over bank GTA; a larger value 
indicates a higher degree of TARP support.  0.003 0.000 0.009 178,604 
Bailout 
Amount/Risk-
Weighted Assets 
A ratio of the bank dollar bailout support over bank risk-weighted assets; a 
larger value indicates a  higher degree of TARP support.  
0.003 0.000 0.014 178,604 
Post TARP An indicator equal to 1 in 2009 -2012 and 0 in 2005-2008. Similar to Sosyura 
and Durchin(2012) but using an extended time period. 0.501 1.000 0.500 178,604 
Control 
Variables 
(Source: Call 
Reports, 
Summary of 
Deposits, Bank 
List with 
Corrective 
Actions, 
Federal 
Housing 
Finance 
Agency website, 
US Census 
Bureau, FOIA 
Request of the 
Federal 
Reserve)  
CAMELS Proxy: 
Capital Adequacy 
Capitalization ratio, defined as equity capital divided by GTA. Capital 
adequacy refers to the amount of a bank’s capital relative to its assets. 
Broadly, this criterion evaluates the extent to which a bank can absorb 
potential losses.  0.109 0.099 0.048 178,604 
CAMELS Proxy: 
Asset Quality 
Asset quality evaluates the overall condition of a bank’s portfolio and is 
typically evaluated by a fraction of nonperforming assets and assets in 
default. Noncurrent loans and leases are loans that are past due for at least 
ninety days or are no longer accruing interest. Higher proportion of 
nonperforming assets indicates lower asset quality. 0.003 0.000 0.008 178,604 
CAMELS Proxy: 
Management 
Quality 
A dummy taking a value of -1 if a bank had a corrective action by the 
corresponding banking regulator (FED, FDIC, and OCC) during the quarter. 
-0.005 0.000 0.074 178,604 
CAMELS Proxy: 
Earnings (ROA) 
Return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of the annualized net income 
to GTA. 0.017 0.018 0.045 178,604 
CAMELS Proxy: 
Liquidity 
Cash divided by bank total deposits. 
0.137 0.051 14.400 178,604 
CAMELS Proxy: 
Sensitivity to 
Market Risk 
The sensitivity to interest rate risk, defined as the ratio of the absolute 
difference (gap) between short-term assets and short-term liabilities to GTA. 
0.130 0.105 0.107 178,604 
Bank Size The log value of GTA.  12.053 11.917 1.339 178,604 
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Type Variable  Definition Mean Median Std N 
Control 
Variables 
(cont.) 
Bank Age Age (in years) of the bank or the oldest bank owned by the bank holding 
company. 76.263 81.000 66.913 178,604 
DWTAF A dummy that takes a value of 1 if a bank received discount window loans 
and/or Term Auction Facility (TAF) funding during the crisis. 0.237 0.000 0.425 178,604 
Merger A dummy that takes a value of 1 from the time that the bank acquired 
another institution and 0 otherwise. 0.219 0.000 0.414 178,604 
BHC A dummy that takes a value of 1 if the entity is a bank holding company 
(BHC). 0.863 1.000 0.940 178,604 
Listed A dummy that takes a value of 1 if bank is listed on a stock exchange or is 
part of a bank holding company that is listed on a stock exchange. 0.068 0.000 0.252 178,604 
Metropolitan A dummy that takes a value of 1 when the majority of bank deposits (50% 
or more) are in metropolitan areas and 0 otherwise. 0.672 1.000 0.469 178,604 
HHI Deposits A measure of bank concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Deposits Index determined using the bank deposit data from the FDIC 
Summary of Deposits. Higher values show greater market concentration.  1162.678 1041.415 
883.52
2 178,604 
Branches/GTA A measure of organizational complexity defined as the ratio of the number 
of branches over GTA multiplied by 1000.  0.029 0.024 0.022 178,604 
Instrumental 
Variables: 
Political &  
Regulatory 
(Sources: 
Center for 
Responsive 
Politics,  
House of 
Representatives, 
Federal Reserve 
Bank of 
Philadelphia 
website, 
Execucomp, 
SEC EDGAR 
DEF14A 
Filings, etc.) 
Subcommittee on 
Financial 
Institutions or 
Capital Markets 
A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a 
district of a House member, who served 
on the Capital Markets Subcommittee or the Financial Institutions 
Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee in 2008 or 
2009.  0.088 0.000 0.227 167,112 
Democrat A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a bank's local Representative 
was a Democrat in the 2007-2008 campaign election cycle.  0.429 0.000 0.495 167,112 
Fed Director A dummy that equals 1 if a bank's director sat on the board of directors of 
a Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) or of a branch of a FRB in 2008 or 2009.  0.013 0.000 0.112 167,112 
CEO 
Compensation 
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if bank’s CEO had a total 
compensation greater than $500,000 in 2008.  0.030 0.000 0.172 167,112 
Excess CEO 
Compensation 
The log of the 1 plus the excess of $500,000 of CEO total compensation in 
2008. 0.185 0.000 1.081 167,112 
Coincident_Index 
(weighted) 
A state macro growth index calculated as a weighted average of the 
changes in the Philadelphia Fed’s state coincident indexes from December 
2007 to December 2010 with the share of the deposits of a given bank 
taken as weights.  -0.771 -0.759 0.358 167,112 
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Table 4.2: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Main Results 
 
 
This table reports estimates from difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for analyzing 
the impact of TARP on competition in Panel A. The measures of competitive advantage are Market 
Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP 
Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post 
TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation. TARP 
Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not 
Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time 
fixed effects. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel B shows the tests of equality for the 
effects of TARP for two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that 
did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level.  
Panel A: Regression Parameters 
Dependent Variable: Market Share  Market Power 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TARP Recipient -0.013***  -0.023***  
 (-15.283)  (-6.726)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient 0.005***   0.038***   
  (4.117)   (9.135)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.014***  -0.023*** 
  (-16.485)  (-6.183) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.008***  -0.015** 
  (-3.162)  (-2.538) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   0.003***   0.029*** 
    (2.998)   (6.007) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   0.011***   0.083*** 
    (3.240)   (10.703) 
Capital Adequacy -0.051*** -0.052*** 2.008*** 2.004*** 
 (-13.991) (-14.205) (36.809) (36.744) 
Asset Quality -0.043** -0.049** -0.811*** -0.837*** 
 (-1.990) (-2.251) (-6.749) (-6.956) 
Management Quality/Regulatory Action 0.006** 0.006** 0.205*** 0.204*** 
 (2.510) (2.393) (14.955) (14.864) 
Earnings(ROA) 0.146*** 0.145*** 3.096*** 3.093*** 
 (25.974) (25.831) (39.949) (39.916) 
Liquidity 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (5.944) (6.065) (-0.616) (-0.614) 
Sensitivity to Market Risk -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.155*** -0.155*** 
  (-9.621) (-9.641) (-16.046) (-16.068) 
DWTAF 0.000 0.000 -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.468) (0.597) (-12.040) (-11.910) 
Bank Size -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (-25.136) (-26.357) (16.147) (15.341) 
Bank Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (21.847) (21.796) (29.573) (29.499) 
Merger -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (-22.835) (-22.587) (-1.440) (-1.105) 
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BHC -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-17.954) (-17.980) (-18.582) (-18.512) 
Listed -0.015*** -0.015*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 
 (-21.702) (-22.507) (6.930) (6.122) 
Metropolitan -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.049*** -0.048*** 
 (-42.497) (-42.440) (-29.017) (-28.851) 
HHI Deposits 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (65.261) (65.270) (3.674) (3.645) 
Branches/GTA -0.737*** -0.741*** -0.923*** -0.936*** 
 (-64.501) (-64.685) (-16.768) (-16.964) 
Constant 0.099*** 0.101*** -0.845*** -0.837*** 
 (31.860) (33.128) (-56.676) (-55.667) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.452 0.452 
 
Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks 
  Market Share Market Power 
t-stat:  
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =  
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 
2.245** 6.141*** 
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Table 4.3: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Lerner Index 
Decomposition 
 
 
This table reports estimates from difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for the impact 
of TARP on Lerner GTA components: Price (price of bank GTA) and MC (marginal cost). The 
regression estimates are reported in Panel A. TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, 
the period after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the 
bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal to one if the bank 
did not repay in 2009-2010. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. All models include time fixed 
effects. Panel B shows the tests of equality for the effects of TARP for two types of TARP banks: 
TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% level. 
 
Panel A: Regression Parameters 
Dependent Variable: Lerner Components 
  Price MC 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TARP Recipient 0.00024***  0.00061***  
 (12.085)  (15.126)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  -0.00023***   -0.00068***   
  (-7.954)   (-13.665)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  0.00029***  0.00068*** 
  (13.580)  (15.681) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  0.00004  0.00021** 
  (0.874)  (2.437) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   -0.00031***   -0.00068*** 
    (-9.898)   (-12.352) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   0.00011*   -0.00074*** 
    (1.686)   (-6.656) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.540 0.540 0.508 0.508 
 
Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks 
  Price MC 
t-stat:  
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =  
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay 
Early 
5.750*** 0.469 
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Table 4.4: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition – Instrumental Variable 
Analysis 
 
 
This table shows difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for analyzing the impact of 
TARP on competition using an instrumental variable approach as in Wooldridge Section 18.4.1. We 
use as instruments several political and regulatory connections variables: Subcommittee on 
Financial Institutions or Capital Markets, Democrat, Fed Director, CEO Compensation, and the 
Coincident Index (weighted). Subcommittee on Financial Institutions or Capital Markets is a 
dummy which takes a value of 1 if a firm is headquartered in a district of a House member, who 
served on the Capital Markets Subcommittee or the Financial Institutions Subcommittee of the 
House Financial Services Committee in 2008 or 2009. Democrat is a dummy which takes a value 
of 1 if a bank's local Representative was a Democrat in the 2007-2008 campaign election cycle. Fed 
Director is a dummy that equals 1 if a bank's director sat on the board of directors of a Federal 
Reserve Bank (FRB) or of a branch of a FRB in 2008 or 2009. CEO Compensation is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if bank’s CEO had a total compensation greater than 500,000 in 
2008. Coincident Index (weighted) is a state macro growth index calculated as a weighted average 
of the changes in the Philadelphia Fed’s state coincident indexes from December 2007 to December 
2010 with the share of the deposits of a given bank taken as weights. The measures of competitive 
advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied 
by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital 
support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program 
initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP 
Recipient_Not Repaid, is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models 
include time fixed effects. Panel A reports first stage results. Panel B reports second stage regression 
estimates. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel C reports the tests of equality for the 
effects of TARP on two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that 
did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Panel A: IV First Stage as in Wooldridge (Section 18.4.1) 
First Stage (Probit Model) 
Dependent Variable: TARP Recipient TARP Recipient_Not Repaid TARP Recipient_Repaid 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) 
Subcommitee on  
Financial Institutions or 
Capital Markets 0.110*** 0.098*** 0.132*** 
  (5.719) (4.977) (3.488) 
Democrat 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.063*** 
  (4.087) (3.475) (3.503) 
FED Director 0.353*** -0.078** 0.466*** 
  (11.338) (-2.036) (11.399) 
CEO Compensation   -0.504*** 0.741*** 
    (-17.264) (21.465) 
Coincident_Index 
(weighted) 
(state-level economic 
conditions)   -0.045*** 0.105*** 
    (-3.271) (4.339) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 167,112 167,112 167,112 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2469 0.1832 0.3444 
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Panel B: IV Second Stage as in Wooldridge (Section 18.4.1) 
Second Stage (IV 2SLS) 
Dependent Variable:  Market Share Market Power 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TARP Recipient 0.036***  0.090*  
 (4.191)  (1.933)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.014***   0.062***   
  (4.471)   (4.854)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  0.219***  -0.264** 
  (8.489)  (-2.385) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  0.102***  -0.093* 
  (6.840)  (-1.799) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   -0.028***   0.040 
    (-3.092)   (1.301) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   0.037***   0.185*** 
    (3.468)   (7.643) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 167,112 167,112 167,112 167,112 
Adjusted R-squared 0.205 0.090 0.450 0.435 
First Stage F-test 349.545*** 40.348*** 349.545*** 40.348*** 
 
Panel C: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks 
  Market Share Market Power 
t-stat:  
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =  
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay 
Early 
3.900*** 2.937*** 
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Table 4.5: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Propensity Score Matched 
Sample Analysis 
 
 
This table reports difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for analyzing the impact of 
TARP on competition in Panel A and Panel B. We use three different propensity score matched 
samples: Nearest-neighbor Matching: N=1, Nearest-neighbor Matching: N=2, and Nearest-neighbor 
Matching: N=3. The measures of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market 
Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one 
in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal 
to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal to 
one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed effects. The estimation 
results are for 2005-2012. Panel C reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP for two types 
of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Market Share 
Dependent Variable: Market Share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Nearest-neighbor Nearest-neighbor Nearest-neighbor 
Independent Variables: Matching: N=1 Matching: N=2 Matching: N=3 
TARP Recipient -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.014***  
 (-10.263)  (-12.685)  (-13.723)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.004**   0.004**   0.004***   
  (2.347)   (2.464)   (2.930)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.014***  -0.015***  
-
0.015*** 
  (-10.985)  (-13.788)  (-15.066) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.009***  -0.009***  
-
0.008*** 
  (-3.699)  (-3.582)  (-3.324) 
Post TARP x TARP 
Recipient_Not Repaid   0.003   0.002*   0.003** 
    (1.587)   (1.649)   (2.062) 
Post TARP x TARP 
Recipient_Repaid   0.011***   0.010***   0.011*** 
    (3.045)   (2.885)   (3.020) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,222 31,222 42,159 42,159 51,073 51,073 
Adjusted R-squared 0.120 0.121 0.135 0.136 0.138 0.139 
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Panel B: Market Power 
Dependent Variable: Market Power 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Nearest-neighbor Nearest-neighbor Nearest-neighbor 
Independent Variables: Matching: N=1 Matching: N=2 Matching: N=3 
TARP Recipient -0.010**  -0.010**  -0.012***  
 (-2.160)  (-2.576)  (-3.222)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.014**   0.017***   0.020***   
  (2.270)   (3.245)   (4.180)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.011**  -0.012***  -0.014*** 
  (-2.396)  (-2.809)  (-3.411) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  0.000  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.055)  (0.127)  (-0.123) 
Post TARP x TARP 
Recipient_Not Repaid   0.007   0.011*   0.014*** 
    (1.152)   (1.899)   (2.710) 
Post TARP x TARP 
Recipient_Repaid   0.046***   0.048***   0.050*** 
    (5.169)   (5.772)   (6.190) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 31,222 31,222 42,159 42,159 51,073 51,073 
Adjusted R-squared 0.489 0.490 0.495 0.496 0.497 0.497 
 
Panel C: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks 
 
  
Market  
Share 
Market 
Power 
Nearest-neighbor 
Matching: N=1 
t-stat:  
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =  
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 
2.427** 4.484*** 
Nearest-neighbor 
Matching: N=2 
t-stat:  
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =  
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 
2.261** 4.310*** 
Nearest-neighbor 
Matching: N=3 
t-stat:  
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =  
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 
2.261** 4.110*** 
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Table 4.6: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Placebo Experiments 
 
 
This table reports difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for analyzing the impact of 
TARP on competition in Panel A and Panel B. In Panel A, we use a placebo experiment, in which 
we fictionally assume that the TARP participation took place four years earlier and we still 
distinguish between banks that received TARP and those that did not and banks that repaid early 
versus those that did not according to their “true" TARP program. Accordingly, we define Placebo 
Post TARP as a dummy equal to one in 2005-2008, the period after the fictional TARP program 
initiation. We run the regressions by using the placebo-sample (2001-2008). The measures of 
competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power 
(proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided 
TARP capital support, Placebo Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2005-2008, the period after 
the fictional TARP program initiation.  In Panel B, we use a placebo experiment in ehich we allocate 
the TARP treatment randomly to banks and report regression estimates with boot-strapped 
confidence intervals using 1000 replications. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if 
the bank repaid early in the true TARP program. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy 
equal to one if the bank did not repay early in the true TARP program. All models include time fixed 
effects. Panel C reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP for two types of TARP banks: 
TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. Robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
Panel A: Regression Parameters (TARP Assumed to Take Place Four Years Earlier) 
Dependent Variable: Market Share  Market Power 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TARP Recipient -0.001  -0.024***  
 (-1.609)  (-8.227)  
Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient  -0.011***   0.003   
  (-10.112)   (0.860)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.001  -0.028*** 
  (-1.167)  (-8.919) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.002  -0.007 
  (-1.318)  (-1.188) 
Placebo Post TARP  x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   -0.012***   0.004 
    (-10.235)   (0.979) 
Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   -0.009***   0.003 
    (-3.139)   (0.394) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 195,256 195,256 194,783 194,783 
Adjusted R-squared 0.257 0.257 0.436 0.437 
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Panel B: Regression Parameters (Random Assignment of the Banks to the TARP 
Treatment) 
Dependent Variable: Market Share  Market Power 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TARP Recipient -0.001  0.001  
 (-0.781)  (0.208)  
Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.000   0.003   
  (0.029)   (0.633)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.001  -0.000 
  (-0.710)  (-0.087) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.001  0.005 
  (-0.323)  (0.716) 
Placebo Post TARP  x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   0.000   0.001 
    (0.050)   (0.288) 
Placebo Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   -0.000   0.009 
    (-0.036)   (0.959) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.218 0.218 0.452 0.452 
 
Panel C: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks  
   Market Share Market Power 
Placebo Experiment 
(TARP Is Assumed to 
Have Taken Place Four 
Years Earlier) 
t-stat: 
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid 
Early =  
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not 
Repay Early 
0.141 0.933 
Placebo Experiment 
(Random Assignment of 
the Banks to the TARP 
Treatment) 
t-stat: 
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid 
Early =  
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not 
Repay Early 
0.000 0.728 
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Table 4.7: Alternative Measures of TARP Support 
 
 
This table reports estimates from difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for the impact of TARP on competition using an alternative measures for 
TARP Support: Bailout Amount/GTA and Bailout Amount/ Risk-Weighted Assets in Panel A. The measures of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied 
by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP 
capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if 
the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed 
effects. Estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel B reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP on the two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid 
early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Regression Parameters 
 
  Bailout Amount / GTA Bailout Amount / Risk-Weighted Assets 
Dependent Variable:  Market Share Market Power Market Share Market Power 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Independent Variables:             
TARP Recipient -0.290***  -0.536***  -0.162***  -0.710***  
 (-13.064)  (-2.947)  (-7.984)  (-3.989)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.156***  0.968***  0.109***  0.806***  
  (3.994)   (4.617)   (3.853)   (4.258)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.279***  -0.528***  -0.163***  -0.716*** 
  (-12.166)  (-2.644)  (-7.796)  (-3.686) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.327***  -0.444**  -0.105*  -0.506*** 
  (-5.364)  (-2.080)  (-1.652)  (-3.057) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  0.033  0.556**  0.046  0.603*** 
  (0.818)  (2.304)  (1.482)  (2.811) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid  0.714***  2.774***  0.538***  2.200*** 
   (6.909)   (9.081)   (5.433)   (9.427) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.219 0.219 0.451 0.452 0.218 0.219 0.452 0.452 
 
 
Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks 
  
  
Market 
Share 
Market 
Power 
Bailout Amount / GTA t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 6.250*** 5.829*** 
Bailout Amount / Risk-Weighted Assets t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =  Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 4.787*** 5.175*** 
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Table 4.8: Alternative Measures of Market Share 
 
 
This table reports difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for the impact of TARP on competition using an alternative measures for market share: Local 
Market Share Loans, Local Market Share Deposits, and Local Market Share Uninsured Deposits. The regression estimates are reported in Panel A. The measures 
of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Loans, Local Market Share Deposits, and Local Market Share Uninsured Deposits). 
TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period 
after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy 
equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed effects. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel B reports the tests of 
equality for the effects of TARP on two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Regression Parameters 
Dependent Variable:  Local Market Share Loans Local Market Share Deposits Local Market Share Uninsured Deposits 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variables:             
TARP Recipient -0.012***  -0.008***  -0.010***  
 (-14.260)  (-18.247)  (-12.198)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.003***   0.002***   0.002**   
  (3.027)   (3.958)   (2.143)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.011***  -0.007***  -0.011*** 
  (-12.816)  (-16.506)  (-13.586) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.013***  -0.009***  -0.006** 
  (-8.083)  (-10.508)  (-2.254) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid 0.001* 0.001* 0.002*** 0.002***   0.000 
  (1.766) (1.780) (5.487) (5.495)   (0.141) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   0.002*   0.001*   0.013*** 
    (1.721)   (1.728)   (3.285) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 178,603 178,603 178,604 178,604 178,278 178,278 
Adjusted R-squared 0.215 0.215 0.298 0.298 0.211 0.212 
 
Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks 
  
Local Market Share  
Loans 
Local Market Share Deposits 
Local Market Share Uninsured 
Deposits 
t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early =  
Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 
2.796*** 4.549*** 3.191*** 
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Table 4.9: Alternative Econometric Models 
 
 
This table reports difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for the impact of TARP on competition using alternative econometric models: bank fixed 
effects, bank random effects, and a model with standard errors clustered at the bank level in Panel A. The measures of competitive advantage are Market Share 
(proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided 
TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is equal to one if the 
bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed 
effects. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. Panel B reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP on two types of TARP banks: TARP banks that 
repaid early and TARP banks that did not. All variables are defined in Table 1. For the bank fixed effects, (1)-(4), we report adjusted R-squared and for the bank 
random effects, (5)-(8), R-squared. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Regression Parameters 
  Bank Fixed Effects Bank Random Effects Clusters by Bank 
Dependent Variable: Market Share Market Power Market Share Market Power Market Share Market Power 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
TARP Recipient     -0.027***  -0.043***  -0.013***  -0.023***  
     (-8.013)  (-5.714)  (-4.174)  (-3.557)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.004***  0.024***  0.005***  0.038***  0.005***  0.038***  
  (9.949)   (5.706)   (3.862)   (4.753)   (2.662)   (5.438)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid      -0.029***  -0.043***  -0.014***  
-
0.023*** 
      (-9.181)  (-5.504)  (-4.490)  (-3.386) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid      -0.017*  -0.034**  -0.008  -0.015 
      (-1.732)  (-2.284)  (-0.845)  (-1.197) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not 
Repaid  0.004***  0.012**  0.004***  0.026***  0.003*  0.029*** 
  (7.465)  (2.533)  (2.877)  (2.803)  (1.691)  (3.551) 
Post TARP x TARP 
Recipient_Repaid  0.008***  0.078***  0.008***  0.094***  0.011***  0.083*** 
   (9.677)   (10.178)   (4.161)   (7.361)   (3.398)   (6.892) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
2
1
0
 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No 
Bank Random Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Observations 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 
R-squared (or Adjusted R-squared) 0.882 0.882 0.610 0.610 0.257 0.257 0.419 0.4187 0.219 0.219 0.452 0.452 
No. Clusters                 7333 7333 7333 7333 
 
Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks 
    Market Share Market Power 
Bank Fixed Effects t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 4.463*** 7.625*** 
Bank Random Effects t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 1.789* 4.513*** 
Clusters by Bank t-stat: Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay Early 2.166** 3.839*** 
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CHAPTER 5 
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation investigates corporate governance, internationalization, and government 
bailouts in banking. The robust findings of three essays add to the banking and corporate 
finance literatures. 
In the first essay in Chapter 2, we use a unique hand-collected dataset on 
shareholder activism (SEC Filings: 13D and DFAN14A) for all listed commercial banks 
and bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US over the period 1994-2010, we explore 
several the following research questions: 1) is there a role for shareholder activism for 
banking?, and if so, 2) what do activists do to change the focus of the targeted banks, and 
3) are they a stabilizing or destabilizing force?. We focus on three conflicts arising among 
bank stakeholders: Shareholder-Manager Conflict 1 (managers take less risk than desired 
by shareholders due to risk aversion), Shareholder-Manager Conflict 2 (managers take 
more risk than desired by shareholders due to overconfidence and/or hubris), and 
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict (activists induce managers to take higher risk to increase 
returns at the expense of bank creditors (deposit insurers, taxpayers, regulators, etc.), given 
creditors’ difficulty in monitoring and regulatory-induced incentives. 
We find that activism is important in banking: about one third of our banks have 
some form of activism during the sample period and activists appear to target banks with
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agency problems and growth potential that are easy in which to implement changes to 
increase value. We find that shareholder activism creates value for shareholders but has 
little impact on operating returns and increases bank default risk, consistent with the 
Hypothesis 3, the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. This suggests that activism may be 
generally a destabilizing force. However, we find that activism differs significantly during 
financial crises, resulting in higher market value and no increase in risk, suggesting that 
shareholder activism may not be a major source of risk during crises. From a public 
standpoint, government loses during normal times, but not during financial crises. 
The paper contributes primarily to two strands of research. First, it contributes to 
the broader literature on shareholder activism by examining activism within one important 
industry rather than across a number of very different industries, which reduces the concern 
about confounding inter-industry differences. Although researchers point to the 
shareholder return benefits resulting from activism, our results suggest that other additional 
effects of activism, such the increase in risk, should not be neglected. Second, this paper 
also adds to the literature on bank risk and performance by introducing shareholder 
activism as a factor influencing risk and performance and sets the groundwork for further 
research on shareholder activism in banking. The current topic is important especially from 
a government policy perspective because poor governance may aggravate financial system 
fragility to shocks and pose systemic risk to the real economy (Laeven and Levine (2009), 
Kirkpatrick (2009), G30 Steering Committee on Corporate Governance (2011), Song and 
Li (2012)) and is regarded as a possible important contributing factor to the recent financial 
crisis. In addition, shareholder activism may be regarded with skepticism. Our findings 
suggest that activists in banking may increase risk and market value at the expense of 
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creditors and may be a threat to financial stability. These results have important 
implications for policies targeting bank governance and regulation of activism in banking. 
The second essay, in Chapter 3, offers the first assessment of the role of 
internationalization on bank risk using US bank data. We find strong, robust evidence that 
the more internationalized the bank, the higher the risk. We use a number of different 
measures of internationalization and risk, employ various econometric procedures to 
control for potential endogeneity and sample selection biases, and consider different 
subsamples of the data. The data persistently suggest that internationalization is associated 
with higher bank risk, consistent with the empirical dominance of the market risk 
hypothesis over the diversification hypothesis. This effect seems to be more pronounced 
during financial crises, particularly market crises. 
Our finding that internationalization is associated with higher risk raises the 
question of why banks internationalize. One potential explanation is higher returns, but our 
results seem to contradict this explanation, given that we find lower mean profitability for 
internationalized banks. Second, banks may become international as part of a defensive 
strategy to follow their important customers abroad by setting up offices in countries where 
their home country customers have foreign affiliates to avoid losing their clients’ business 
(e.g., Brimmer and Dahl, 1975; Goldberg and Saunders, 1981; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; 
Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). This strategy might not translate into large enough financial 
benefits to offset the costs of internationalization. A third potential explanation is empire 
building by bank managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, Roll, 1986, 
Stulz, 1990). Managers that grow the bank through international activities may gain higher 
salaries and/or more prestige than domestic bank managers. This may occur if there are 
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significant agency problems in banking, particularly if these agency problems are 
intensified by international diversification (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007).  We put this 
last explanation to test and we find that the positive relation between internationalization 
and bank risk is consistently stronger for banks that more likely to have severe agency 
problems, supporting the empire-building explanation.  
This paper contributes primarily to two related strands of research. First, it adds to 
the literature on bank risk by introducing internationalization as a factor influencing risk 
and sets the groundwork for further research on bank internationalization. Although some 
policymakers, practitioners, and researchers point to the benefits of geographical risk 
diversification resulting from the internationalization of banks, our results suggest that this 
effect is dominated by other factors. Specifically, our results suggest that the additional 
local market risks taken on following international expansion outweigh the benefits of 
diversification. Second, this paper contributes to the broader internationalization literature 
by examining risk within one important industry rather than across a number of very 
different industries with their confounding differences. After controlling for endogeneity 
and other possible explanations for our results, we continue to find that bank 
internationalization is associated with a higher risk in an industry in which risk is highly 
monitored by bank supervisors as well as shareholders and debt holders. These findings 
suggest that authorities might consider internationalization as an additional factor in bank 
supervision and regulation. 
The third essay, in Chapter 4, conducts an empirical assessment of the TARP 
injections on bank competition and investigates whether TARP may have given its 
recipients competitive advantages. Our difference-in-difference (DID) regression analysis 
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yields several important results: 1) TARP recipients did get competitive advantages and 
increased both their market share and market power relative to non-TARP recipients, 
consistent with the empirical dominance of Hypothesis H1a over Hypothesis H1b and 
Hypothesis H2a over Hypothesis H2b. 2) Results point to the likelihood that the positive 
market share and market power findings may be driven primarily by the safety channel 
(TARP banks may be perceived as safer), which is partially offset by the cost disadvantage 
channel (TARP funds may be relatively expensive). Thus, the safety channel and the cost 
disadvantage channel are the most important to explain the results. 3). The competitive 
advantages are primarily or entirely due to TARP recipients that repaid early, suggesting 
that these banks significantly reduced the importance of the cost disadvantage channel and 
increased the importance of the safety channel, consistent with Hypothesis H3. 
Overall, our results suggest that TARP may have resulted in a possible distortion 
in competition, which may have misallocated resources, and may help explain other 
findings in the literature on the effects of TARP on bank risk and bank lending. First, our 
findings may help explain the results in the literature that TARP increased risk for the large 
banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming; Duchin and Sosyura, forthcoming) and 
decreased risk for the small banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming). As discussed 
above, results in the literature suggest that a nonmonotonic effect of market power on risk 
may have been in effect during the crisis period – higher market power may be associated 
with higher risk for banks at high levels of market power, while higher market power may 
be associated with lower risk at low levels of market power (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 
2010; Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2013). Given that large (small) banks typically have 
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higher (lower) levels of market power, TARP may have led to an increase (decrease) in 
risk for large (small) banks. 
Our results also may help explain the findings in the literature that TARP resulted 
in reduced or no change in lending by large banks (Black and Hazelwood, forthcoming; 
Duchin and Sosyura, forthcoming) and increased lending by small banks (Black and 
Hazelwood, forthcoming; Li, forthcoming). According to the standard structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis, an increase in market power should lead to a reduced supply of 
credit. However, for relationship borrowers, the supply of credit may be increased by larger 
market share and larger market power because limits on competition help banks force 
implicit contracts with relationship borrowers that result in greater credit availability (e.g., 
Sharpe, 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). This may help explain the increase in lending by 
small banks which tend to specialize in relationship lending, and the decrease or no change 
in lending by the large banks, which more often engage in transactional lending (Berger, 
Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005). 
In terms of policy implications, determination about which banks to be bailed out 
should rely on a comprehensive analysis of both benefits and costs. Some but not all of 
these costs and benefits, competition, risk taking, and lending, may be evaluated based on 
our results and those in the literature.  Based on the findings for these three effects, any 
bailouts may be focused primarily on the small banks, where the effects seem to be less 
distortionary and more toward the public interest, since the increase in market share and 
market power is the least, risk may be decreased, and lending may be increased. However, 
in regards to the other major benefit of bailouts, increasing the stability of the financial 
system, presumably the benefits would be greater for the large banks. However, also the 
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distortions in competition may be greater, and risk taking and lending implications may be 
less favorable. Therefore, policymakers should balance all these different effects. 
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APPENDIX A FOR CHAPTER 2 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable Definition Source 
Panel A1. Dependent Variables 
A1.1 Financial Performance 
TOBIN's Q A measure of financial performance determined as 
market value of common stock over equity book 
value. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Compustat data 
BUY-AND-HOLD_RET  Buy-and-hold stock return over the previous 4 
quarters. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on CRSP data 
BUY-AND-HOLD_AB_RET Buy-and-hold abnormal stock return over the 
previous 4 quarters.  
Authors' 
calculation based 
on CRSP data 
SHARPE RATIO Ratio of stocks returns over standard deviation of 
stock returns over the previous 4 quarters. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on CRSP data 
A1.2 Operating returns 
ROA Return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of the 
annualized net income to GTA. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
ROE Return on equity (ROE), measured as the ratio of 
the annualized net income to total equity. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
A1.3 Risk-taking 
Z-SCORE  A measure of financial risk: the bank-level Z-index 
determined as A(ROA)+ A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a 
larger value indicates higher overall bank risk. 
Averages of ROA and EQ/TA as well as the 
standard deviation of ROA are computed over the 
previous 4 quarters.  
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
LLA RATIO A Measure of bank risk defined as loan loss 
allowance over GTA, with higher values indicating 
more bank risk. 
As above 
NPL RATIO  Fraction of nonperforming loans and loans in 
default from GTA. Noncurrent loans and leases are 
loans that are past due for at least ninety days or are 
no longer accruing interest. Higher proportion of 
nonperforming assets indicates lower asset quality.  
As above 
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Variable Definition Source 
A1.3 Risk-taking (cont.) 
VOLATILITY ROA  For each quarter, the standard deviation of ROA is 
calculated as the quarterly standard deviation over 
the previous 4 quarters. ROA is determined as the 
ratio of net operating income over gross total assets 
(GTA). 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on CRSP data 
VOLATILITY_STOCK_RET  The volatility of daily returns for each calendar 
year. 
 
As above 
Panel A2. Shareholder Activism Variables 
ACTIVISM  A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if there 
is shareholder activism targeting the bank during the 
quarter. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on SEC EDGAR 
13D and DFAN 
14A Filings. 
NO_ACTIVISM_EVENTS  Number of activism events for the bank during the 
quarter. 
As above 
HF_ACTIVIST A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 the 
activist targeting the bank during the quarter is a 
hedge fund. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Bloomberg 
Markets 
Magazine, 
Wikipedia, 
individual Google 
searches 
Panel A2. Shareholder Activism Variables (cont.) 
NON_HF_ACTIVIST A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 the 
activist targeting the bank during the quarter is not a 
hedge fund. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Bloomberg 
Markets 
Magazine, 
Wikipedia, 
individual Google 
searches 
13D A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if there 
is 13D shareholder activism targeting the bank 
during the quarter. 
As above 
DFAN14A  A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if there 
is DFAN14A (proxy statements) shareholder 
activism targeting the bank during the quarter. 
As above 
Panel A3. Main Control Variables 
BANK SIZE The log value of bank GTA.  Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
BANK AGE  Age (in years) of the oldest bank owned by the bank 
holding company. 
As above 
DEPOSITS / GTA  Measure of the composition of bank liabilities 
determined as total total deposits over GTA. 
As above 
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Variable Definition Source 
Panel A3. Main Control Variables (cont.) 
LOANS / GTA  Measure of the composition of bank assets side 
determined as total total loans over GTA.  
As above 
INCOME_DIVERSITY  Measure of diversity defined as 1 minus the absolute 
value of the ratio between difference between net 
interest income and other operating income and total 
operating income.  
As above 
OVERHEAD_COSTS A proxy of the bank’s cost structure determined as 
the ratio of overhead expenses to assets. 
As above 
FOREIGN_OWNERSHIP A dummy is equal to 1 when foreign shareholdings 
exceed 50% of total bank ownership. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
OCC SUPERVISOR A dummy variable taking a value of 1 for national 
banks that are supervised by OCC.  
As above 
FDIC SUPERVISOR A dummy variable taking a value of 1 for state non-
member banks that are supervised by FDIC.  
As above 
FRS SUPERVISOR A dummy variable taking a value of 1 for state 
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve 
System.  
As above 
Panel A4. Instrumental Variable 
% BUSY ACTIVISTS Percent % busy activists, that is, activists with five 
or more campaigns and/or 2 or more proxy fights at 
the same time. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on SEC EDGAR 
13D and DFAN 
14A Filings. 
Panel A5. Other Variables 
TBTF Too-big-to-fail, a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 in all quarters when the banks has GTA 
greater or equal to 100 Billion. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
FINANCIAL_CRISES A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for a 
financial crisis period and 0 otherwise 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
GROWTH The growth rate of real bank gross total assets 
(GTA). 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
CAPITALIZATION RATIO The bank level capitalization ratio measured as 
equity capital over GTA. Capital adequacy refers to 
the amount of a bank’s capital relative to its GTA. 
Broadly, this criterion evaluates the extent to which 
a bank can absorb potential losses. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
DIVYLD  Dividend yield, defined as (common dividend + 
preferred dividends)/(market value of common 
stocks + book value of preferred).  
Authors' 
calculation based 
on COMPUSTAT 
data 
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Variable Definition Source 
Panel A5. Other Variables (cont.) 
INST OWNERSHIP The proportion of shares held by institutions.  Authors' 
calculation based 
on Thompson 
Institutional 
Dataset 
AMIHUD The Amihud (2002) measure of trading illiquidity 
determined as the yearly average (using daily data) 
of 1000*sqrt(|return|/dollar trading volume), with 
lower values meaning more liquidity. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on CRSP data 
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS  The number of analysts covering the company.  Authors' 
calculation based 
on I/B/E/S data 
BRANCHES / GTA  A measure of organizational complexity defined as 
the ratio of total bank branches over GTA. Banks 
that have more branches per dollar of assets are 
more complex.  
As above 
NO_STATES A measure of organizational structure defined as the 
log of the number of states in which the bank has 
branches. Banks that are active in multiple states 
have more complex organizational structures that 
cover longer distances. 
As above 
METROPOLITAN A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the 
majority of bank deposits (50% or more) are in 
MSA areas and 0 otherwise.  
As above 
CASH_HOLDINGS Cash holdings divided by GTA. Authors' 
calculation based 
on Call Report 
data 
HHI DEPOSITS A measure of bank concentration, measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Deposits Index determined 
using the bank deposit data. Higher values show 
greater market concentration. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on Summary of 
Deposits data 
INCORP_DE A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is 
incorporated in the state of Delaware. 
Authors' 
calculation based 
on COMPUSTAT 
data 
BIG_4 AUDITOR A dummy variable equal to one if the firm hires a 
Big Four auditor, and zero otherwise.  
As above 
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APPENDIX B FOR CHAPTER 2 
OTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
B.1 Other Potentially Omitted Correlated Variable 
One potential concern is that unobserved determinants of market value, operating 
performance, and bank risk would cause them to appear in the error term, and if these 
omitted variables are correlated with our included explanatory variable, there is an 
endogeneity problem which could bias our results. Although we saturate the main 
regressions with several bank level controls to alleviate the concern of correlated omitted 
variables, we examine whether our earlier results are sensitive to adding more controls for 
other determinants of bank market value, operating performance, and risk. These controls 
are BHC INDICATOR (a dummy which takes a value of 1 if bank is owned by a bank 
holding company (BHC) or is a BHC itself), MERGERS (a dummy equal to one from the 
moment that the bank itself or its immediate parent acquired another institution), 
WRITEOFF_INDICATOR (a dummy variable which is equal to one if past acquisitions 
and/or capital expenditures are written off as in Helwege, Intintoli, and Zhang (2012)), 
MBS/GTA (ratio of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to GTA as reported on the balance 
sheet as in Berger, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014)), COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
LOANS (commercial real estate divided by GTA as in Berger and Bouwman (2013)),
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CASH_HOLDINGS (ratio of cash holding over GTA), and HHI DEPOSITS (Herfindahl-
Hirschman deposits index, a proxy for the local market concentration). The results reported 
in Table B.1 Panel A columns (1)-(3) indicate that adding the above controls does not 
materially affect our previous findings.   
In addition, to mitigate the concern that other governance indicators may influence 
the effectiveness of shareholder activists in implementing changes in the target banks, we 
conduct also tests in which we include four other governance controls. INST OWNERSHIP 
is the ratio of the total institutional share holdings to total bank outstanding shares and 
LONG-TERM INST OWNERSHIP is the ratio of total long-term holdings by institutions to 
total bank outstanding shares. For both measures, a lower ownership ratio would indicate 
less monitoring by institutions. NUMBER BLOCKHOLDERS is the number of institutions 
holdings 5% or more ownership, and NUMBER OF ANALYSTS is a measure of analyst 
coverage, which is the number of stock analysts providing earnings forecasts for the bank 
in each quarter as per I/B/E/S and a lower number of analysts would indicate less 
monitoring by analysts. 119  The results reported in Table B.1 Panel A models (4)-(6) 
indicate that adding the above controls does not materially affect our previous findings. 
B.2 Including LexisNexis News 
Our activism data presented in the analysis covers all SEC registrants who have either filed 
an Schedule 13D 120  – often referred to as a “beneficial ownership report and its 
amendments Schedule 13D/A (if there is any material change in the facts disclosed in the 
                                                 
119 Because a large number of banks do not have information reported in I/B/E/S, we include in the estimation 
also the variable NUMBER OF ANALYSTS NOT IN IBES to account for this. 
 
120  Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Rule §240.13d provides details on the SEC registrants and 
requirements. 
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initial SC 13D (shares owned, discussions with management, etc.) – or DFAN 14A for 
proxy fights with management. These are generally including shareholders who acquire 
greater than a 5% stake in the company. 
Given the amount of capital that is needed to acquire a 5% stake in a large-cap 
company, the previously collected filings could bias the sample toward smaller targets. At 
very large firms, some pension funds could have engaged in activism with a less than 5% 
stake in the company.121 To incorporate activism events that were not accompanied by 
Schedule 13D or DFAN 14A,  we collect information about such events through news 
searches in LexisNexis for our top 100 banks in each time period  in terms of total assets 
using a general search with the company current name and any previous names (where 
information is available) and  any and various combinations of the following keywords: 
“activism” or “activist investor” or “dissident investor” or “activist shareholder” or “group 
of concerned shareholders” or “shareholder activism” or “hedge fund activist” or “hedge 
fund activism” or “institutional activism” or “activist campaign” or “investor campaign.” 
The searches were limited to the sample period of 1994 to 2010. This retrieves news articles 
for 140 unique entities. Results vary and range from 2 pages to 3,415 pages of news for 
one single entity. We manually look at each of the cases to check the relevance of the 
results and exclude news that include the company, but contain activism about a different 
company in the article, that are only social activists pleading for several social causes and 
not investor activists, and any others that are not true activists and cannot be deemed to be 
an event. In some cases, we further check the completeness of the news searches using the 
                                                 
121 A recent article in The New York Times (November 28, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/ 
some-big-public-pension-funds-are-behaving-like-activist-investors/) shows that some of the biggest public 
pension funds, which have sought to influence companies for years, are now starting to emulate the activist 
investors by engaging with, and sometimes seeking to oust, directors of companies whose stock they own. 
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DEF 14A report to check if the investor appears in the shareholder proposals section. Our 
analysis deems 98 news results as not relevant and finds 42 with new relevant results that 
sometimes belong to several companies as some of the pension funds may target several 
banks at the same time. This generates 96 events the majority (~85%) of which has a 
pension fund as an activist such as California Public Employees' Retirement System 
(CalPERS), American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), 
several pension funds in the New York State Retirement System, Connecticut Retirement 
Plans and Trust Funds (CRPTF), United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America 
Pension Fund, The Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA), American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).122 
We add these new events to our sample and incorporate them in our ACTIVISM 
variable and re-estimate our results to understand whether our results may be impacted by 
these investors with stake less than 5% that may behave as activists. We present the results 
in Table B.2 Panels A-C. Panel A and Panel B show that our main results and the results 
for financial crises versus normal times continue to hold and are not affected by the addition 
of these new events. Panel C provides a more detailed view of the effects of these events 
from LexisNexis compared to SC 13D and DFAN14A filings. It shows that effects of these 
activists are generally weaker and potentially more negative on performance, which may 
be due to both the fact that many of the proposals that pension funds put forward may not 
be successful and also due to their limited power because of their small stake in the 
companies. Our results are consistent with Wahal (1996), which studies the efficacy of 
                                                 
122 We impose no limitation to the percentage of shares owned as many times this information is not available 
in the LexisNexis news. In few cases, we are able to retrieve the ownership from the DEF 14A report when 
the shareholder appears in the Shareholder Proposals section and for those cases the share ownership is small, 
many times < 1%. 
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pension fund activism and impact on performance and find no evidence of long-term 
improvements in either stock price or accounting measures of performance in the post-
targeting period. However, these events do not tend to increase risk, so the Shareholder-
Creditor Conflict is potentially not in effect for them. 
B.3 Channels of Activism Based on Demands  
Table B.3 details the effects of activism by channels of action. Thus, the ACTIVISM 
measure is broken down into the seven different demands that activists declare in the13D 
filing. We create dummies for each of these demands and include them in our regression 
analysis to better understand channels of action based on activist demands. In this context, 
activist demands for a particular event are being represented by the most predominant 
objective. Secondary objectives are ignored. 
First, we look at the effect of activism on market value, represented by TOBIN’s Q. 
We find that activists increase bank market performance via an array of actions ranging 
from capital structure changes (e.g., financing, stock repurchases), operating and corporate 
strategic structure changes (spin-off, divestiture, M&A) to internal corporate governance 
changes (changes in board composition, CEO, compensation, removal of poison pill, 
declassified board etc.). In addition, market tends to perceive proxy fights filed by 
shareholders positively as we tend to see a boost in the value of the firm due to expected 
improvements within the firm once shareholders may win these conflicts.  
Second, we look at the impact of activism on operating returns, as measured by 
ROA. The minimal impact found in the main analysis is consistent across the various 
channels. The one exception is proxy fights, which show a negative impact on operating 
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returns. Results indicate that proxy fights initiated by activists may be costly for the firm 
and may consume resources, which may be materialized in poor accounting results. 
Third, we analyze the impact on bank risk. As expected, almost all of the activism 
channels generate an increase in risk consistent with Manager-Shareholder Conflict 1 and 
Shareholder-Creditor Conflict, but to a lesser extent engage management and strategic 
changes actions (insignificant). The most severe decreases in Z-score come from proxy 
fights. 
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Table B.1: Other Potentially Omitted Correlated Variables 
 
 
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and financial performance (TOBIN’s Q), 
operating returns (ROA), and risk taking (Z-SCORE) using several models that include additional possible omitted variables to account for the potential omitted 
correlated variables bias. We define the main activism measure (ACTIVISM) as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material 
activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower 
overall bank risk.  ROA is operating net income over GTA. We use an OLS model with time and bank FE. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The 
sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
ACTIVISM 0.005*** -0.000 -4.421*** 0.004** -0.000 -4.181*** 
  (3.099) (-1.506) (-3.029) (2.418) (-1.469) (-2.865) 
BHC INDICATOR 0.028*** 0.001*** -4.013 0.026*** 0.001*** -3.097 
 (6.395) (2.758) (-1.459) (5.639) (3.003) (-1.132) 
MERGERS 0.009 -0.001 5.312 0.008 -0.001 5.564 
 (1.594) (-1.428) (1.546) (1.446) (-1.533) (1.600) 
WRITEOFF_INDICATOR -0.034 -0.001** -10.497*** -0.034 -0.001** -10.515*** 
 (-1.448) (-2.222) (-4.959) (-1.456) (-2.198) (-4.948) 
MBS/GTA 0.100*** 0.002*** 4.943 0.097*** 0.002*** 6.062 
 (3.791) (3.063) (0.791) (3.735) (3.084) (0.971) 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS 0.050*** 0.000 -28.212*** 0.051*** 0.000 -28.518*** 
 (3.177) (0.182) (-4.147) (3.176) (0.179) (-4.188) 
CASH_HOLDINGS 0.109** -0.000 -13.978 0.109** -0.000 -13.018 
 (2.450) (-0.226) (-1.298) (2.428) (-0.207) (-1.203) 
HHI DEPOSITS -0.009 0.001 28.813*** -0.005 0.001 27.761*** 
 (-0.448) (1.142) (3.751) (-0.257) (0.866) (3.588) 
INST OWNERSHIP       0.013 0.001*** 6.328** 
    (1.269) (3.656) (2.170) 
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LONG-TERM INST OWNERSHIP    -0.047*** -0.002*** 15.773** 
    (-2.829) (-3.202) (2.230) 
NUMBER BLOCKHOLDERS    0.003 -0.000*** -1.422*** 
    (1.413) (-3.536) (-3.224) 
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS    -0.003*** 0.000 0.678*** 
    (-2.799) (0.777) (5.105) 
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS_NOT_IN_IBIS    -0.004** 0.000 2.460*** 
    (-2.037) (1.042) (2.966) 
Previous Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,128 22,584 22,514 22,094 22,549 22,479 
R-squared  0.878 0.608 0.473 0.879 0.609 0.474 
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Table B.2: Shareholder Activism during Normal Times and Financial Crises (including LexisNexis News) 
 
 
This table reports the regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and financial performance (TOBIN’s Q), 
operating returns (ROA), and risk taking (Z-SCORE) during normal times and during crises versus normal times. We define the main activism measure (ACTIVISM) 
as a dummy, which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. The bank-level Z-SCORE is a measure of financial risk and it 
is determined as A (ROA) + A(EQ/TA) / Std_ROA; a larger value indicates lower overall bank risk.  ROA is operating net income over GTA. We use an OLS 
model with time and bank FE. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. FINANCIAL_CRISES variable construction follows Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
FINANCIAL_CRISES 123 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for a crisis period and it includes both market (those originated in the capital markets) and 
banking crises (those originated in the banking sector). Panel A reports effects of activism during financial crises. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 
2010. Please see Appendix A for details on the definitions and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Main Effects (including LexisNexis News) 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM 0.004** -0.000 -3.571*** 
  (2.521) (-1.349) (-2.700) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,832 23,976 23,812 
R-squared 0.875 0.604 0.472 
 
  
                                                 
123 Banking crisis is the recent subprime lending crisis and market crises are the Russian debt crisis plus LTCM bailout in 1998, and the bursting of the dot.com 
bubble plus September 11. Normal times is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for all time periods that are not financial crises. 
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Panel B: Effects during Financial Crises (including LexisNexis News) 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ACTIVISM 0.001 -0.000 -8.385*** 
  (0.358) (-1.347) (-5.252) 
ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES 0.008** 0.000 10.542*** 
  (2.449) (0.443) (4.505) 
(ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES) 0.009*** 0.000 2.157 
t-stat (ACTIVISM + ACTIVISM * FINANCIAL_CRISES = 0) 3.292 0.566 1.118 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,821 23,965 23,801 
R-squared 0.875 0.604 0.472 
 
Panel C: Effects by Filing Type 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
LexisNexis News -0.022*** -0.001* 8.133 
  (-2.996) (-1.931) (1.577) 
DFAN14A 0.005 0.000 -14.962*** 
  (0.987) (0.625) (-4.157) 
13D 0.008*** -0.000 -4.798*** 
  (4.928) (-0.494) (-3.883) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,821 23,965 23,801 
R-squared 0.875 0.604 0.472 
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t-test  for equality of coefficients 
0.574 0.748 2.793*** 
DFAN14A = 13D 
t-test  for equality of coefficients 
3.017*** 1.895* 3.670*** 
LexisNexis News = DFAN14A 
t-test  for equality of coefficients 
3.999*** 1.772* 2.443*** 
LexisNexis News = 13D 
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Table B.3: Channels of Action for Activists (Based on Demands) 
 
 
This table reports the OLS regression estimates of the relation between the shareholder activism of US Commercial banks and their financial performance, operating 
returns, and risk. ACTIVISM is a dummy which takes a value of 1 in all quarters in which the bank had material activist events. We show models in which we broke 
down ACTIVISM into its seven activist demands to understand the channels through which activists work: ENGAGE MANAGEMENT, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, 
INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ASSE SALE (STRATEGIC), LITIGATION/BANKRUPTCY, PROXY FIGHT, and STRATEGIC CHANGES. We consider 
the categories to be exclusive, by keeping the most important reason of the filing and ignoring the secondary reasons. We use an OLS model with time and bank 
fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged 4 quarters. The sample period runs from t = 1994 to t = 2010. Please see Appendix A, for details on the definitions 
and determination of all variables utilized in the regressions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  TOBIN'S Q ROA Z-SCORE 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
ENGAGE MANAGEMENT 0.003 0.000 -1.925 
  (1.066) (0.622) (-0.861) 
STRATEGIC CHANGES 0.031*** -0.000 2.269 
  (4.491) (-1.219) (0.876) 
INTERNAL GOVERNANCE 0.019*** 0.000 -4.676* 
  (4.520) (0.627) (-1.904) 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 0.012** 0.000 -9.942** 
  (2.444) (0.448) (-2.375) 
PROXY  FIGHT 0.014*** -0.001** -33.054*** 
  (2.748) (-2.566) (-4.904) 
ASSET SALE (STRATEGIC) 0.006 0.000 -15.808*** 
  (1.070) (0.618) (-4.300) 
LITIGATION/BANKRUPTCY 0.000 -0.000 -5.553*** 
  (0.024) (-0.693) (-2.742) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,819 23,963 23,799 
R-squared (or Pseudo) 0.875 0.604 0.473 
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APPENDIX C FOR CHAPTER 3 
MODEL DETAILS 
We assess the impact of internationalization on risk, that is, the effect of the foreign 
assets ratio, w, on the Z-score, that is: 
/ =  
 +  ⁄    . (C.1) 
Given that the expected return of the portfolio is:  =  + 1 −  , (C.2) 
and the standard deviation of the portfolio  is: 
 =  + 1 −  + 21 −  , (C.3) 
the impact of the foreign assets ratio () on the Z of the international bank is: 
∂Z/ ∂w =  X
 + 1 −  +  ⁄  + 1 −  + 21 − Y  . (C.4) 
Equation (C.4) is equivalent to: 
/ =  X
 + 1 −  + 21 − Y
+  X
1 −  + 1 −  + 21 − Y
+    X
 ⁄  + 1 −  + 21 − Y  . 
(C.5) 
After taking the derivatives, we obtain:
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/ =  !1 −  + "! + 1 −  + 21 − "#$ 
−  ! + 1 − "! + 1 −  + 21 − "#$ 
−  ! − 1 −  + 1 − 2"! + 1 −  + 21 − "#$ / , 
(C.6) 
which is the same as equation (3.7) in Section 3.2.  
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APPENDIX D FOR CHAPTER 4 
LERNER INDEX CALCULATION 
We proxy market power by the Lerner Index for GTA, and calculate it as observed price-
cost margin divided by price (e.g., Lerner,1933; Brucker, 1970, 1972; Benston, 1972; 
Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos, and Perez, 2005; Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina, 2010). The Lerner GTA is calculated as  
(D.1)it it
it
it
Price MC
Lerner GTA
Price
−
=   
A firm in perfect competition has an index value of 0 and thus no market power (as Price 
= MC), while a firm with market power has a positive index.  
We consider Priceit as the price of GTA proxied by the ratio of total revenues 
(interest and non-interest income) to GTA for a bank i at a time t and MCit represents 
marginal cost of total assets for a bank i at time t. In order to get MCit for each bank for 
each point in time, we take the derivative from the following estimated translog cost 
function: 
3 3
22
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1 1
3 3
, , 3
1 1
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ln ln
it it it k k it k it k it
k k
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= =
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∑ ∑
∑∑
 
where i represents banks and t represents time in quarters, Costit is total operating plus 
financial costs, Wk,it represents input prices: W1,it is the ratio of personnel expenses to GTA
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(proxy for input price of labor), W2,it  is the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and 
money market funding (proxy for input price of all funds) and W3,it is the ratio of other 
operating and administrative expenses to GTA (proxy for input price of fixed capital), and 
Timet is a vector of time fixed effects. The Wk,it are average prices in the market because 
we want to allow individual banks to have different prices to reflect their individual market 
power. To construct the input prices Wk,it, we calculate the weighted average of the input 
prices for all local markets in which the bank operates, where the weights are the ratios of 
the deposits of bank i in the local markets over the bank total deposits.1 Marginal cost for 
GTA is finally determined as: 
3
1 2 ,
1
ˆ ˆ ˆln ln (D.3)itit it k k it
kit
Cost
MC GTA W
GTA
θ θ φ
=
 
= + + 
 
∑  
where the  ^’s  indicate estimated coefficients. 
                                                 
1 As an alternative method in unreported results, we construct the weighted average of the input prices using 
as weights the proportions of branches that banks have in the local markets in which they operate. Results 
are robust to this alternative method. 
 
 
267 
 
APPENDIX E FOR CHAPTER 4 
OTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
E.1 Effects by Size Classes 
As discussed above, size may be a source of economic strength for a bank and could offer 
a better competitive position on the market, and thus effects of TARP may differ by bank 
size. We split the banks according to their size in GTA into three different classes: small 
banks (GTA ≤ $1 billion), medium banks ($1 billion ≤ GTA < $3 billion) and large banks 
(GTA > $3 billion) and create the following three size dummies: SMALL, MEDIUM, and 
LARGE. We interact these size dummies with the TARP Recipient dummy and obtain the 
following interaction terms: SMALL*TARP Recipient, MEDIUM*TARP Recipient, 
LARGE*TARP Recipient. We then create interaction terms between the previously 
obtained variables and our Post TARP dummy: SMALL * TARP Recipient * Post TARP, 
MEDIUM * TARP Recipient * Post TARP, LARGE * TARP Recipient * Post TARP. We 
similarly create variables for the two types of TARP banks.  
We rerun our regressions using these new variables to understand the impact of 
various class sizes on our results. Table E.1 Panel A, columns (1)-(2) present the results 
for the market share regressions and Table E.1 Panel A, columns (3)-(4) show the results 
for market power. Table E.1 Panel B reports results from a test for the equality of 
coefficients for the two types of TARP recipients. The regressions show that the greater
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the bank size, the higher the competitive advantage the TARP banks can obtain in terms of 
both market share and market power. When splitting between TARP banks that repaid and 
those that did not, we find that for those banks that did not repay, again the greater the bank 
size the higher the competitive advantage of TARP banks. For banks that repaid, the results 
are again stronger for the large banks than for the small banks, but the results for the 
medium banks are mixed. 
E.2 Excluding Involuntary Participants 
Most of the banks voluntarily participated in the TARP program, however there are a few 
that were involuntary – they were required to participate in the program at its inception. 
We classify the following eight banks as involuntary participants: Citigroup, JP Morgan, 
Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Bank of New York, Bank of America, and 
State Street Bank.1 Since we would like to ensure that our results are not driven by the 
involuntary participants, we rerun our analysis using a sample that excludes them in Table 
E.2 Panel A, columns (1) - (4), and report the tests of equality between the two types of 
TARP groups in Panel E. The results are qualitatively similar to our main findings. 
E.3 Excluding Banks Subject to Stress Tests (SCAP and CCAR) 
The US Banks 2009 Stress Tests aka Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) 
was a mandatory program applied to 19 banking organizations with assets exceeding $100 
billion that cover about 2/3 of U.S banking assets and about half of loans.2 It was conducted 
                                                 
1 We exclude Merrill Lynch from the original 9 involuntary recipients because it is not a bank. 
 
2 These were 19 banks, including Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan 
Stanley, Wells Fargo, Bank of NY Mellon, BB&T, Fifth Third Bancorp, Keycorp, PNC Financial, Regions 
Financial, SunTrust Banks, US Bancorp, Ally Financial, American Express Company, Capital One Financial, 
Metlife, and State Street. 
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by Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies (FED, FDIC, OCC) from February 25, 2009 to late 
April 2009 and it was designed to ensure that large banking organizations had enough 
capital to withstand the recession and a more adverse scenario that might occur over the 
rest of 2009 and 2010. These organizations had to have or raise enough capital to meet 
capital requirements under a more adverse scenario, or else the Treasury would provide the 
capital. A possible consequence of the SCAP program was to essentially publicize that the 
19 biggest banking organizations were too-big-to-fail (TBTF) to assure the public of the 
safety of the financial system. Given this special treatment of banks under SCAP, we worry 
that our competitive advantage for TARP banks might be driven by this subsample of 
banks. These same banking organizations were also subject to the Comprehensive Capital 
Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress tests in 2011 and 2012, which may also impact their 
competitive advantages. Therefore, we reestimate our regressions by using a sample which 
excludes banks that were subject to the SCAP and CCAR stress tests. Table E.2 Panel B, 
columns (1) - (4) report the estimation results and Panel E reports the tests of equality 
between the two types of TARP groups. We find that our main results continue to hold. 
E.4 Capitalization Ratio 
The level of capital a bank has prior to infusion can impact the competitive advantage that 
the TARP recipients can get. Banks with a higher level of capital prior to infusion may 
have a better ability to use the extra capital to expand and acquire less well capitalized 
peers (e.g., Berger and Bouwman (2013)). We group banks according to whether they had 
low equity to assets ratio (EQCAP_08Q3 ≤ 7%) or high capital (EQCAP_08Q3 > 7%) 
before the TARP program started (2008:Q3) and regression estimates are shown in Table 
E.2 Panel C, columns (1)-(8) and Panel E reports the tests of equality between the two 
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types of TARP groups. Looking at the regression results, we find that only banks with a 
higher capitalization ratio gained competitive advantages in terms of market share and 
market power as indicated by the positive coefficients for the DID terms. 
E.5 HHI 
We also group banks according to their local market concentration. This is proxied by HHI 
Deposits for the local markets in which the bank is present. We consider three groups for 
the bank concentration: unconcentrated (HHI ≤ 1,000), moderately concentrated (1000 < 
HHI ≤ 1,800), and highly concentrated (HHI >1,800). 
Our results for the three subsamples are reported in Table E.2 Panel D, columns 
(1)-(12) and Panel E reports the tests of equality between the two types of TARP groups. 
Results suggest that the most competitive advantages given by TARP were gained by the 
banks in the highly concentrated category, followed by the moderately concentrated 
category. Therefore, the more concentrated the local banking market, the higher increase 
in competitive advantage a bank gets. 
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Table E.1: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition by Size Class 
 
 
This table shows tests for the impact of TARP on competition by bank size classes. We report difference-
indifference (DID) regression estimates for banks with interactions of the key terms with different bank sizes: 
small (GTA ≤ 1 Billion), medium (1 Billion < GTA ≤ 3 Billion) and large (GTA > 3 Billion). The measures 
of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power 
(proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP 
capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after TARP program initiation. 
TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not 
Repaid, which is a dummy equal to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed 
effects. Panel C reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP on two types of TARP banks: TARP 
banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. All variables 
are defined in Table 1. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Panel A: Regression parameters 
Dependent Variable: Market Share  Market Power 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SMALL x TARP Recipient -0.013***  -0.025***  
 (-13.318)  (-6.497)  
MEDIUM x TARP Recipient -0.012***  0.001  
 (-10.216)  (0.133)  
LARGE  x TARP Recipient -0.005*  0.010  
 (-1.821)  (1.205)  
SMALL x Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.001   0.022***   
  (0.563)   (4.264)   
MEDIUM x Post TARP x TARP Recipient 0.007***   0.031***   
  (5.388)   (3.450)   
LARGE x Post TARP x TARP Recipient 0.017***   0.111***   
  (4.671)   (11.467)   
SMALL x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.013***  -0.025*** 
  (-13.120)  (-5.808) 
MEDIUM x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.011***  0.001 
  (-8.601)  (0.192) 
LARGE x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.017***  -0.003 
  (-11.323)  (-0.283) 
SMALL x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   -0.000   0.016*** 
    (-0.096)   (2.837) 
MEDIUM x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   0.008***   0.026** 
    (5.344)   (2.568) 
LARGE x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   0.020***   0.130*** 
    (9.026)   (8.944) 
SMALL x TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.013***  -0.029*** 
  (-4.182)  (-3.745) 
MEDIUM x TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.015***  -0.000 
  (-8.624)  (-0.033) 
LARGE x TARP Recipient_Repaid  0.007  0.022** 
  (1.609)  (2.100) 
SMALL x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   0.009*   0.075*** 
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    (1.705)   (6.449) 
MEDIUM x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   0.003   0.056*** 
    (1.303)   (3.103) 
LARGE x Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   0.013**   0.093*** 
    (2.081)   (7.361) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,604 178,604 178,604 178,604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.219 0.220 0.453 0.453 
 
Panel B: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for the Two Types of TARP Banks 
  Market Share Market Power 
t-stat:   
Effect for Small TARP Banks (GTA ≤ 1 Billion) that Repaid Early =  
Effect for Small TARP Banks (GTA ≤ 1 Billion) that Did Not Repay 
Early 
1.685* 4.657*** 
t-stat:   
Effect for Medium TARP Banks (1 Billion < GTA  ≤ 3 Billion) that 
Repaid Early = Effect for Medium TARP Banks (1 Billion < GTA  ≤ 
3 Billion) that Did Not Repay Early 
1.828* 1.435 
t-stat:  
Effect for Large TARP Banks (GTA > 3 Billion) that Repaid Early =  
Effect for Large TARP Banks (GTA > 3 Billion) that Did Not Repay 
Early 
0.959 1.936* 
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Table E.2: Effects of TARP on Bank Competition: Subsamples Analysis 
 
 
This table shows additional subsample tests for analyzing the impact of TARP on competition. Panel A columns (1)-(4) report difference-in-difference (DID) 
regression estimates from a sample that excludes involuntary participants. Panel B columns (1)-(4) report difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates from 
a sample that excludes banks subject to stress-tests (SCAP and CCAR).Panel C columns (1)-(8) report difference-in-difference (DID) regression estimates for 
banks with low capitalization (EQCAP_08Q3 ≤ 7%) and high capitalization (EQCAP_08Q3 > 7%). Panel D columns (1)-(12) report difference-in-difference (DID) 
regression estimates for banks with different local concentration: Unconcentrated, which represents banks for which HHI is below 1,000 points, Moderately 
Concentrated, which covers banks for which HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800 points, and Highly Concentrated, those for which the HHI is in excess of 1,800 
points. The measures of competitive advantage are Market Share (proxied by Local Market Share Assets) and Market Power (proxied by Lerner GTA). TARP 
Recipient is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP capital support, Post TARP is a dummy equal to one in 2009-2012, the period after 
TARP program initiation. TARP Recipient_Repaid is a dummy equal to one if the bank repaid in 2009-2010. TARP Recipient_Not Repaid, which is a dummy equal 
to one if the bank did not repay in 2009-2010. All models include time fixed effects. Panel E reports the tests of equality for the effects of TARP on two types of 
TARP banks: TARP banks that repaid early and TARP banks that did not. The estimation results are for 2005-2012. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
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Panel A: Excluding TARP Involuntary Participants 
Dependent Variable: Market Share  Market Power 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TARP Recipient -0.013***  -0.022***  
 (-16.679)  (-6.518)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.004***   0.037***   
  (4.324)   (8.801)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.013***  -0.023*** 
  (-16.035)  (-6.195) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.013***  -0.012** 
  (-7.299)  (-1.997) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   0.003***   0.029*** 
    (3.023)   (6.006) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   0.010***   0.080*** 
    (4.160)   (10.051) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,408 178,408 178,408 178,408 
Adjusted R-squared 0.223 0.223 0.452 0.452 
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Panel B: Excluding Banks Subject to the Stress Tests (SCAP and CCAR) 
Dependent Variable: Market Share  Market Power 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TARP Recipient -0.013***  -0.022***  
 (-16.529)  (-6.463)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.004***  0.036***  
  (4.075)   (8.410)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.013***  -0.023*** 
  (-15.921)  (-6.138) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  -0.013***  -0.012** 
  (-7.107)  (-2.099) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  0.003***  0.028*** 
  (2.920)  (5.768) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid  0.009***  0.079*** 
   (3.774)  (9.753) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 178,101 178,101 178,101 178,101 
Adjusted R-squared 0.223 0.223 0.452 0.452 
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Panel C: Subsamples by Capitalization Level (EQCAP_08Q3) 
Dependent Variable: Market Share Market Power 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Poorly Capitalized Highly Capitalized Poorly Capitalized Highly Capitalized 
Independent Variables: EQCAP _08Q3 ≤  7% EQCAP _08Q3 > 7% EQCAP _08Q3 ≤  7% EQCAP _08Q3 > 7% 
TARP Recipient 0.029***  -0.016***  0.040***  -0.026***  
 (4.483)  (-20.133)  (3.476)  (-7.599)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.009  0.005***  -0.019  0.040***  
  (0.832)   (5.068)   (-1.206)   (9.285)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  -0.005  -0.015***  0.043***  -0.027*** 
  (-1.383)  (-16.907)  (3.278)  (-7.223) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid  0.122***  -0.021***  0.031  -0.013** 
  (6.133)  (-18.753)  (1.615)  (-2.131) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not Repaid  0.003  0.003***  -0.014  0.030*** 
  (0.679)  (3.112)  (-0.794)  (6.212) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid  0.039  0.012***  -0.034  0.087*** 
   (1.159)   (7.723)   (-1.166)   (10.829) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,176 7,176 171,428 171,428 7,176 7,176 171,428 171,428 
Adjusted R-squared 0.144 0.187 0.225 0.225 0.575 0.575 0.447 0.447 
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Panel D: Subsamples by Local Concentration (HHI) 
Dependent Variable: Market Share Market Power 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Unconcentrated 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
Highly  
Concentrated Unconcentrated 
Moderately 
Concentrated 
Highly  
Concentrated 
Independent Variables: HHI ≤ 1000 1000 < HHI ≤ 1,800 HHI  > 1800 HHI ≤ 1000 1000 < HHI ≤ 1,800 HHI  > 1800 
TARP Recipient 
-
0.007***  -0.016***  
-
0.033***  
-
0.021***  -0.024***  
-
0.056***  
 (-7.489)  (-15.421)  (-8.646)  (-3.717)  (-5.074)  (-5.915)  
Post TARP x TARP Recipient  0.001   0.006***   0.027***   0.022***   0.049***   0.075***   
  (0.847)   (4.279)   (5.870)   (3.097)   (8.324)   (6.310)   
TARP Recipient_Not Repaid   
-
0.008***   -0.015***   
-
0.040***   
-
0.023***   -0.027***   
-
0.033*** 
   (-10.668)   (-13.752)   (-10.455)   (-3.682)   (-5.350)   (-2.949) 
TARP Recipient_Repaid   0.002   -0.017***   -0.005   -0.009   0.001   
-
0.125*** 
   (0.386)   (-7.739)   (-0.595)   (-0.869)   (0.143)   (-9.626) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Not 
Repaid   0.004***   0.003*   0.024***   0.018**   0.042***   0.039*** 
    (3.642)   (1.929)   (4.936)   (2.281)   (6.278)   (2.704) 
Post TARP x TARP Recipient_Repaid   
-
0.015***   0.020***   0.046***   0.049***   0.082***   0.196*** 
    (-2.834)   (4.951)   (4.485)   (3.524)   (7.519)   (12.085) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 84,627 84,627 68,181 68,181 25,796 25,796 84,627 84,627 68,181 68,181 25,796 25,796 
Adjusted R-squared 0.095 0.096 0.073 0.074 0.252 0.253 0.526 0.527 0.398 0.398 0.436 0.436 
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Panel E: Tests of the Equality of the Effects of TARP for Different Types of TARP Recipients 
    Market Share Market Power 
Excluding Involuntary Participants 
t-stat: 
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay 
Early 
2.604*** 5.673*** 
Excluding Banks Subject to the Stress Tests 
t-stat: 
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay 
Early 
2.328** 5.559*** 
Poorly Capitalized 
EQCAP _08Q3 ≤  7% 
t-stat: 
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay 
Early 
1.068 0.600 
Highly Capitalized 
EQCAP _08Q3 > 7% 
t-stat: 
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay 
Early 
4.691*** 6.133*** 
Unconcentrated 
HHI ≤ 1000 
t-stat: 
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay 
Early 
3.393*** 2.007** 
Moderately Concentrated 
1000 < HHI ≤ 1,800 
t-stat: 
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay 
Early 
4.140*** 3.162*** 
Highly Concentrated 
HHI  > 1800 
t-stat: 
Effect for TARP Banks that Repaid Early = Effect for TARP Banks that Did Not Repay 
Early 
2.019** 7.288*** 
 
